PATTERNS OF POWER

## French Guinea

# Held by Force, Believed by None

*A study of the cheapest colonial hold and the cleanest break — the conquest and extractive administration of French Guinea in French West Africa, 1880s–1958, and the referendum that ended it, read against the Patterns of Power framework*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series

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*held as tested, not revealed*

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FRONT MATTER

# PREFACE AND OUTLINE

*Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts*

## The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to French Guinea — from the coastal treaties and the conquest of the interior in the last decades of the nineteenth century, through sixty years of extractive administration in French West Africa, to the referendum of 28 September 1958 in which Guinea alone said NON, took its independence, and was punished for it. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the formation that installs belief in the next generation, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the extraction that draws off the surplus, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, the three monopolies whose separation or fusion decides whether liberty is present at all, and — running through all of it — position-logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Guinea was chosen because it is the collection's great divergence case. Every other colony in the corpus is an order that held — that ran cheaply, was inherited smoothly, and passed into independence with its structures substantially intact. Guinea is the one whose order did not hold: the single French African territory to reject the Community in 1958, the cleanest rupture in the collection, and therefore

the control-case at the opposite pole from Morocco's smooth continuity. Run the two together and one variable is isolated — whether the metropole and the local elite both wish the arrangement to continue — and Guinea is the case where both, at the same moment, wished it to end. It is also the collection's purest instance of a single structural fact: an order held by force and by no belief at all among the ruled, which is why its every dimension, traced module by module, runs to an extreme, and why its collapse, when the metropole's will emptied, was total.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction, and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure by web search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Guinea application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

## The method of information asymmetry

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground — the civilising doctrine published in Paris beside the head tax levied in a currency the taxed did not hold; the Republic's proclamation that all men are born free and equal beside the indigénat that punished a subject without trial; the promise of citizenship in the loi Lamine Guèye beside the double college that weighted the citizen's vote into a thinner urn. The study lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not argue a verdict, because the verdict on a colonial order is a moral question the reader must answer; what it refuses is a false sum in either direction — the apologist's, that the ruin which followed independence proves the colony should have been kept, and the sentimental mirror's, that the achievement of the leaving cancels its cost.

## The disciplines

Three disciplines govern every page. The first is quotation: public-domain primary sources — laws, decrees, speeches, the words of the record — are quoted exactly, in the original language with a translation, at the length the argument needs; modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited; and no quotation, date, or figure is ever fabricated or reconstructed from memory, a doubtful line being dropped rather than guessed, and a contested figure given as a range. The second is that legibility is not pardon: to explain the logic of an order, and to credit its real achievements at full weight, is never to absolve it, and the study names the legal fiction as fiction while granting the road, the peace, and the rising population their due. The third is that suffering is held with gravity and both flattery and demonisation refused — of the conqueror, and equally of the conquered order that was itself a former conquest, and of the counter-elite whose dignity in 1958 and whose tyranny afterward are both set down without letting either erase the other.

## The colonial bend

The series predicts that its general pattern bends in a colony, and Guinea confirms the bend in its own direction, more sharply than any case yet. The robe is reversed — cut for the metropole whose belief funds the conquest, not for the conquered whose belief the floor does not need — and in Guinea it was reversed by a single clause, the assertion of a racial hierarchy that licensed the empire to Paris and, in the same breath, forbade ever admitting the people it ruled. Formation was withheld from the mass and capped for a thin elite, so that the field was left to the old order's own Quranic schools while a handful were formed just enough to become the counter-elite. The seam between the story and the cost was held not by censorship but by indifference, and broke not when a fact leaked but when the colonised gained a voice inside the metropole's own institutions. Extraction ran through office and the franc tax rather than through seized land, because France wanted the flow and not the ground — which is also why the metabolic note of mass famine was largely never called, and the accounting fell instead on the sword. And the collapse was driven by the metropole's will emptying, not by the ruled beating the floor; but because the order had given the ruled nothing to defend, the emptying brought the whole of it down at once.

## A map of the fourteen parts

**Landscape · Born Free, Born Faithful.** The three formed worlds on the eve — a Republic that held itself the heir of 1789 and 1848, an Islamic highland that had become the furniture of reality, and a savannah empire still being built at gunpoint — none of them the ground from which the others could be judged.

**Module 1 · The Word for It Was Pacification.** The floor of force, and the finding that founding violence tracks how much of the conquered order could be reused: the coast taken by treaty, Fuuta Jalon by manipulating its own factions, Wassoulou destroyed in sixteen years of war — the conquest carried, as ever, by the conquered.

**Module 2 · Vacant and Without a Master.** The settlement, and a fourth configuration of the land-fiction: France wrote the vacancy fiction and largely left it unspent, because it wanted the flow and not the ground, so the real division ran through office and trade rather than through title.

**Module 3 · The Conscience of Democracies.** The reversed robe, and the finding that it is one clause and not two choices — the superiority that reconciled the democracy to its empire is the same superiority that forbade admitting the conquered, making the colony cheap to hold at home and dear to hold forever in Guinea.

**Module 4 · The Stocks Will Never Mix.** Formation at three settings — full for the metropole, none for the mass, capped for a thin elite — and the finding that the capped elite-formation is the dangerous one, building, with the withheld mass-formation, the two halves of the rupture.

**Module 5 · The Door That Was Not Shut.** The cost column held by force because no belief made it cheap, beside an exit dial left open to Sierra Leone and Liberia — and the finding that an open exit converts the form of resistance from revolt into flight, buying quiet by leakage rather than consent.

**Module 6 · No Knowledge of Money.** Extraction by a head tax payable only in francs, which on a subsistence people is a labour draft — and the finding that in an open-exit flow colony the tax-as-labour-draft and the exit valve are one system, manufacturing the mobile wage-earning workforce that would fill the union hall.

**Module 7 · You Are Going There to Suppress the RDA.** The seam held by indifference and not concealment, proven by the scandals that broke elsewhere — and the finding that a colonial seam breaks not by information but by

enfranchisement, when the excluded gain a voice inside the metropole's own institutions.

**Module 8 · No Position to Defend.** The default broken at both tiers that matter — the évolués foreclosed by the robe and so made the counter-elite, the chiefs co-opted onto positions so artificial that defending them was a liability — so that the machine did not run itself but had to be held by force.

**Module 9 · The Double College.** Liberty as the residue of contestability — foreclosure under colonial rule, then a leashed plurality forced from below — and the finding that colonial contestability resolves into exit rather than participation, its liberty a property of the struggle that died with the struggle's victory.

**Module 10 · No Obstacle.** The rupture, driven by the metropole's exhausted repricing — and the finding that a mass mobilisation, real and popular, works upon the change through the elite ledgers rather than around them, both ledgers repricing to leave at once so the order fell by a vote rather than a war.

**Module 11 · The Debt Not Called.** The grim accounting, in which the metabolic note was largely never called because France preserved the order it milked — the sword and the chronic exaction carrying the weight, the population rising, and the credit granted at full weight without pardon: a colony that killed relatively few and wronged very nearly everyone.

**Module 12 · An Example to the Others.** The study read against the corpus and closed on the counter-position — the metropole's punishment of the breakaway as position-logic across Haiti and Guinea, and the case that the NON was a catastrophe stated in full and answered without flinching, holding the dignity of the choice and the tyranny that followed without letting either cancel the other.

LANDSCAPE

# BORN FREE, BORN FAITHFUL

*Landscape · the formed worlds on the eve of conquest — a Republic that held itself the heir of 1789 and 1848, an Islamic highland that had become the furniture of reality, and a savannah empire still being built at gunpoint; three peoples each certain its own order was simply the shape of the world, and none of them the ground from which the others could be judged*

## Three shores, and none of them the true one

A LANDSCAPE MODULE IN THIS COLLECTION IS USUALLY BUILT FROM two shores — the conquering society on one side of the water, the conquered on the other, each drawn as it stood on the eve. Guinea needs three, and it needs a discipline held from the first sentence that the others can take more loosely: that not one of the three shores is the true ground from which the rest are to be judged. Each is a *formed* world. Each is a set of convictions installed so early and held so deep that the people inside it do not experience their convictions as convictions at all, but as the plain shape of things — what the foundational statement of this collection calls the field of the visible, the horizon a person's position draws for him before he weighs a single cost or benefit, so that whoever governs what a man can see has governed his decision before he makes it. A man a mile inland holds no false belief about the tide; he simply has no thought about it, because nothing in his position ever put the tide in his view. The three peoples about to collide on the Rivières du Sud were each of them a mile inland from the others' tide.

This matters most, and is hardest to hold, for the shore we are most tempted to treat as neutral: metropolitan France. It is easy to write the French as the knowing

party, the ones who saw the machine clearly and dressed it for the others; and where an individual administrator is concerned that is sometimes true. But the French nation that funded the conquest and manned it was a formed population exactly as the Fulɓe peasant was a formed population, and its formation was the more effective for being liberal. The free Frenchman did not experience himself as an oppressor and the labourer of Lille did not experience himself as an underclass, because the story that made sense of French greatness had been installed in him from a schoolroom the Third Republic built expressly for the purpose, and inside that story the empire was not a contradiction of France's founding principles but their extension. Begin there, because the whole study turns on it: an order can be an expensive-pole conquest laid over a cheaper one and still be, at home, a genuinely believed civilisation. The reversed robe of the colonial cases — cut for the metropole whose belief funds the conquest rather than for the conquered whose belief the floor does not need — is not a cynic's costume thrown over a scheme. It is the metropole's own furniture of reality, and its power is precisely that the men wearing it cannot see it as a robe.

## The Republic of free and equal men

Consider what France had been taught to believe about itself, in its own founding words, because the words are exact and public and the contradiction they were about to run is not a modern imputation but one that France's own deputies spoke aloud in France's own chamber.

The first article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, voted on 26 August 1789, reads: «Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits» — men are born, and remain, free and equal in rights. It is among the most consequential sentences ever set down, and the men who set it down knew at once that it had a problem, because France in 1789 held hundreds of thousands of human beings as chattel in its Caribbean colonies. Mirabeau, of the Society of the Friends of the Blacks, noted the very month it passed that no deputy had dared propose the honest amendment — that only white men are born free, that Africans are born slaves — because to write the exception down would be to admit that the colour line destroyed the equality of rights the article proclaimed. The contradiction was there at the birth of the Republican formation, unspoken, load-bearing, and it took a revolution, a restoration of slavery under Napoleon, and

half a century more before France resolved it in the direction its own first article demanded. By the decree of 27 April 1848, drafted under Victor Schœlcher, the Second Republic abolished slavery in all French possessions, and Schœlcher gave the abolition its moral form in a sentence that a later France would need to have quoted back to it: it is impossible, he wrote, to introduce humanity into slavery — «il est impossible d'introduire l'humanité dans l'esclavage» — the only remedy for the incalculable evils of servitude being liberty itself.

So by the middle of the nineteenth century a French citizen carried two installed convictions of enormous force: that men are born free and equal, and that France, alone among the powers, had faced the evil of slavery squarely and ended it. These were not lies told to him by a knowing elite. They were, in the language of this collection's paper on founders and inheritors, things that had been built and had then become real — the more real for being, in their own terms, true. France did abolish slavery. The article does say what it says.

And it was onto exactly this formation, without any sense of contradiction, that the doctrine of conquest was laid. On 28 July 1885, before the Chamber of Deputies, Jules Ferry — the republican father of the free and secular school, the man who had done more than any other to install the first two convictions in French children — rose to defend colonial expansion and rested it openly on a third. Colonial policy, he said, could be attached to three orders of ideas: economic, civilisational, and political-patriotic. It was the second he stated most baldly. «Les races supérieures ont un droit vis-à-vis des races inférieures», he told the deputies; there is a right belonging to the superior races over the inferior, and it exists because there is a duty — «elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures», they have the duty to civilise the inferior races. He was careful, and this is the part the schoolroom would keep, to cast French conquest as the *opposite* of slavery: the Spanish who introduced bondage into the Americas, he said, had failed in their duty as men of a superior race, whereas the European nations of his own day discharged that superior duty of civilisation with breadth, with greatness, and with honesty.

The contradiction was named on the spot, in the room, by Frenchmen. As Ferry spoke, the deputy Joseph Fabre interrupted him: this doctrine, Fabre said, arrives at the abdication of the principles of 1789 and of 1848 — «vous aboutissez ainsi à l'abdication des principes de 1789 et de 1848» — the replacement of the law of justice by a law of grace. Two days later Georges Clemenceau answered Ferry at

length, and his answer is the sharpest refusal of the civilising robe spoken by any European of the period: superior races, inferior races — no, he said, there is no right of the so-called superior nations against the inferior; let us not dress violence in the hypocritical name of civilisation — «n'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation». This is worth holding for the whole of the study, because it forbids the easy reading. The seam at the metropole was not sealed. Some Frenchmen saw the machine and said so, in the plainest terms, in the national assembly. The formation was contested — which is what a formation looks like when it is a real belief in a free society and not a decree, and which makes it, in this collection's terms, a *crowded* rather than a wholly captured seam at home, even as the thing it was arguing about was neither crowded nor free at all.

But the vote went Ferry's way, the credits passed, and the mass of the French public was formed to the majority's conviction and not the dissenters'. And this is the exact mechanism the field of the visible describes, running at home rather than abroad: a France that had been taught it was the nation which ended slavery was, within a generation, to build in Guinea a régime of head taxes payable only in French coin, of the *indigénat*'s summary punishments, and of forced labour on roads and railways under conditions its own law would not have permitted for a European — a slavery by another name, laid by the nation of abolition — and the French public would neither know nor much wonder, not because it was lied to about the facts but because its formation had drawn the horizon so that the colony fell outside it, and the word *slavery* had been fixed to a thing France had ended and could not therefore be doing. The contradiction its own deputies had spoken aloud in 1885 dissolved back out of the national field of view, and stayed dissolved for seventy years.

## The highland that had become the world

Turn to the second shore, the interior highland of the Fuuta Jalon, and the recursion this collection insists on is not an abstraction but a dated event with named men. No ground France reached was ever virgin or aboriginal; every order it met was itself the residue of an earlier conquest, driven by formation across enough generations to have become, to the people living in it, simply the way the world is. The Fuuta Jalon is the clean case, and its architecture was genuinely sophisticated.

Around 1727, in a jihad launched by Fulɓe Muslim scholars and warriors against the animist Jallonke aristocracy who then held the plateau, a coalition of the faithful took the highlands after a decisive victory at Talansan and established the first of the great Fula theocratic states of West Africa. Its founder, the cleric Karamokho Alfa, was elected almami — from the Arabic *al-imam*, the leader — by a council of nine ulama each representing one of the plateau's provinces; the state seated its political capital at Timbo and its religious capital at Fugumba, governed under a strict reading of the sharia, kept its official records and its constitution in Arabic, and ran a dense network of Quranic schools through which the plateau's children were formed to the faith. When Karamokho Alfa's line and the line of his cousin and successor Ibrahim Sori fell into rivalry, the two factions — the clerical Alfaya and the more military Soriya — resolved it not by civil war to the finish but by an agreement to *alternate* the almamate between them, a rotation of the supreme office that held, remarkably, into the twentieth century. A written constitution, a council that could constrain and depose the ruler, an elective and rotating headship, an official language of record, a system of schools: this was a built order of real complexity, and by the time France arrived it had been running for the better part of a hundred and seventy years — long enough that no living highlander had known anything else, long enough that the almami's authority and the Friday obligation and the Qur'anic calendar were not a régime anyone remembered choosing but the furniture of the world.

This is the cheap pole of the collection's gradient at full function — an order held up not by a standing garrison but by the governed's own conviction, formed into them from childhood so that they policed it themselves for nothing. The ordinary Pullo of the Fuuta did not experience himself as a subject of anyone's power; he experienced himself as a believer discharging his obligations to God and to the rightful authority God's law had set over him, which is the same thing the collection's foundational statement describes when it speaks of a crowd raising stones against a violator under a law their own ancestors wrote — the few having spent nothing, the many enforcing the order with their own hands and their own sense of doing right.

And the honest ledger requires, at once and in the same breath, the thing that cheapness sat upon, because naming a built order's origin is not debunking it and refusing to name its costs is not honouring it. The Fuuta Jalon was a slave society. Its Muslim Fulɓe aristocracy and clerisy were sustained by a large servile

population settled in dependent villages, the *runde*, whose labour fed the plateau's cheapness at the top; the twin Fula states of the region drew directly on the Atlantic trade, supplying captives, cattle and grain to the French and Portuguese on the coast. The order that ran so cheaply on conviction ran that cheaply *because* a caste beneath it had been formed, over the same century and a half, to a subjection its own belief presented as the order of the world. That the belief was real does not make the subjection gentle; that the subjection was real does not make the belief a fraud. Both are true at once, and the study is worth nothing if it cannot hold them together — because the same doubleness will be demanded of it, on the other side of the ledger, when it comes to weigh what France did.

## The savannah still at the sword

The third shore is a different thing from the second, and the difference is the whole reason to draw it separately: Samory Touré's Wassoulou empire was a conquest caught in the act, at the *expensive* end of the same gradient the Fuuta had long since travelled to the cheap end.

Samory, born around 1830 into a Dyula trading family in the Malinké country of the upper Niger, built from the 1860s a state out of the shattered chiefdoms of the Milo valley, took the war-title *fama* in 1878, and adopted the almami's Islamic title in 1884, fusing a claim to religious authority onto a career of arms and giving a diverse, conquered population a single idiom of loyalty. At its height his empire ran across the upper Niger and its administration was real — provinces under appointed officials, a professional standing army of *sofa* infantry reckoned in the tens of thousands, and firearms he first bought from the coast and by the 1890s repaired and manufactured in workshops of his own, because he had understood, better than any neighbour, that courage was no reply to European artillery. But his Islam was in many districts an imposition of the last two decades rather than an inheritance of the last two centuries, resented where it was recent; his authority was newer than a single lifetime; and his war economy rested frankly on the capture and sale of slaves, the trade in captives being one of the sinews that paid for the horses and the guns. This is the expensive pole plainly: an order held up by visible force and a war chest because its belief had not yet had the generations it needs to take, a thing being built and not yet a thing that had become the world. The framework predicts, and the conquest module will test, that France's founding violence

tracked exactly this difference — that where it met an order already naturalised it would try to slip into the almami's chair, and where it met an order still held at the sword it would have to break the man holding it, at the maximum cost of the whole campaign.

One fact belongs here and must then be set down and left, because to spend it now would be to sentimentalise the study before it has earned anything. Samory was captured by the French captain Henri Gouraud at Guélémou on 29 September 1898, exiled to an island in Gabon, and died there of pneumonia on 2 June 1900; his tomb stands today in the garden of the Grand Mosque of Conakry. He is held, across the sources most commonly and probably though not beyond dispute, to have been the great-grandfather of Ahmed Sékou Touré — the man who, sixty years after Samory broke on France's guns, would break France's order from within with a single word. The recursion of this collection is rarely so nearly genealogical. It is noted, and not spent.

## The coast, and the machine that was coming

Between these interiors and the sea lay the coastal country the French called the Rivières du Sud — a belt of Susu, Baga, Nalu and other peoples, plural chieftaincies and trading polities with no single order over them, long entangled with European commerce. It was here, not in the highlands, that France first set its foot: a protectorate at Boké in 1849, consolidation of the coast through the treaty-making of Faidherbe's Senegal from the 1850s, a treaty with the almami of the Fuuta Jalon in 1881 that France chose to read as a protectorate, the detachment of the rivers as a separate colony around 1890, its christening as *Guinée française* with Conakry for a capital, and its incorporation in 1895 into the new federation of French West Africa. The order that was coming for all three interior worlds was not, in the end, a settler's hunger for their ground — Guinea would be no Algeria — but an extractive administration of the AOF type, which wanted the interior's labour and its produce and its taxes and needed, for that, only enough force to make its writ run and enough intermediaries to collect. It carried two currencies of legitimacy that never touched: toward home, the civilising duty Ferry had stated to the Chamber, published and believed in France; toward the conquered, no legitimating story worth the name at all — a tax, a chief, and the summary

penalties of the *indigénat*. The first was a robe; the second was a floor with nothing laid over it. Which of those a given population received depended on which side of the water it stood, and that division — a story told in Paris about a country Parisians would never see, and a cost paid in a country whose people were told no story at all — is the seam this study exists to trace.

## Reading the landscape against the framework

Two refinements this landscape offers the framework, both held at the modest weight a landscape can bear, to be tested and not yet banked.

The first is that the recursion has a *gradient inside it*. The collection's rule — that a conqueror never meets an aboriginal baseline, only an earlier conquest naturalised to the self-running pole — has been drawn, in the prior cases, against a single native order sitting at the cheap end. Guinea shows two native orders at once, at *opposite* ends of the same gradient: the Fuuta Jalon, a former conquest so fully naturalised across a hundred and seventy years that it had become the furniture of the highland world; and the Wassoulou, a conquest still in progress, held at the expensive pole by force and a war economy, its belief not yet taken. The recursion is therefore not a fact about "the native order" in the singular but a position on a scale, and the landscape's wager — which Module 1 will test directly — is that the conqueror's founding violence reads off that scale, cheap where the order was already naturalised and could be entered, dear where it was new and could only be broken.

The second is the one your framing of this landscape presses hardest, and it turns the reversed robe a half-turn further than the corpus has yet turned it. The framework already holds that the colonial robe is cut for the metropole, whose belief funds the conquest, rather than for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not need. Guinea adds that the metropole is itself a formed world, subject to the very field-of-the-visible mechanism the framework uses to explain the docility of the conquered — so that the robe is not merely *addressed to* the metropole but *woven from* the metropole's own furniture of reality, and its work is less to persuade the French public of a proposition than to keep the colony's true nature outside that public's horizon altogether. The evidence is that the contradiction did not need to be hidden to be unseen: France's own deputies named it aloud, in the

national chamber, in the exact terms of 1789 and 1848, and the naming changed nothing, because a population formed to believe itself the nation that had ended slavery could not see the forced-labour colony as slavery even with a colleague pointing at it across the aisle. The reversed robe, on this reading, is the metropole's formation turned to face outward — and a nation can run a slavery by another name with a mostly quiet conscience not because it has been deceived about the facts but because its own field of the visible has been drawn so that the facts do not register as the thing they are. That is the seam this study will follow from both ends, and the measure of France's order in Guinea will be, throughout, how much work it had to do to keep those two ends from meeting.

## A note on sources.

The exact primary quotations here are public-domain and verified against sources reproducing the texts. The first article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789 («Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits») is quoted from the official text held by the Conseil constitutionnel. The decree abolishing slavery in the French possessions is dated 27 April 1848 and associated with Victor Schœlcher; the Schœlcher sentence on the impossibility of introducing humanity into slavery is quoted as reproduced by the French Ministry of Culture's archival material and given in his words. Jules Ferry's speech of 28 July 1885 — the three orders of ideas, and «les races supérieures ont un droit vis-à-vis des races inférieures… elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures» — together with Joseph Fabre's interjection on the abdication of «les principes de 1789 et de 1848» and Georges Clemenceau's reply of 30 July 1885 («n'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation») are quoted from the record of the debates as reproduced by the Assemblée nationale and the standard collections of the colonial debate. The reconstruction of the Imamate of Fuuta Jalon — the jihad of the 1720s and the battle of Talansan, the founding under Karamokho Alfa with Timbo as political and Fugumba as religious capital, the council of nine, the almami title, the Alfaya/Soriya alternation persisting into the twentieth century, the Arabic constitution and Quranic-school network, and the servile *runde* foundation and the plateau's involvement in the coastal slave trade — follows the standard scholarship on the Fulɓe jihad-states (Barry; Klein; and the reference literature), with the Talansan date given as

approximately 1727 where sources vary between the mid-1720s and the early 1730s, and the traditional account of the battle's lopsided numbers treated as legend rather than figure. The account of Samory Touré and the Wassoulou empire — his birth around 1830, the *fama* title of 1878 and the almami title of 1884, the *sofa* army and its firearms, the slave-based war economy, the capture by Captain Henri Gouraud at Guélémou on 29 September 1898, exile to Ndjolé in Gabon, and death of pneumonia on 2 June 1900 — follows the standard biographical and encyclopaedic literature (Person's work on Samori above all), with army sizes given as reported ranges in the tens of thousands and to be tightened where the record allows. The descent of Ahmed Sékou Touré from Samory is carried across the sources most commonly as great-grandfather and occasionally as grandfather, and is given here as claimed-and-probable rather than established. The French coastal advance — the Boké protectorate of 1849, Faidherbe's Senegal treaty-making of the 1850s–1860s, the 1881 Fuuta Jalon treaty read by France as a protectorate, the detachment of the Rivières du Sud and its renaming as French Guinea around 1890, and incorporation into French West Africa in 1895 — follows the standard colonial-administrative accounts, with dates given as the record's approximate anchors where sources differ by a year or two. All framework language is developed across the collection (*The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Architect and the Inheritor*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 1 · THE FLOOR OF FORCE

# THE WORD FOR IT WAS PACIFICATION

*Module 1 · The Floor of Force — how a Republic with modern rifles laid a floor over three orders it met on the way in, taking the cheapest floor each one allowed: a treaty on the coast, a single afternoon's battle on a plateau whose chair it could enter, and sixteen years of war and a man-made famine in a savannah whose empire was welded to one man and held no seat a stranger could occupy; how the whole of it was carried by African soldiers, many of them former slaves and defeated enemies; and how its authors called it not conquest but pacification*

## Men with better rifles

Strip the word *pacification* off the thing and what arrived on the Rivières du Sud in the last third of the nineteenth century was warlordism with better guns. Columns of armed men came inland from the coast to lay a floor of organised violence over populations that had not asked for them and could not, once the floor was down, get out from under it — which is the founding act of every order in this collection, the sword set across a people before any story is laid over the sword to make it cheap. The floor is the first fact. The story comes after. This module is about the floor: who held the organised violence at the founding, by what acts it was established, against whom, and at what cost — and it reads that cost as the output of a calculation rather than a temperament, because the men laying the floor were not monsters indulging a taste for slaughter but administrators of a Republic solving a problem from a position, and the problem has a name that governs everything that follows.

The problem was to claim sovereignty over a large piece of West Africa *as cheaply as possible*. France in these decades was acquiring an empire it insisted must

pay for itself, against British and Portuguese rivals racing for the same coast, with a handful of Frenchmen and a thin budget to do it. So the men on the ground did what any coalition holding superior force does when it wants a territory and does not want to pay full price for it: they looked at what was already running on the ground and asked, in order of cheapness, whether they could use it. Could this order be co-opted — its rulers left in place and turned into instruments? Could France rule through it, slipping into a seat the order had already built? Could its factions be set against one another so that one side would open the door? Or was there nothing here to enter — no seat, no faction to turn, only a rival who had to be broken before anything could be built? These are the questions the framework's menu of solutions poses to every conqueror, and Guinea is unusually valuable to the framework because France asked them of *three different orders* within a single generation and got three different answers, so that the founding violence can be watched tracking the answer with almost diagrammatic precision. The finding this module builds toward, stated here so the reader can weigh the evidence against it, is that initial violence is a function of how much was already running that the conqueror could reuse: near-nothing where an order stood ready to be absorbed, a single afternoon where a naturalised order offered a seat and a quarrel, and sixteen years and a famine where an order was new, personal, welded to one hostile man, and offered nothing to sit in at all.

## The coast: a floor laid by treaty

Begin where France began, on the belt of coast and estuary it called the Rivières du Sud, because it is the cheapest case and it sets the baseline. Here France met no single order at all — a plural country of Susu, Baga, Nalu and other peoples, of chieftaincies and trading polities long entangled with European commerce and answerable to no common overlord. An order of that kind offers a conqueror the least resistance and the least to break, because there is no apex whose fall brings down a realm and no faith whose insult raises one; there are only many small authorities, each of which can be dealt with separately, bought, over-awed, or signed. So France laid its first floor here by the cheapest instrument there is, the treaty: a protectorate declared at Boké in 1849, the coast consolidated through the treaty-making of Faidherbe's Senegal across the 1850s and 1860s, the estuaries detached and reorganised as a colony toward 1890, and the whole christened

*Guinée française* with Conakry for its capital. The violence in this was real but low and dispersed — the punitive column against a chief who would not sign, the gunboat on a river — because there was no concentrated thing to fight. This is the floor at its cheapest: laid over a country with nothing large enough to require a war, by paper backed at the margins by force, and it is the baseline against which the two interior conquests must be measured, because both were dearer, and each was dearer in proportion to how much more there was inland that could not simply be signed.

## The plateau: a floor laid in a single afternoon

The highland imamate of the Fuuta Jalon was the opposite of the coast in the one respect that mattered to a conqueror counting costs: it was a single, centralised, thoroughly naturalised order with a genuine apex, and — this is the decisive fact — that apex was an *office*, the rotating almamate, and an office, unlike a bloodline or a prophet, is a seat a stranger can try to sit in. France read the plateau correctly and reached, first, not for the sword but for the chair.

From August 1889, in the scholarship's own description of it, France pursued in the Fuuta Jalon a deliberate policy of "peaceful expansion" — encircling the imamate by taking control of the territories that bordered it, and applying constant pressure meant to bring the almamis, by gradual stages, to submit to French authority without a war. It signed treaties with the almamis of the federation; it worked the order not from outside but along its own seams. And the seams were there to be worked, because the Fuuta Jalon was in the grip of exactly the internal fracture the framework teaches a conqueror to look for. The imamate's power-sharing constitution, which alternated the supreme office between the clerical Alfaya and the more military Soriya, had curdled by the 1890s into a chronic factional war; the last independent almami, Bokar Biro of the Soriya, had come to power over the body of his own brother and held it through a see-saw of coups and counter-coups; the great provincial chiefs of Labé and Timbi were manoeuvring for autonomy; and a pro-French candidate, Umaru Bademba, stood ready in the Alfaya wing to take the alternating throne. France did not manufacture any of this. It found the quarrel already burning and poured its weight onto one side of it — backing Bademba and the disgruntled chiefs against the sitting almami — so that

when the moment came, the column that entered the Fuuta Jalon marched as the ally of one Fula faction against another, and not as a foreign invader against a united people.

When diplomacy and faction-play could not bring Bokar Biro himself to terms, France switched to force in 1896, and the force it needed was astonishingly small, because most of the work had already been done by the order's own fracture. Citing Bokar Biro's breach of his constitutional term as the pretext, a French column marched into the capital, Timbo, without resistance on 3 November 1896. Ten days later, at Porédaka on 13 November, it met and destroyed the last army of the imamate. The engagement is worth stating in its exact proportions, because the proportions are the argument: on the French side some eighty tirailleurs with artillery and a body of Fula auxiliaries; on the other, seven or eight hundred of the almami's men; and at the end of it roughly a hundred and fifty of Bokar Biro's dead against three wounded on the French side. A hundred and seventy years of independent statehood ended in a single afternoon's slaughter by an artillery-backed column of fewer than a hundred rifles, because by the time the rifles were fired the order had already been hollowed from within, and there was almost nothing left to defend. Bokar Biro was hunted down and killed. And then France did the thing that reveals what it had wanted all along: it did not abolish the almamate but *kept* it, concluding a protectorate treaty at Timbo in 1897 that recognised the two ruling families as intermediaries and promised to respect the old constitution — and then, over the following years, quietly emptied the office of everything but its name, dividing the Fuuta Jalon into administrative cantons under chiefs who held their places at French pleasure. France had assumed the chair, sat down in it, and then sawed the legs off from underneath the man it had left sitting there. The plateau cost one afternoon of concentrated killing precisely because it had a seat to enter and a faction to turn, and both were on offer.

## The savannah: a floor that took sixteen years to lay

East and north, in the Malinké savannah of the upper Niger, France met the third order, and here every condition that had made the plateau cheap was reversed. Samory Touré's Wassoulou empire was not an ancient naturalised order with a rotating office; it was a conquest still in progress, a personal military state built

inside a single lifetime and welded to one extraordinary and wholly hostile man, held together not by a belief its subjects had inherited but by Samory's own force, his war economy, and his professional army. There was no seat in it a stranger could occupy, because the seat *was* Samory; there was no faction France could turn into a collaborating almami, because the empire's cohesion ran through his person and his sofas; and there was no chair to inherit, because the thing had not yet cooled into the kind of office a conqueror can slip into. An order of that shape offers a conqueror only one move, and it is the most expensive one on the menu: destroy the man, and with him the state, because nothing short of his removal ends it. So the savannah cost what the plateau did not — the better part of two decades and a famine.

The war ran, in its phases, from 1882, when the French commander Borgnis-Desbordes declared a market town under Samory's control to be under French protection and Samory took it back by force, through a decade of treaties made and broken, to Archinard's surprise march on Kankan in March 1891, launched in the expectation of a lightning campaign that would finish Samory in weeks. It did not finish him. Understanding better than any neighbour that courage was no answer to artillery and that his forts could not stand against French guns, Samory abandoned the war of position for a war of manoeuvre and scorched earth: at a council of his commanders at Frankonedou in May 1892 the empire resolved to burn and evacuate each district as it withdrew, denying the French anything to capture and buying time and distance by laying its own country waste. He shifted his capital east from Bissandougou to Dabakala, rebuilt a second empire toward Kong and the Bandama, and fought on. The strategy delayed the French for years, and it exacted a terrible price from his own people — the deliberate devastation of evacuated districts, the forced eastward migration of much of a nation, and, in the final flight toward Liberia after the fall of Sikasso on 1 May 1898 freed the French to concentrate against him, mass death by starvation in the unfamiliar mountains of the west. It must be said plainly, and located correctly, that a large part of the savannah's dying was authored by the resistance's own war method and not by French killing directly; the accounting module will weigh it, and will weigh it as what it was, but the fact belongs here too, because the sixteen-year cost of laying this floor was paid in that devastation as much as in battle. The end came on information supplied by Samory's own deserting sofas: on 29 September 1898 the French captain Henri Gouraud surprised his camp at Guélémou and took the

almami without a fight. The order that had cost France sixteen years fell, in the end, in an ambush — but only after the sixteen years, because there had never been any cheaper way to take an order that was one man and had no chair.

## Who carried the rifles

Now the fact that governs the moral shape of the whole conquest and is the framework's sharpest irony made flesh: the floor of force in Guinea was not laid by Frenchmen. It was laid by Africans, for France, against Africans.

The columns that entered Timbo and hunted Bokar Biro, that burned after Samory across the savannah for sixteen years, were composed overwhelmingly of tirailleurs sénégalais — African infantry under a thin crust of French officers — and the manner of their recruitment closes a circle the Landscape opened. In the nineteenth century these soldiers were most often former slaves and men of low standing, and the army acquired them, in the standard account, by methods that ran the gamut from purchase to coercion: for years by *rachat*, the outright buying of slaves on the open market; then, as that practice was formally abandoned in the 1880s, by paying an enlistment bounty to a slave's master, by incorporating prisoners of war and requisitioned porters and peasants, and — the historian Myron Echenberg's careful third category — by the genuine career choice of the first free mercenaries of the corps. From 1891 a fugitive slave could win official emancipation by enlisting; the road out of bondage, for such a man, ran through the ranks of the army that was conquering his neighbours. And as the conquest advanced it fed on its own victories, because for a soldier on the losing side, taking service with the victor was often simply survival: defeated African armies became an important source of recruits, and after 1898 Samory's own sons and commanders and sofas were folded into French service, the empire's soldiers becoming, within a season, the empire-breakers' soldiers. So the nation that had abolished slavery in 1848 built the instrument of its West African conquest substantially out of slaves — bought, freed-into-service, or captured in the fighting — and the men who carried the rifles that laid the floor were, very often, the same kind of men the floor was laid upon. The framework's rule that the conquered do the conquering is not a paradox to be admired but the plainest description of the columns: a superiority not of French bodies, of which there were few, but of French organisation and French weapons — the Gras rifle, the Lebel, the

mountain gun — laid over African manpower recruited from the conquered themselves and pointed at the still-unconquered next door.

## The word for it

Over all of this — the treaties and the punitive columns, the artillery at Porédaka, the sixteen years of burning after Samory, the African soldiers doing the dying and the killing — France laid a single word, and the word was *pacification*. The columns did not, in their own records, conquer a country; they *pacified* it, as though the country had been in a state of disturbance that France arrived to calm, rather than in a state of order that France arrived to overthrow. This is the founding legend, and it is the first thread of the robe the later modules will trace: a story in which the violence is not aggression but the restoration of a peace, not the laying of a floor but the lifting of a chaos, so that the men with the rifles could understand themselves — and could be understood at home — as agents of order against disorder rather than as what the framework says every founding coalition is, a warlord with a better weapon taking a thing that was not his. The word did real work. It let a Republic formed on the abolition of slavery raise its conquest army out of slaves and call the result a civilising peace; it let a single afternoon's slaughter of the almami's men be filed as the restoration of good order to a fractious plateau; it let sixteen years of war against Samory be recorded as the pacification of a bandit rather than the destruction of a state. And it points forward to the central finding of this study, because it reveals which way the robe faced. The word *pacification* was not addressed to the pacified, who knew exactly what had happened to them; it was addressed to Paris, where the men who paid for the columns and manned them needed the conquest to be legible as a duty discharged rather than a country taken. Toward the conquered, France offered no story at all — only the floor, and the chief, and soon the tax. The robe was cut for home from the very first act, and the first act was called pacification.

## Reading the floor against the framework

The refinement Guinea's founding offers the framework is a bridge between two modules that have until now been kept apart, and it is worth stating precisely because the case makes it with unusual clarity.

The framework already holds, at Module 8, that the single variable most predictive of how a conqueror will handle a conquered order is whether that order vested its power in an *office* — a seat a stranger can occupy — rather than in a bloodline, a creed, or a person; where there is a chair, a conqueror can assume it cheaply, and where there is none, he must forge or destroy. Guinea shows that this same variable governs Module 1 as well — that it predicts not only the *Menu family* a conqueror draws but the *founding violence* he pays, and that the two are the same variable read at two different moments. On a single conqueror, in a single decade, the three answers line up along the variable exactly: the coast, a plural country with no apex to break and everything to absorb, took a floor laid by treaty at almost no cost; the plateau, a naturalised order with a transferable office and a live internal fracture, took a floor laid in one afternoon, because the chair could be entered and the faction turned; the savannah, a new personal empire welded to one man with no seat and no belief yet taken, took a floor that cost sixteen years and a famine, because the only way to end it was to break the man. Founding violence, on this reading, is not a measure of a conqueror's cruelty or a people's courage but of the reusability of what the conqueror found — cheapest where an order stood ready to be absorbed or entered, dearest where nothing could be reused and everything had to be destroyed and rebuilt. The chair question and the violence question are one question.

Two corollaries follow, and both point ahead. The first is that the conqueror's single cheapest lever, applied identically to the plateau and the savannah, was the native order's *own* internal fracture — the Alfaya against the Soriya and the great chiefs against the centre in the Fuuta Jalon, the tensions and defections that produced the deserters who gave up Samory in the end. France did not create these seams; it found them and armed one side, which is elite chaos exploited from outside at the moment of founding, and it is worth marking now because the whole study bends toward its mirror image: in 1896 and 1898 France was the outside power profiting from a native order's own fracture, and in 1958 France will be the order broken from within by a fracture a rival exploits, the seam that opens being its own. The second corollary refines the meaning of "the floor of force" itself. The floor here was not the metropole's arm but a locally recruited arm the metropole officered and equipped — Africans, many of them former slaves and defeated enemies, carrying French rifles against other Africans — so that the credible violence pricing defection was, in its bodies, drawn from the conquered

population, and its superiority lay in weapons and organisation rather than in numbers of Frenchmen. That is a cheaper floor to lay than a metropolitan army, and it is one more instance of the same logic that governs the whole conquest: France took, at every point, the cheapest floor the ground allowed. The word it laid over the cheapness was *pacification*, and the measure of the modules to come is how long, and at what cost, that word could be kept true at home while the floor did its work in the country the word was about.

## A note on sources.

This module rests more on narrative reconstruction from modern scholarship than on exact primary quotation, and the load-bearing specifics are given as verified against multiple independent sources. The Fuuta Jalon sequence — France's policy of "peaceful expansion" from August 1889, the encirclement of the imamate and the treaties with its almamis, the exploitation of the Alfaya/Soriya fracture and the backing of the pro-French Umaru Bademba and the disgruntled regional chiefs, the shift to force in 1896, the unopposed entry into Timbo on 3 November 1896 and the Battle of Porédaka on 13 November 1896 with its stated proportions (roughly eighty tirailleurs with artillery and Fula auxiliaries against seven or eight hundred, and some hundred and fifty dead against three French wounded), the death of Bokar Biro, and the protectorate treaty of 1897 followed by the hollowing of the almamate into appointed cantons — follows the standard scholarship (Boubacar Barry's work on Senegambia and the conquest of the Fuuta Jalon; Christopher Harrison on French Islamic policy in the Fuuta-Jalon; and the reference literature), with the "peaceful expansion" characterisation given in Barry's terms and dates given as the record's anchors where sources vary by a day or two on Porédaka. The Franco-Mandinka (Samory) war — the provocation at Keniera in 1882, the slaughter of the sofas' frontal charges by modern French rifles, the treaties of the later 1880s, Archinard's march on Kankan in March 1891 and the expectation of a lightning campaign, Samory's turn to scorched earth and the council at Frankonedou in May 1892, the eastward migration and the second empire toward Kong and Dabakala, the fall of Sikasso on 1 May 1898, the flight toward Liberia and the mass death by starvation, and the capture at Guélémou by Captain Henri Gouraud on 29 September 1898 on information from deserting sofas — follows the standard accounts (Yves Person's work on Samori above all;

and the reference literature on the Mandingo Wars), with the scorched-earth famine attributed to the resistance's own war method and its magnitude reserved, as contested, for the grim-accounting module (an often-cited estimate of some 150,000 displaced eastward between 1891 and 1898 is given there as an estimate, not a settled figure). The composition and recruitment of the tirailleurs sénégalais — their predominance in the conquest columns under French officers, recruitment by *rachat* and, after its formal abandonment in the 1880s, by enlistment bounties paid to slaveowners, incorporation of prisoners and requisitioned peasants, and voluntary service; the route to emancipation through enlistment from 1891; and the folding of defeated African soldiers, including Samory's own men, into French service — follows the standard scholarship (Myron Echenberg's *Les Tirailleurs Sénégalais*/"Slaves into Soldiers" and the work on the *ce*ddo*–sofa–tirailleur* transition, and Martin Klein's *Slavery and Colonial Rule in West Africa*), and is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted. The word *pacification* is given as the standard and attested French term for these operations, used in the scholarship and in the army's own records, and is treated here as the founding legend rather than quoted from any single unverified regimental source. A contemporary New York Times report on Samory's capture (1898) described him as the most dangerous antagonist the Europeans had faced in the region for well over a decade, and is paraphrased here rather than quoted. All framework language — the floor of force, position logic and the menu of solutions, the chair a stranger can occupy, elite chaos exploited from outside — is developed across the collection (*The Machine That Runs Itself*, *Above Warlordism*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 2 · THE SETTLEMENT

# VACANT AND WITHOUT A MASTER

*Module 2 · The Settlement — who got what once the floor was laid: how France declared the conquered land vacant and without a master and then, wanting the flow and not the ground, left most of the claim unspent; how the trade and the plantations went to the metropolitan houses and planters the administration supplied with forced labour; and how the co-opted chief was paid in a removable office and a rebate capped at a fourteenth of what he collected, his standing among his own people converted into a thing France granted and could take back*

## What a government is for

The plainest description of a government, and the one people least often say aloud, is that it is the standing answer to the question *who gets what*. A floor of force, once laid, does one thing before it does anything else: it declares ownership. It says which land is whose, which trade is whose, which office is whose, and — the same act from the other side — who owns nothing and must labour on someone else's land, in someone else's trade, under someone else's office to live at all. This is the settlement, the second of the three monopolies, the division of wealth and its sources; and the framework's first discipline about it is that the beneficiary is never a people or a race but a *position* — whoever ends up exempt from labour yet holding most of everything — with the mirror position, the underclass, defined as whoever must labour to live. Module 1 established that France laid a floor over the peoples of Guinea. This module asks what France then declared: who got what, once the guns had settled the question of who could declare anything at all.

Guinea's answer is distinctive within the collection, and the distinction is worth stating at the outset because it governs everything below. France took the wealth of Guinea as a *flow* and not as a *stock*. It wanted the colony's labour, its crops, its trade, and its taxes — things that are drawn off a population year by year and require the population to stay on its land and keep producing — and it did not, on the whole, want the land itself, because it had no great body of settlers to seat on the ground and no plan to replace the cultivators with colonists. This one fact reshapes the whole settlement. A colony that takes the ground must dispossess, and dispossession needs a land-fiction pressed to the hilt; a colony that takes the flow needs the cultivator left in place and productive, and so it writes its land-fiction and then, mostly, holds it in reserve. Guinea did exactly that, and the real division of spoils ran not through land title but through two other channels — the metropolitan monopoly on trade and plantation, and the conversion of the native chief into a salaried, removable office. Take these in turn, beginning with the fiction that was written and then left largely unspent, because the writing of it is where the settlement declared, in law, that the country was France's to give.

## The land declared empty

The instrument is exact and public. By the décret of 23 October 1904 organising the domaine in French West Africa, the State declared, in Article 10, that «les terres vacantes et sans maître, dans les colonies et territoires de l'Afrique occidentale française, appartiennent à l'État» — the vacant lands, and those without a master, in the colonies and territories of French West Africa belong to the State. This is the vacancy fiction in its purest form, and it is the same Lockean move the collection has met before: the doctrine that unimproved, unoccupied land is unowned and therefore falls to whoever will claim and improve it, which can declare an inhabited country legally empty without anyone having to lie about who lives on it. In West Africa the fiction rested on a particular and revealing myth — the myth of the *forêt vierge*, the virgin forest, the belief that the dense woodland of the interior and the south was primordial and untouched, empty of any people whose transformations of it counted as possession — and the honest scholarship notes that this "virgin forest" was nothing of the kind, being lived in and worked and shaped by populations whose presence the word *vierge* simply wrote out. The Landscape opened this study on the principle that no ground France reached was ever virgin;

the land law is that principle turned into an article of the code, and the word France chose for a country full of farmers, herders and forest peoples was *vacant*.

The fiction was elaborated and hardened over the following decades. The décret of 24 July 1906 organised landed-property registration — immatriculation — and required that land be registered before it could be conceded or sold, building the register a settlement of this kind needs. The décret of 15 November 1935 sharpened the definition of the vacant, providing that the State owns those lands «qui, ne faisant pas l'objet d'un titre régulier de propriété ou de jouissance… sont inexploitées ou inoccupées depuis plus de dix ans» — lands not held under a regular title of property or use, and unexploited or unoccupied for more than ten years. And beneath the vacancy article ran a second and franker doctrine, the *succession d'État* — the theory that by the treaties its officers had signed with African chiefs, the colonial State had succeeded to the whole of the powers those chiefs held, land rights included. The theory does not survive its own premises, as the legal scholarship has pointed out, because the chiefs who signed were political authorities who did not, in most of these societies, hold or dispose of land in the first place; a chief could no more sign away the land than he could sign away the rain. But the theory did not need to be sound. It needed only to be written, so that the taking, when it came, could present itself as a lawful succession to rights France had acquired by treaty rather than as a seizure — the settlement performing, in the legal register, exactly the trick Module 1 watched the word *pacification* perform in the military one.

And here is the distinctive fact: France wrote all of this and then, for the most part, did not spend it. The same 1904 decree that vested the vacant land in the State also provided that lands forming the collective property of natives, or held by chiefs as representatives of native collectivities, could not be ceded to private individuals by sale — a protection with no analogue in settler Algeria, and it tells you what the settlement was for. France was not clearing the population off the ground to seat colonists on it; it was leaving the population on the ground to work it and be taxed on it, and reserving to the State only the "vacant" margins it might wish to concede for a plantation, a mine, a railway, or a town. The vacancy fiction in Guinea is therefore a claim asserted and largely held in reserve — the State's title to the country written into the code and then left mostly unpressed against the cultivator, because pressing it was neither necessary nor desirable when what France wanted was the flow the cultivator produced. The land was declared empty

so that France *could* take it; it was left in native hands because taking it was not the point.

## The metropolitan share: the houses, the planters, the corridor

Where, then, did the wealth actually go? The first and largest metropolitan channel was trade, and it was a monopoly. The great French import-export houses — the trading companies whose names ran the length of the AOF coast — controlled the buying of the colony's produce and the selling of its imports, with Lebanese and Syrian traders operating the retail relay in the interior, so that the cultivator sold his crop cheap to a company agent and bought his cloth, his salt and his tools dear from the same commercial chain, and the margin between the two ran home to metropolitan shareholders. This is the wealth monopoly's daily engine, and the extraction module will follow its arithmetic; the point for the settlement is simply that the trade of the colony was, from the outset, declared to be the companies', a concession of the commercial life of a whole territory to a handful of firms.

The second channel was the plantation, and it opened later. Guinea's export economy passed through a wild-rubber boom that collapsed around 1913, a long depression, and then, from the 1930s, the crop that would define it: the banana, grown in lower Guinea, encouraged by the administration through preferential customs duties and accelerated by the refrigerated ships that arrived in 1935, until by the mid-1950s Guinea was the main banana producer of French West Africa and bananas together with coffee made up on the order of four-fifths of the colony's export value. And the plantations that grew the bananas were, in the standard account, mostly European-owned — the expatriate planter enjoying two advantages the African grower did not, access to capital and the active support of an administration that recruited his labour force for him through the forced-labour system the next modules will detail. Some Africans did enter the banana trade, and the coffee of the forest region was substantially a smallholder crop, so the plantation share was not a pure European monopoly as the trade nearly was; but the commanding heights of it — the capital, the shipping, the customs preference, the state-supplied labour — were arranged for the European planter, and that arrangement is the settlement delivering the ground it had reserved, and the labour it had drafted, to the metropolitan interest. Over the whole of it ran the third

metropolitan asset, the Conakry–Niger railway driven inland from the coast between roughly 1900 and 1914, whose corridor was the spine of the export economy and whose cost — paid in conscript lives — belongs to the modules on the cost column and the accounting, but whose *purpose* belongs here: it was built to carry the flow to the sea, and the flow was the settlement's whole object.

One thing Guinea was not, and it is worth marking to keep the classification honest: it was not run as a chartered concession-state in the manner of Leopold's Congo or parts of French Equatorial Africa, where companies were handed sovereign powers — the monopoly of violence and the right to tax — over great blocks of territory. In Guinea the sovereign powers stayed with the administration; the companies got the trade and the planters got the concessions, but the floor and the tax remained the State's. The settlement conceded the wealth without conceding the government, which is a cheaper and more controllable arrangement than the concession-state, and one more instance of France taking, in Guinea, the least it needed to take to get the flow.

## The native share: a removable office and a fourteenth of the take

The most revealing part of the settlement is what the co-opted African intermediary got, because it is the clearest case in the module of the framework's central move — the conversion of a relation between persons into a thing a conqueror grants. Under the system the French themselves called direct administration, the chief was not left as an autonomous ruler mediated from above, as in the British indirect-rule ideal; he was, in the standard description, converted into an agent of the colonial bureaucracy. Beneath the Governor-General at Dakar and the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony sat the commandant de cercle, the French district officer who held tax collection, military recruitment, the mobilisation of forced labour, the supervision of native justice, and the judgeship of the indigénat penal code, backed by the gardes-de-cercle, the armed police of the district. Below him were the chefs de canton and chefs de village — Africans appointed by the French and removable by the French, made responsible for collecting the tax, recruiting the forced labour, finding the military conscripts, and dispensing customary justice in the matters left to it. That is the office. Now

the consideration, which the framework treats as the single most diagnostic fact in the module: what did the chief owe in return, and did it include armed service?

It did not. The chief owed tax, labour, recruits and compliance — the collection and the delivery of the flow — and for these he was paid a salary and a rebate on what he gathered, allowed to arm no more than a few personal guards while the real force of the district stayed with the commandant and the gardes-de-cercle. The rebate can be quantified, and the figure is the sharpest single number in the settlement: the economic historians who have reconstructed the AOF fiscal system find that the total payments made to the chiefs never amounted to more than about seven per cent of the sums they collected. The co-opted intermediary of French Guinea, in other words, was paid roughly a fourteenth of the tax he raised, plus a wage, plus the standing and the petty exactions his office allowed him — and in exchange he delivered the tax, the labour and the men, and he could be dismissed at the commandant's word. This is the modern colonial grant in its purest form, the grant that buys compliance rather than service, with the medieval clause deleted: the older enfeoffment that bought an armed retinue installed a permanent civil-war risk in the same charter, because the lord's men could become the army that removed the king; the colonial grant strips the armed capacity in the same decade it hands out the office, so that the chief holds a position he can lose and no force he could ever turn. France paid the warlordism of the old order to stop being warlordism — converted the man who had commanded followers into a man who commanded a canton on sufferance — and it paid for the conversion at a rate of one part in fourteen.

The provenance of these chiefs ran along a spectrum that the coordination module will make central, and it is enough here to mark its ends. On the Fuuta Jalon plateau, where a genuine Fulani aristocracy and a real structure of provincial authority had existed for a century and a half, France co-opted something that was already there — the hollowed almamate of Module 1, the provincial chiefs — grafting its cantons onto lineages that carried independent standing. Elsewhere — on the plural coast, in the forest, and across the Malinké savannah once Samory's state had been destroyed rather than inherited — the canton was far more often an administrative creation, a district drawn on a French map with a chief appointed to it who might have little or no traditional claim to the men he now taxed. The settlement therefore installed an intermediary layer of very uneven legitimacy, some of it resting on real lineage and much of it resting on nothing but the appointment

itself, and that unevenness is the fault line the whole study will return to; but its measure belongs to Module 8, and here it is enough to have established what the layer *received* — office, wage, and a fourteenth of the take — and on what terms it held it, which is: entirely at France's pleasure.

## What the settlement did not touch

Two things the settlement of Guinea conspicuously left where it found them, and both are findings. The first is the land, already discussed: the cultivator stayed on his ground, his collective and lineage tenure formally protected from private sale, because France wanted him producing on it. The second is the servile foundation of the native order itself. France abolished the *slave trade* by decree on 12 December 1905 and could recite, at home, its descent from the abolition of 1848; but the *institution* of slavery within the native societies — the servile castes of the Fuuta Jalon, the dependents of Upper Guinea — it did not abolish, and internal slavery persisted, tolerated and unmentioned, into the 1950s, disappearing in substance only around 1955–56. The settlement thus left the chief his servile dependents as it left the cultivator his fields, and for the same reason: dismantling the native hierarchy of subjection would have been an expense with no return to a power that wanted the flow and needed the intermediaries who delivered it. So the nation that had ended slavery in 1848, and had raised its conquest army partly out of freed and purchased slaves, governed Guinea for half a century through chiefs whose own standing rested on servile labour it declined to touch — the reversed robe's contradiction of the Landscape reappearing, precisely, in the ledger of the settlement.

## Reading the settlement against the framework

The refinement Guinea offers here is an addition to the framework's taxonomy of settlement-fictions, and it is a real one, because the case sits cleanly outside the three fictions the corpus has named.

The framework holds that a written settlement runs one of three fictions, each doing a distinct job: *vacancy*, which declares occupied land empty and does the work of dispossession where the conqueror wants the ground and has settlers to

seat; *recognition*, which declares un-owned land long-owned and does the work of binding an elite; and *divisibility*, which declares collective land partible and does the work of manufacturing a market where willing sellers did not exist. Guinea shows a fourth configuration the taxonomy has not named: a settlement that *writes the vacancy fiction and then declines to spend it*. France declared the country vacant and without a master, built the register, and asserted the State's title to the whole of the unclaimed ground — and then, wanting the flow rather than the stock, protected native tenure from sale, left the cultivator in place, and used the vacancy claim only at the margins, for the concession, the plantation, the mine, the line. The vacancy fiction here is not the instrument of dispossession it is in a settler colony; it is a title held in reserve, a claim asserted so that the ground *could* be taken if wanted and mostly not taken because it was not. The refinement to carry forward is that the fiction a settlement writes tells you what the conqueror wanted the option to do, while the extent to which he *spends* it tells you what he actually wanted — and that the two can diverge sharply, so that a colony can carry a fully articulated vacancy law on its books and still not be a dispossession colony, because it wrote the law for the option and never exercised it. Reading only the statute, an analyst would file Guinea with Algeria and Kenya; reading the statute against its own restraint, he files it correctly, as a flow-extraction colony that reserved the ground it did not want.

The deeper move of the settlement, then, ran not through land at all but through *office*, and this is where the framework's core mechanism — relations into things — did its Guinea-specific work. What France converted into a grantable, revocable thing was not primarily the soil but *authority itself*. The chief's place among his own people had been a relation — his standing with his lineage, his community, the men who followed him — and, like all such relations, it was not a thing that could be handed over, because it lived in the recognition of the people who granted it. The settlement converted that relation into an office: the canton, drawn on a French map, held from the commandant's appointment, carrying a wage and a fourteenth of the tax, revocable at a word. Same man, in many cases the same followers, but the source of his authority re-routed — from below and beside him, where it had come from his people, to above him, where it now came from the register the commandant kept. This is the settlement's re-sourcing of title performed on power rather than on property, and it produced the same result the collection has seen it produce with land: a man who will defend the arrangement

because the arrangement is now what makes his standing his, requiring no loyalty and no belief, only the alignment of his interest with the office he holds. But it produced that result with a distinctive fragility, and the fragility is the corollary the case adds. A title re-sourced onto land leaves the grantee holding a thing — an estate, a parcel — that has value even if the granting power weakens, and that can only be taken from him by a court or a war. A title re-sourced onto an office leaves the grantee holding nothing but the office, which has no value at all once the power that appoints to it is gone. The chief of Fuuta Jalon whose lineage carried independent standing had something of his own to fall back on; the appointed chief of a drawn canton had only France, and when France's strength ebbed he would have neither the people's recognition, which the appointment had replaced, nor an estate, which the appointment had never included, nor a retinue, which the consideration had deliberately denied him. The settlement bought the intermediary cheaply — a fourteenth of the take, an office, no armed service — and the cheapness and the coming brittleness are, once again in this collection, the same fact seen from two ends: France paid so little for the chief's compliance precisely because it gave him a place that was worth nothing the moment France stopped guaranteeing it. Who got what, in the settlement of Guinea, has a precise answer at the intermediary tier — the chief got an office and a fourteenth — and the answer contains, already, the reason the whole layer would collapse from the side the day a rival appeared who could offer the people the recognition the appointment had taken away.

## A note on sources.

The exact primary quotations here are public-domain legal texts, verified against sources reproducing them. The vacancy article — «les terres vacantes et sans maître, dans les colonies et territoires de l'Afrique occidentale française, appartiennent à l'État» — is Article 10 of the décret of 23 October 1904 organising the domaine in French West Africa, quoted as reproduced in the standard legal collections (Recueil Dareste, 1905) and the scholarship on colonial property law; the same decree's protection of native collective land and chief-held land from private sale is given as reproduced there. The décret of 24 July 1906 on landed-property registration (immatriculation) and the décret of 15 November 1935 redefining State land as that «qui, ne faisant pas l'objet d'un titre régulier de

propriété ou de jouissance… sont inexploitées ou inoccupées depuis plus de dix ans» are quoted and dated as reproduced in the same literature. The doctrine of *succession d'État* and its critique (that the signatory chieftaincies did not, in most of these societies, hold or dispose of land) follows the legal-historical scholarship (Dégni-Ségui; Atta and Zoungrana) and is paraphrased. The *forêt vierge* characterisation and its role in justifying the "vacant and without master" attribution follows the forestry-historical literature on AOF and is paraphrased. The economic reconstruction — the monopoly of the French import-export houses with a Lebanese-Syrian retail relay; the rubber cycle and its collapse around 1913; the banana economy of lower Guinea from the 1930s, the preferential customs duties and the refrigerated ships of 1935, and Guinea as the main AOF banana producer by the mid-1950s with bananas and coffee on the order of four-fifths of export value; and the finding that most plantations were European-owned, the planters benefiting from access to capital and from administration-supplied forced labour while some Africans entered the banana trade and coffee was substantially a smallholder crop — follows Odile Goerg's work on colonial Guinea (as in the *Encyclopedia of African History*) and the standard economic-historical literature, and is paraphrased and credited. The administrative hierarchy (Governor-General, Lieutenant-Governor, commandant de cercle, chef de canton, chef de village) and the chiefs' functions (tax collection, forced-labour and military recruitment, customary justice, appointment and removability by the French, the right to a few guards while the gardes-de-cercle remained under the commandant) follow the standard scholarship on the AOF administration and the *cercle* system (Crowder; Delavignette; and the reference literature) and are paraphrased. The figure that total payments to the chiefs never exceeded about seven per cent of the sums they collected is from the recent quantitative work on AOF fiscal administration (Cogneau, Dupraz and colleagues; the World Inequality Lab working paper on head tax and blood tax in French West Africa) and is given as their finding. The abolition of the slave trade by the décret of 12 December 1905, and the persistence of internal slavery in Fuuta Jalon and Upper Guinea until roughly 1955–56, follow the standard scholarship on slavery and colonial rule in West Africa (Klein) and the reference literature. That Guinea was not run as a chartered concession-state on the Congo/AEF model is given as the standard classification. All framework language — the settlement as the wealth monopoly, the elite as a position, relations into things and the re-sourcing of title, the vacancy fiction, the consideration and the deleted military clause — is developed across the

collection (*The Three Monopolies*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Grant and the Sword*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 3 · THE ROBE

# THE CONSCIENCE OF DEMOCRACIES

*Module 3 · The Robe — the legitimating belief France laid over the conquest, cut not for the conquered whose compliance the floor already held but for the metropole, a republic that found its own empire troubling: how the theorist of "association", Jules Harmand, named the scandal openly — that conquest is unjust and disquieting to the conscience of democracies — and answered it in a single move, a hierarchy of races that both licensed the empire to Paris and forbade ever admitting the people it ruled; and how that one doctrine made the colony cheap to hold at home and dear to hold forever in Guinea*

## What a robe is, and who it is for

A robe, in this collection's plain sense, is the legitimating belief laid over a floor of force to make the force cheap — the story that lets an arrangement run on the governed's own conviction rather than on the continuous exertion of the sword, so that people formed into it enforce it themselves and are not forever revolting. The clearest way to see that it is a real thing and not a mere trick is to see it working where it plainly contradicts the facts: a republic founded on the proposition that all men are created equal, governed by a propertied few and holding a slave population, whose citizens nonetheless believe themselves free and equal and their leaders deserving, and whose belief carries the whole arrangement so cheaply that the many do not rise, because the vote feels like it decides everything and the fortunate feel that they earned it. The robe is not the lie a knowing few tell a duped many each morning; it is a conviction driven so deep by formation that it has become the shape of the world to the people who hold it, and it does its work precisely because it is sincerely held. That is the engine of every durable order in this collection, and the case studies are its instances.

But a colony bends the robe, and the bend is the whole of this module. In an ordinary order the robe is laid over the ruled, because it is the ruled whose cheap compliance the apex wants. In a colony the apex does not need the conquered peasant's belief, because the conquered peasant's compliance is already bought — cheaply enough — by the floor of Module 1 and the cost column of Module 5, held by force and the reach of the chief and the tax, and to be dealt with more fully below and in the modules to come. What the colonial apex needs is the belief of a wholly different audience: the population back in the metropole, whose sons man the columns, whose taxes underwrite the administration, and — this is the crux — whose belief in their own righteousness the whole empire is drawn against. And in the French case that audience posed a specific and acute problem, because the metropole was not an old monarchy in which conquest needed no excuse but a republic that had told itself, in the words the Landscape set down, that men are born free and equal, that it had abolished slavery, and that it lived in an enlightened age. To such a metropole its own empire is a scandal waiting to be noticed, and the robe's first task is not to persuade the conquered of anything at all but to keep the metropole's own conscience quiet about what is being done in its name.

The remarkable thing about the French case — and the reason it can be read with unusual precision — is that its own theorists said this out loud, and one of them wrote the instruction manual.

## The theorist who named the scandal

In 1910 the naval physician and colonial administrator Jules Harmand published *Domination et colonisation*, the most systematic French statement of the doctrine that would govern rule in French West Africa: *association*. Harmand began not by asserting France's right but by conceding the difficulty, and the concession is the most honest sentence in the literature of empire. Conquest, he wrote, «si nécessaire soit-elle, apparaît particulièrement injuste et inquiétante à la conscience des démocraties» — however necessary it may be, appears particularly unjust and disquieting to the conscience of democracies. Here is the reversed robe named by the man weaving it: the problem the doctrine exists to solve is not the conquered's resistance but the *democracy's own conscience*, the risk that a republic of the rights of man will look at what it is doing to other men and recoil. Harmand saw that risk plainly and set out to disarm it.

His disarming had two clauses, and together they are the robe. The first was the assertion of a hierarchy. One must accept as a principle and take as a starting point, he wrote, «qu'il y a une hiérarchie des races et des civilisations, et que nous appartenons à la race et à la civilisation supérieures» — that there is a hierarchy of races and civilisations, and that we belong to the superior race and civilisation. And on this hierarchy he founded the whole right of conquest: «la légitimation foncière de la conquête… c'est cette conviction de notre supériorité, non pas seulement mécanique, économique et militaire, mais surtout de notre supériorité morale» — the fundamental legitimation of conquest is this conviction of our superiority, not merely mechanical, economic and military, but above all *moral*. This is the robe stated by its theorist with a clarity the practitioners rarely matched: the empire is legitimate because the conqueror is superior, and superior not only in guns and money but in worth, so that his rule is not theft but the natural precedence of the higher over the lower. It is the answer to the user's question in this module's own framing — is the robe civilising, or is it racial superiority? — and the answer is that it is racial superiority *expressed as* a civilising duty, because Harmand's second clause turned the hierarchy from a boast into an obligation: if this superiority confers rights, he wrote, «elle impose en retour de grands devoirs» — it imposes in return great duties. The right to rule became the duty to civilise; the precedence of the higher became the burden of the strong; and the plunder of a continent put on the robe of a service rendered to its inhabitants, exactly as Jules Ferry had told the Chamber in 1885 that the superior races had not merely a right but a *devoir de civiliser les races inférieures*.

The second clause did a further and darker piece of work, and it is the hinge on which the whole colonial order turned, because it converted the robe into a permanent refusal. If the conquered were of an inferior race and civilisation, then they could not be made into Frenchmen, and it would be an error to try. Harmand said so directly: to wish to transport democratic institutions into such milieus, he wrote, «est un non-sens et une aberration ; les sujets ne sont pas et ne peuvent pas être des citoyens au sens démocratique de ce mot» — is nonsense and an aberration; the subjects are not and cannot be citizens in the democratic sense of the word. And he grounded this not in policy but in nature, holding that some races were «fatalement destinées à rester séparées» — fatally destined to remain separate — and that attempts at mixing them, physically and «surtout moral ou législatif», above all morally or legislatively, could end only in «les résultats les plus

déplorables», the most deplorable results. He opposed even the schooling of colonial subjects in advanced learning, on the ground that their minds were not fitted for it. This is the doctrinal root of the withheld formation the next module will measure, and it must be held exactly, because it is the point at which the metropolitan robe and the colonial floor become one thing: the same assertion of a racial hierarchy that reconciled the democracy to its empire *also forbade forming the conquered into believers*, because forming them would mean admitting them, and the whole doctrine existed to prove that they could not be admitted.

## The two robes, and the single decision behind them

Set this beside the collection's theory of the cheap and expensive poles and the shape of the colonial order comes clear. An order can hold its people cheaply only if it makes the second trade the founding conqueror faces: to build the interpreter class and the formation that will carry a legitimating belief down into the population until the population holds the order up for itself. France made that trade — but it made it toward Paris and refused it toward Guinea, and the two are the same act.

Toward the metropole, France built the cheap robe in full. Through the free and secular school Ferry himself had founded, through the press, through the literature of empire and the pageantry of the colonial exhibitions, the French public was formed to experience the empire not as an arrangement holding millions down for profit but as the greatness of France and the discharge of a civilising duty — *la plus grande France*, the enlightened nation carrying order and progress to those who could not supply it themselves. By the interwar years the doctrine had acquired an economic dress as well, in Albert Sarraut's programme of *mise en valeur*, the "development" or "valorisation" of the colonies, which recast the extraction of Modules 2 and 6 as a work of improvement undertaken for the benefit of coloniser and colonised together. This robe went fully cheap, in the collection's technical sense: it sank so deep into the metropole's formation that it stopped looking like a robe at all and became simply what France was — so that the ordinary French citizen, as the Landscape found, could not see the forced-labour colony as a contradiction of 1789 and 1848 because his formation had drawn the empire as their fulfilment. The most successful management of belief erases every

trace of itself, and toward the metropole the French colonial robe erased itself completely.

Toward the conquered mass of Guinea, France built no cheap robe at all, and this is the finding the module rests on. The plateau Fulɓe and the savannah Malinké and the coastal peoples were not offered a French legitimating story to internalise; they were taxed, conscripted for labour, disciplined by the summary penalties of the indigénat, and left otherwise to the Quranic schools and the old order the next module will describe. Their compliance was held by the cost column, not by conviction, and the surveillance and the summary punishment that fill the later modules are, in the framework's terms, the tell of a belief that never took. But the deeper truth of Guinea is that no belief was ever seriously offered to the mass to take, and the reason is the one Harmand wrote down: to form the native into a believer in French rule would have been to form him toward citizenship, and the whole doctrine held that he could not be a citizen. So France declined the trade that would have made the colony cheap to hold, and paid for the refusal in the only currency left — force and surveillance, continuously, forever, at the expensive pole. Toward the conquered there was a floor, a chief, and a tax, and above them, facing the other way across the sea, a story about civilisation addressed to people who would never set foot in the country it was told about.

Between these two audiences sat a third the framework tells us never to neglect: the coordinating class, the corps of colonial administrators who ran the *cercles* with a handful of Frenchmen apiece and whose compliance the apex could least afford to lose. Toward them the robe was neither absent nor purely cynical, because managed belief catches the managers too. The administrator understood himself — many of them sincerely — as a servant of France and an agent of civilisation, a bearer of the *devoir* Harmand had described, and that self-understanding was the currency in which his loyalty was paid: not a wage alone but a vocation, the sense that the thin white line in the bush was holding something up that was worth holding. That the vocation was real to the men who felt it does not make it less a robe; it makes it the robe working as designed, on the class it most needed to bind.

## The leash the robe put on France

The framework's discipline requires that a robe be read in the second direction as well as the first — that one ask not only what the belief bought the apex but what

it cost him, what acts his own robe forbade. And here Harmand's honesty is again the best evidence, because his admission that conquest is «injuste et inquiétante à la conscience des démocraties» is the leash named by the man holding it. The metropole's belief in its own righteousness was not a free instrument France could wield without cost; it was a real constraint, and the measure of the constraint is the sheer elaboration of the doctrine built to satisfy it. A power that could simply have announced that it was taking Guinea because it wanted Guinea had no need of a naval physician to write three hundred and seventy pages reconciling the deed to the Republic; France needed exactly that because the Republic's belief could not be overridden, only answered, and answering it took work. The elaboration is the measure of the constraint, and the whole civilising literature — the *devoir*, the *mission*, the *mise en valeur*, the *association* — is that measure made visible.

What, then, could France not do? It could not be seen, at home, to be doing what it was in fact doing. It could not call the forced labour of the coming modules by its name, could not let the extraction stand forth as extraction, could not admit that a nation of abolition was running a slavery under another name — because the metropolitan robe would turn if it saw those things plainly, the conviction that funded the empire curdling into the conscience that condemned it. So the order's core labour became the keeping of its two ends apart, the sealing of the seam between where the story was told and where the cost was paid, and the reflex of the apparatus, whenever the seam was forced, was to reword rather than to defend — to answer a scandal with a better euphemism rather than a justification, because a euphemism keeps the robe intact and a justification would require admitting there was something to justify. That reflex, and its cost, is the subject of Module 7; here it is enough to have located its source, which is the leash the metropolitan belief put on the men in the colony.

And the robe carried a second constraint, slower-acting and ultimately fatal, which the later modules will collect. A robe woven from a *civilising duty* contains, in its own universal language, a promise — that the rule is a tutelage toward some eventual elevation of the ruled — and a promise can be called in. Harmand had tried to foreclose it by insisting the subjects could never be citizens; but the schoolroom the next module describes, however stunted, produced a stratum who had learned the Republic's own creed, and who would in time turn the *devoir de civiliser* back upon the men who professed it, demanding the citizenship the robe had promised in principle and the doctrine had denied in fact. The robe that

reconciled the metropole to the empire thus planted in the empire the exact claim that would one day be used to end it — but that is the business of Modules 9 and 10, and it is named here only to mark that the leash, once fastened, does not come off.

## Reading the robe against the framework

The framework already holds that the colonial robe is *reversed* — cut for the metropole whose belief funds the conquest rather than for the conquered whose belief the floor does not need. Guinea, read through the theory of the cheap and expensive poles and the founder's second trade, lets the reversal be stated more precisely and, for the first time in the corpus, be traced to a single mechanism rather than two parallel choices.

The colonial order runs two robes at opposite ends of the gradient at once. Toward the metropole it runs a robe that has gone fully cheap — sunk so deep into formation through the national school and the culture of empire that it no longer registers as a robe, so that the citizen experiences the empire as civilisation and greatness rather than as an arrangement. Toward the conquered it runs no cheap robe at all, declining the formation that would install belief, and holding them instead at the expensive pole by force and surveillance. The corpus has described this as the robe being *cut for* one audience and *withheld from* the other, as though the conqueror made two separate decisions about two separate populations. Guinea shows that it is one decision. The doctrine that cuts the cheap robe for the metropole — the assertion of a hierarchy of races that makes the conqueror's superiority the legitimation of his conquest — has as its own content the proposition that the conquered cannot be admitted, cannot be made citizens, cannot be formed into the belief that would make them cheap to hold. Harmand wrote both clauses in one book because they are one thought: the superiority that reconciles the democracy to its empire is the same superiority that forbids the empire ever to enfranchise its subjects. The refinement to carry forward, compounding the settlement's finding that this was a flow-extraction colony that reserved the ground it did not want, is therefore this: the reversed robe is not two choices but one, and the single assertion at its heart — *we are superior* — does two things in the same breath that pull in opposite directions across the sea. At home it is a cheap robe, funding and manning the empire on the metropole's own proud

conviction of its worth. In the colony it is the refusal of a robe, condemning the conqueror to hold the conquered forever by force, because a superiority deep enough to justify the empire to a democracy is a superiority too deep to let the democracy ever admit the people the empire rules. The robe that makes a colony cheap to hold at home is, by the identical clause, the robe that makes it dear to hold in the colony — and dear not by accident or brutality but by doctrine, permanently, because the belief that pays for the empire is the belief that the empire's subjects can never be let in.

There is a cost accounting hidden in that symmetry which the grim-accounting module will have to weigh, and it can be stated now as the robe's own ledger. France bought the empire's *funding* at the metropole for almost nothing, because the robe there went cheap; it bought the empire's *holding* in Guinea at a permanent premium, because the robe there was never allowed to take. A conqueror willing to pay the founder's second trade toward the conquered — to form them, to admit them, to let a native interpreter class carry a shared belief — might have held Guinea cheaply in the end, as the cheap-pole orders of the collection hold their people, but only at the price of one day having Frenchmen who were Guinean, which the whole robe existed to forbid. France chose the other way, and the two robes of this module are the two halves of that choice: the proud cheap conviction at home, and the expensive silent floor in the colony, joined at the single clause that says the men under the floor are not, and can never be, the equals of the men who believe the conviction. When the will to keep paying the premium ran out — which is the subject of the study's end — there was nothing underneath to hold the colony but the force whose price had finally come due, because France had spent seventy years making sure the conquered had been given no belief of France's that might have held it for free.

## A note on sources.

The exact primary quotations here are from public-domain sources and verified against reproductions of the texts. The passages from Jules Harmand, *Domination et colonisation* (Flammarion, 1910) — that conquest «si nécessaire soit-elle, apparaît particulièrement injuste et inquiétante à la conscience des démocraties»; that the subjects «ne sont pas et ne peuvent pas être des citoyens au sens démocratique de ce mot»; that one must accept as principle «qu'il y a une

hiérarchie des races et des civilisations, et que nous appartenons à la race et à la civilisation supérieures»; that «la légitimation foncière de la conquête… c'est cette conviction de notre supériorité, non pas seulement mécanique, économique et militaire, mais surtout de notre supériorité morale»; that this superiority «impose en retour de grands devoirs»; and that certain races are «fatalement destinées à rester séparées» with mixing «surtout moral ou législatif» producing «les résultats les plus déplorables» — are quoted as reproduced in the scholarly literature on colonial doctrine (the Éditions de la Sorbonne volume citing Harmand pages 156 and 53, and the French edition of Charles W. Mills's *The Racial Contract*, both reproducing the primary text), the work itself being public domain and available through Gallica. Jules Ferry's «devoir de civiliser les races inférieures» (28 July 1885) is as established and sourced in the Landscape from the record of the Assemblée nationale. Harmand's characterisation of assimilation as an «erreur capitale» and his opposition to advanced schooling for colonial subjects follow the reproductions and the standard scholarship on the assimilation/association debate and are given as his positions. Albert Sarraut's doctrine of *mise en valeur* (from *La mise en valeur des colonies françaises*, 1923) is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted, the work remaining in copyright. The characterisation of the AOF robe as thin toward the conquered mass, of association as the justification for withholding formation, of the "blood debt" (*impôt du sang*) rationale for African military recruitment, and of the administrator's vocation as the coordinating class's currency, follows the standard scholarship on French West African colonial ideology (Conklin's work on the civilising mission in AOF; and the reference literature) and is paraphrased. All framework language — the robe and the cheap and expensive poles, the reversed robe cut for the metropole, managed belief and the robe that erases itself, the founder's second trade, the audiences of the robe, and the leash — is developed across the collection (*The Cheapest Hold*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Architect and the Inheritor*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 4 · FORMATION

# THE STOCKS WILL NEVER MIX

*Module 4 · Formation — how an order installs its belief in the next generation, and how France ran the machine at three settings at once: the full formation that made Republican citizens at home, no formation at all for the Guinean mass — because to form them as it formed its own children would be to admit them — and a capped "just enough" formation for a thin elite of auxiliaries; how the field it declined to enter was held by the old order's own dense formation, the Quranic school and the ajami catechism that had long since become the way the world was; and how the capped elite and the unformed mass became, in the end, the two halves of France's undoing*

## The machine that makes the next generation

Formation is the part of the machine that runs on children. A robe laid over a floor makes the force cheap only if the belief is installed deep enough that the governed hold the order up themselves, and belief of that depth is not argued into an adult but grown into a child — through the school, the rite, the calendar, the thousand daily corrections by which a society tells its young what a person is, what he owes, and where he stands. Formation is the machine that does this, and it is the machine that launders a conquest into nativeness, because a belief installed in the cradle is not experienced as a belief at all but as the plain furniture of the world. The previous module found that France, toward the conquered mass of Guinea, laid no cheap robe — offered no legitimating story for the Guinean to internalise — and this module asks the question that follows directly: if France did not form the Guinean into a believer in French rule, then who formed him, and into what? Because an unformed person

does not stay unformed. Some order always fills the space, and the whole of this module is the study of which orders filled it, and of the trouble that grew from France running the formation machine at three different settings at once.

Begin with the setting France ran at home, because it is the measure of everything it declined to run in the colony, and because the same Republic — and very nearly the same man — built both.

## The school that made citizens

In the metropole, the Third Republic built one of the most deliberate formation machines in modern history, and it built it precisely to make a certain kind of person. By the loi of 16 June 1881 primary schooling was made free, and by the loi of 28 March 1882 it was made compulsory for children of both sexes from six to thirteen and secular, wrested from the Church and given to the state and its lay teachers. The architect was Jules Ferry — the same Ferry whose civilising doctrine the Landscape and Module 3 set down — and the purpose of his school was not chiefly to convey letters and sums but to *form citizens*: the programmes were built around the history and geography of France, a secular morality, and patriotic song, calculated to develop in every child a sentiment of national belonging, and the instituteurs who carried this into every village were called, in the phrase that stuck, the hussards noirs de la République, the black hussars of the Republic, foot-soldiers of a formation whose object was the Republican citizen. The school, in the plainest terms the historians use, became a major political instrument for building the nation, an engine for turning the children of France into Frenchmen attached to the Republic and the patrie. This is formation at the cheap-pole setting: the machine that makes a population hold its own order up, so that the French citizen of Module 3 — the one who would fund and man the empire while experiencing it as civilisation rather than as an arrangement — was manufactured, year on year, in the classroom. The robe that erased itself at home was installed here, in childhood, by the hussards of the Republic.

And the same laws, the historians of French education note in the same breath, largely excluded the colonised. The citizen-making school stopped at the water. What crossed it was a different machine entirely, running at two lower settings, and the gap between them is the subject of the rest of this module.

## The formation withheld from the mass

Toward the mass of Guinea, France ran the formation machine at zero, and it did so for a reason its own theorists had stated with precision. To form the Guinean child as the Republic formed the French child — history, geography, the rights of man, the sentiment of national belonging — would be to make him a Frenchman and, in time, a citizen, and the whole doctrine of association existed to prove that he could not be one. Harmand had written it: the subjects «ne sont pas et ne peuvent pas être des citoyens», and he had opposed advanced schooling for colonial subjects on the ground that their minds were unfitted for it. The soldiers put it more crudely, and the crudeness is worth hearing because it is the doctrine stripped of its philosophy. Reporting in 1902 on the Muslim highlands, the French officer Captain Normand warned that the marabout was «slowly creating a force which can only be hostile to us» and would «always be a worry for the future of French Africa», and he reached, to explain the impossibility of ever assimilating such people, for a line of Marshal Bugeaud's from the Algerian wars: boil the head of a Christian and the head of a Muslim together for a week as you like, and the stocks will never mix. This is the belief that set the machine to zero for the mass — the conviction, held from Harmand's study to the field officer's report, that the conquered were of a stock that could not be made French and that it was therefore pointless, even dangerous, to try. The refusal to form was not neglect. It was policy, and it was the same policy as the withheld citizenship: a people you have decided can never be admitted is a people you must never form, because to form them toward a belief in your order is to form them toward the membership your doctrine denies them.

The result is legible in the one place formation is always countable, the enrolment figures, and the figures are among the lowest in colonial Africa. Primary enrolment across French West Africa ran at something on the order of half a per cent of the total population — lower, the education historians note, than in the neighbouring British colonies — and in Guinea the overwhelming majority of children, on the order of nineteen in twenty, never saw the inside of a French classroom at all. The mass of the plateau and the savannah and the forest passed their childhoods entirely outside the machine France was running for its own children a schooner's crossing away, and grew up formed by something else.

## The formation that held the field

That something else was the order the Landscape described — the former conquest's robe that had fully taken — and its own formation machine had been running, deep and self-reproducing, for a hundred and seventy years before the first French schoolmaster arrived and went on running after him. The eighteenth-century Fulani jihad that founded the imamate had produced not only a state but a genuine tradition of Islamic learning, carried in Arabic and, strikingly, in the Fulani vernacular written in Arabic script — the tradition scholars call ajami. Its first known Fuuta Jalon practitioner, Cerno Samba Mombeya, who lived from about 1755 to 1852, set out to teach the doctrine to his people in their own tongue and justified the choice in a line that is the mission-statement of a mass formation: I shall use the Fulfulde tongue, he wrote, to explain the dogma. Beneath that literary tradition ran the ordinary machine of the highland childhood, the Quranic school of the karamoko — the teacher — with its graded stages: the first cycle teaching the child to read Arabic and recite the Qur'an, the advanced stages dispensing law and interpretation in Pular, the initiation into prayer and the practices of the brotherhood, the whole amounting, in one description, to a practical catechism that formed the plateau's children into Muslims of the community, knowing their obligations, their calendar, and their place. Whether, as is sometimes claimed, this made highland literacy more widespread than in parts of contemporary Europe cannot be established and should not be asserted; what can be established is the density and the depth of the thing — a real, structured, self-reproducing formation, rich enough to have left the enormous manuscript corpus that scholars are still recovering from the trunks and suitcases of Guinea — and it is the density that matters here, because it is what met the space France left empty. The child France declined to form into a French citizen was formed, thoroughly and from the cradle, into a Muslim subject of an order that experienced itself not as a régime anyone had chosen but as the shape of the world.

France knew this formation for a rival and treated it as one, which is the tell the framework teaches us to read. It did not build a French school to replace the Quranic one, because building that school would have meant forming the mass toward the membership the doctrine forbade; instead it *watched* the Quranic one, developing over the decades a whole politique musulmane of surveillance — census of the marabouts, monitoring of the brotherhoods, wariness of the pilgrimage and the Arabic letter — precisely because it could neither replace the belief nor trust it.

Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took, and Guinea sharpens the tell: the belief France surveilled was not a failed French formation but a fully successful native one, still holding the field France had refused to enter. Normand's marabout, the force that «can only be hostile to us», was the rival formation seen for what it was — an order forming its own next generation, in its own tongue, into a loyalty that was not France's and could not be made France's without admitting the people it formed.

## The few, made useful and kept out

Between the citizen-school of the metropole and the empty setting for the mass, France ran the machine at a third, carefully throttled position: enough formation, for a thin selected few, to produce the auxiliaries the administration could not do without. This is the "just enough" of colonial formation, and its logic is exact — the cercles could not be run, the tax could not be collected, the sick could not be treated, the schools that did exist could not be staffed, without some Africans who could read a French order, keep a French register, and stand between the commandant and the mass; but every increment of formation beyond what those tasks required was a step toward the citizenship the doctrine denied, and so the machine was set to yield the auxiliary and stop short of the equal.

The apparatus that did this was a narrow federal pyramid crowned by the École normale William Ponty — begun at Saint-Louis in 1903, moved to the island of Gorée in 1913 and renamed for the dead Governor-General, moved again to Sébikotane in 1937 — which drew the ablest products of the territories' handful of schools and trained them, in the words of the scholarship, to be «bons maîtres» and «auxiliaires dévoués», good teachers and devoted auxiliaries: schoolmasters, clerks, and, through the linked École de médecine at Dakar, the "African doctors" who assisted the colonial physicians. The historians describe the school's function without euphemism as the selection and co-optation of an indigenous academic elite through domestication, and they note what the education deliberately was not: truncated, diluted from the metropolitan original, terminating early, aimed at particular low-level colonial positions, and lacking the equivalent of a French diploma. The Ponty graduate — the *Pontin* — was formed enough to serve and formed to stop there. Preference in this narrow channel ran, as the settlement of Module 2 would predict, to the sons of the co-opted chiefs and notables, so that

the school reproduced the intermediary class from its own children: the trajectory of a highland notable's son who attended a Quranic school until he was moved into a French one and rose from there into the évolué stratum is the ordinary shape of it, the chief's boy passing from the karamoko's catechism to the commandant's classroom to a career as an auxiliary of the order that had co-opted his father.

And this thin stratum, formed just enough and refused admission, is where the danger the whole study bends toward was seeded. For a man formed partly in the French machine had learned the French creed — the rights of man, the citizen, the Republic — and had then been handed, in place of the citizenship that creed implies, a sujet's status, a low-level post, and a diploma that was not quite a diploma. The évolués of Guinea began, in the interwar years, to gather in associations of their own — a Fulani circle taking the name of a French administrator-ethnographer, a Mandé union, a forest union — bodies the administration permitted as harmless improvement societies and which became, in time, the nuclei of something else. The framework's discipline reserves the political mechanics for the modules on coordination and collapse, and they will be reserved; but the formation module must record what formation built, and what it built was a small class of men who knew France's own creed well enough to hold France to it, and who had been given every reason to want to. The Ponty rolls carry the names of the men who would lead French West Africa out of the empire; Guinea's own would furnish, among others, a founder-secretary of the organisation of independent African states. The machine set to produce devoted auxiliaries produced, at its far edge, the auxiliaries' own gravediggers.

## Reading formation against the framework

The corpus already carries, from the Morocco study, the finding that a colony's withheld formation "leaves the old nation in possession of itself" — that by declining to form the conquered, the coloniser preserves intact the very order that will one day reclaim the country. Guinea confirms that finding at its first setting and adds a second mechanism the corpus has not yet isolated, and the addition is the refinement this module contributes.

The colony does not run formation at two settings but at three, and the third is the dangerous one. There is the full formation the metropole runs on its own children, which makes citizens and installs the cheap robe at home. There is the

zero setting for the conquered mass, which — as Morocco found — leaves the old order's own formation in undisputed possession of the field, so that the mass grows up formed by the former conquest's robe into a loyalty that is not the coloniser's. And there is, between them, the throttled setting: a *capped* formation run on a thin selected elite, calibrated to yield the useful auxiliary and to stop short of the equal. The Morocco finding isolated the first and second and the danger of their combination — an old nation preserved intact beneath a rule that will not form it. Guinea isolates the third and shows that it is the sharper hazard, because the capped formation does something the withheld formation cannot: it produces a stratum formed *partly in the coloniser's own creed and denied the membership that creed entails*, and that stratum is precisely the material of a counter-elite. The refinement to carry forward is that the true peril to a colony is not the withheld formation alone but the *interaction* of the withheld and the capped — a mass formed by an order that is not the coloniser's, standing available beneath an elite the coloniser half-formed in its own creed and then refused to admit. The one supplies the leaders who know the Republic's language well enough to turn it back on the Republic; the other supplies the followers who will move for those leaders because they were never formed to move for France. Neither alone unmakes the colony. Together they are its undoing, and the "just enough" that seemed the cheapest possible formation policy turns out to have built, at its two ends at once, both halves of the thing that ends the arrangement.

This sits exactly where the study's argument has been accumulating. The settlement took the flow and not the ground, and so ran through office rather than land; the robe was one clause that funded the empire at home by the same assertion that forbade admitting the conquered; and formation is that clause enacted upon children — the refusal to form the mass being the refusal to admit them, and the capping of the elite being the same refusal applied to the few who could not be entirely excluded because the administration needed them. And the cost of the whole arrangement is now visible in a form the grim accounting will later have to weigh: France declined to pay the founder's second trade, declined to form the conquered into believers who would hold the order up for free, and it declined because paying would have meant one day having Guineans who were French. So it held the mass by force, at the expensive pole, formed by an order not its own; it formed a thin elite just enough to run the machine and not enough to belong to it; and it left standing, in the space between, the two formations whose eventual

meeting — the créole creed of the évolué joined to the Islamic and customary loyalty of the mass — was the shape the rupture would take. The stocks, France's own doctrine insisted, would never mix. The doctrine was wrong in the way that mattered most: France mixed just enough of one stock into its own formation to produce the men who would lead the other, and it had left the other formed and waiting.

## A note on sources.

The exact primary quotations here are from public-domain or period sources and are given as verified against reproductions. The Ferry school laws — the loi of 16 June 1881 establishing free public primary education and the loi of 28 March 1882 making primary instruction compulsory (ages six to thirteen) and secular — and their stated purpose of forming Republican citizens through the instituteurs (the «hussards noirs de la République») and programmes of national history, geography, secular morality and patriotic song, follow the standard French educational history and the record of the laws, and are paraphrased with the short quoted phrases as reproduced there. Captain Normand's warning of 1902 that «the marabout is slowly creating a force which can only be hostile to us» and would be «a worry for the future of French Africa», and his citation of Marshal Bugeaud's image that the Christian and Muslim "stocks will never mix," are quoted as reproduced (in translation) in Christopher Harrison's study of French Islamic policy in the Fuuta-Jalon, and the earlier French essays and the 1906 Marseilles exhibition guidebook downplaying Fulbe "fanaticism" follow the same source. The line of Cerno Samba Mombeya (c. 1755–1852) — «I shall use the Fulfulde tongue to explain the dogma» — is quoted in the translation given in the scholarship on West African ajami (the *African Studies Review* article on Fulani ajami traditions, and the Boston University African Ajami Library / NEH project on Fuuta Jalon manuscripts), which also documents the density of the Arabic and Pular-ajami literary tradition and the graded Quranic-school pedagogy of the karamoko; the further claim that highland literacy exceeded that of parts of contemporary Europe is noted as a claim that circulates and is not asserted. The enrolment figures — AOF primary enrolment on the order of half a per cent of the total population, lower than in neighbouring British colonies, and the great majority of Guinean children (on the order of nineteen in twenty) unschooled in

French — follow the standard scholarship on AOF education (Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa* and his work on the civilising mission and schooling; Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*; and the education-history literature), and the truncated, auxiliary-oriented character of the education given even to the schooled few is given as their finding. The École normale William Ponty (Saint-Louis 1903, Gorée 1913 and renamed, Sébikotane 1937), its function of forming «bons maîtres» and «auxiliaires dévoués» and of selecting and co-opting an indigenous academic elite, the linked École de médecine de l'AOF at Dakar (1918), the preference for the sons of chiefs and notables, and the emergence of the évolué associations follow the standard scholarship (the openedition studies of the "fabrique du Pontin"; the work on William Ponty and the AOF elite; and Odile Goerg on colonial Guinea for the Guinean évolué associations) and are paraphrased. That numerous Ponty graduates became leaders of the independence era, including a Guinean founder-figure of the Organisation of African Unity (Diallo Telli), follows the standard reference literature. All framework language — formation as the installation of belief, the good subject and the calendar, the cheap and expensive poles, the withheld formation and the old order left in possession, the founder's second trade, and surveillance as the tell of a belief that never took — is developed across the collection (*The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Architect and the Inheritor*, *The Cheapest Hold*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 5 · THE COST COLUMN

# THE DOOR THAT WAS NOT SHUT

*Module 5 · The Cost Column — why the ordinary Guinean complied when he was taxed in a currency he did not hold, drafted for unpaid labour, and punished at a district officer's word: how, with no belief in French rule to make compliance cheap, the whole weight fell on the force dial — the indigénat, the prestation, the chief and the gardes-cercles, held hard and credible; but how the other dial, the exit, was never shut the way Morocco's map and Algeria's permit shut theirs, because Sierra Leone and Liberia were genuinely other orders a man could walk to, and men did; and how an order that keeps quiet by letting its most aggrieved leave has not solved its cost problem but exported it*

## The subject's ledger, not the state's budget

This module asks one question, and it is the question about the man at the bottom rather than about the men who ruled him: why did the ordinary Guinean — the peasant on his fields, the herder on the plateau, the porter on the road — comply? Why did his own reckoning, day after day, come out against revolt, when the order was taking his labour, his crops and his coin and giving him, as the last three modules have shown, no story worth believing in return? The framework's name for that reckoning is the cost column, and the first discipline of the module is to keep it the *subject's* ledger and not the administration's budget. It is not about what France spent to rule Guinea. It is about what compliance cost the Guinean against what revolt or flight would have cost him, and about the two dials that set the balance: how credible the force that would punish him, and whether he had anywhere to go.

Begin with the benefit side of his ledger, because in Guinea it was nearly empty, and its emptiness determines everything else. In an order whose robe has taken, the subject complies in large part for the benefit — because he believes the arrangement is right, or sacred, or simply the way of the world, and his own community enforces it on him for nothing. The Morocco study found a conqueror who had rented exactly such a benefit column: by ruling through a preserved sultan whose obedience was a religious duty, France arranged that defiance of French rule presented itself to the ordinary Moroccan as defiance of God's own commander, punished by his own neighbours at no cost to France, so that the cheapest cost column an occupier ever had was one it inherited already full. Guinea is the opposite case, and the opposition is the whole of this module. Modules 3 and 4 established that France laid no cheap robe over the Guinean mass and formed no belief in French rule into them; their compliance was never bought by conviction, and no Guinean community priced defiance of France as a sin. The benefit column was empty. And an empty benefit column has a hard consequence, stated plainly in the framework's identity of floor and ledger: everything the belief would have carried must now be carried by force. Where the robe does not take, the cost column must be held high by visible coercion — and surveillance and summary punishment, when you find them, are the tell of a belief that never took. Guinea is that tell, everywhere.

## The force dial, held hard

So the first dial was turned as far as it would go, and the machinery that turned it was the ordinary apparatus of French West African rule, bearing directly on the individual in a way Morocco's rented sacred floor never had to. Three instruments filled the Guinean's cost column, and all three reached him where he lived.

The first was the indigénat — the native code, the caste penal law that was the daily texture of a subject's life and the plainest refutation of any claim that French West Africa was an empire of law. It was not a statute but an accreting body of decrees, codified from 1887 and extended across the federation, and it gave the commandant de cercle the power to inflict summary punishment, without trial and without the protections of French law, on any *sujet* — any native who was not one of the tiny class of citizens — under a schedule of "special infractions" that ran from genuine crimes down to acts that were offences only for a native to commit:

disrespect toward France, its symbols or its functionaries; refusal or delay in paying tax; failure to obey an administrative order; the "vagrancy" that meant being found outside one's expected place; the desertion of a labour requisition. The punishments were fines of up to a hundred francs or fifteen days' wages, imprisonment of up to fifteen days, forced labour, and — under the AOF's reorganising texts — the power to intern a man, seize his goods, and confine or banish him from a district for as long as ten years. Corporal punishment was formally outlawed and, the record is clear, used regularly. The signature of the governor was required and was almost always supplied after the fact. In practice the power was arbitrary and constant, exercised by the commandant on his tours and delegated in effect to the chief in the village, so that the ordinary subject lived under a man who could fine, gaol, flog or displace him on his own word for an offence the man himself defined. This is the cost column made flesh: a credible enforcer who could reach the subject, and whom the subject knew could reach him.

The second instrument was forced labour, which the indigénat existed in part to enforce, and which took, in the standard reckoning, four forms at once. There was the prestation, a labour tax that obliged every adult male to give a number of unpaid days each year — on the order of eight to fifteen — to public works, the roads and above all the railway whose corridor the settlement was built around. There was the pressure, backed by the same penal power, to accept labour contracts with private planters, so that the European banana estate of Module 2 received its hands from an administration that recruited them under threat. There was forced labour as punishment, the readiest sanction the indigénat supplied for disobedience or "vagrancy." And there was the forced cultivation of particular crops for sale to a designated buyer. A man who would not go was a man the indigénat could gaol; a man who went was a man whose days and whose harvest were no longer his. The whole of it was carried, at the point of contact, by other Africans — the gardes-cercles, the armed native police of the district, and the canton chief with his handful of guards — so that here too, as at the conquest, the floor pressing on the conquered was manned by the conquered.

The third instrument was the tax itself, and it belongs to the next module in its full working, but it sits in the cost column here as the recurring demand that set the whole machine in motion: a head tax the subject owed every year, in French coin, on pain of the indigénat. The demand's collision with a people who lived by

subsistence and held no coin is the subject of Module 6; its place in this module is caught perfectly in an episode from the Koniagui country of the Senegalese frontier in 1902, recorded in the standard history of colonial Guinea. As long as the local commander levied nothing, there had been no conflict with the Koniagui, who — like the Bassari and the forest peoples of the Liberian border — had never accepted any overlordship and, accustomed to living free, resisted with fierce energy. When a lieutenant came with a column to conduct the levy, the war chief of one village answered that he was ready to pay his tax in millet or in groundnuts but that he knew nothing of money; the officer, in the historian's account ambitious for his own glory, demanded coin and pressed the point in an imperious and provocative way. The answer is the cost column speaking in the subject's own voice: a man willing to render what he had, meeting a demand for what he did not have, backed by a force that would punish the shortfall. Multiply that demand across a territory, renew it every year, and stand the indigénat behind it, and you have the machine that filled the Guinean's cost column — not a belief that made him comply, but a force that made non-compliance cost more than compliance did.

## The dial that was not shut

And yet the Guinean was not a plantation slave or a bound serf, and the reason is the second dial. The force dial was turned hard; the exit dial was not, and this is where Guinea departs most sharply from the other cases in the collection and where the module's finding lives.

The framework holds that the floor beneath extraction is set by exit as much as by force: where the subject has somewhere to flee and survive, his threshold is high and the extractor must leave him enough to make staying worth more than going; where every door is shut — the towns few, the borders sealed, the neighbouring lords colluding to return each other's runaways — the exit dial reads zero and extraction can be driven toward the bone. Morocco's exits, the study of that case found, were closed by geography: Atlantic to the west, Sahara to the south, French Algeria to the east, the Spanish zone and the sea to the north, so that the tightest cage needed no policy and left no archive, and the subject's immobility was later misread as consent. Algeria closed its exits with a document, the permit a native needed to travel. Guinea closed neither. Its interior opened, to the west and south,

onto British Sierra Leone and independent Liberia — not more of the same French order under a different governor, but genuinely other régimes, under other flags, running other machines, whose ports and mines and trade drew Guineans across a border France did not control. To the north and east lay the rest of French West Africa, and even there the internal frontiers were valves: the seasonal migration to the groundnut fields of Senegal, undertaken in part to earn the very coin the tax demanded, and later the pull of the diamond diggings of Sierra Leone.

And the record is plain that people used these doors, and used them precisely to escape the cost column this module has described. Flight across the borders to Sierra Leone and to Liberia is named, in the histories of Guinean resistance, alongside tax evasion and quiet sabotage as one of the ordinary forms that resistance took when armed confrontation was hopeless; and the indigénat and the corvée are identified as direct causes of it, the summary penal regime and the labour requisition incentivising evasion through rural flight and temporary migration, especially among the able-bodied men most wanted for the corvée and the columns. The pattern reaches back to the conquest itself: the last independent almami of the Fuuta Jalon had complained, in the 1890s, of the exodus of his own slaves and free subjects toward the territories the French then controlled, because those were the less oppressive — men voting with their feet toward whichever side of a moving frontier pressed them less. Under the settled colony the frontier stopped moving but the voting continued, now outward, toward the flags that were not French. The exit dial in Guinea was never at zero, and often not close to it.

## What an open door does to the ledger

Set the two dials together and Guinea's cost column comes into focus as a distinctive configuration, and one the corpus has not previously isolated. The hard-force cases the collection has studied — the plantation, the mine, the total serfdom — are cases where both dials are turned against the subject at once: the force terrible *and* the exit shut, so the floor sinks to the bone and the subject, with nothing to lose and nowhere to go, either submits utterly or rises in despair. Guinea turned the first dial hard and left the second open, and the combination did two things to the ordinary subject's ledger that neither dial would have done alone.

First, the open door raised the floor. However hard France turned the force dial, it could not drive the Guinean's extraction to the bone the way a closed-exit plantation could, because a man pressed past a certain point could simply leave — and men did — so that the administration and the planters were always, whether they framed it so or not, bidding against Sierra Leone and Liberia for the labour and the residence of the population they taxed. An extractor who cannot shut the door must leave the subject enough to make staying the better choice, and the presence of a real elsewhere put a limit, imprecise but genuine, beneath how far the extraction could go. Second, and more consequentially for the study's argument, the open door changed the *form* that pressure took when it built. In a closed-exit order the man who can bear no more has only one direction to move, which is up, against the floor, in revolt; in an open-exit order he has another, which is out, across the border, in flight. And flight is the safer gamble by far — revolt against an intact officered force is near-certain death, while flight merely costs a man his land, his kin and his place. So the Guinean who was pressed past endurance tended not to rise but to leave, and the pressure that in a sealed order would have accumulated against the floor until it cracked was instead bled off, man by man, across the frontiers, discharged harmlessly from the order's point of view into Freetown and Monrovia and the Senegalese groundnut fields. This is much of why the settled colony of Guinea, held by a force it never dressed in belief, nonetheless saw so little sustained armed revolt after the conquest: not because the subjects consented — they did not, there being nothing offered them to consent to — and not because they were trapped — they were not, the door standing open — but because the men most likely to have led or filled a revolt were the men most likely to have already walked out of the country.

The frontier peoples are the exception that confirms the rule. Where the exit was nearest and the tax newest — among the Koniagui and Bassari and the forest peoples of the Liberian border, who had never been conquered by any prior overlord and had least reason to think submission normal — resistance was fiercest and longest, because there the cost column was being filled for the first time against people accustomed to living free, and the choice between the new burden and flight was live and bitter. Elsewhere, among populations long habituated by the old order to obeying *some* authority, the burden was borne or escaped rather than fought.

## Reading the cost column against the framework

The framework's account of the subsistence floor, and of the two dials that set it, is confirmed by Guinea and refined by it at the point where the case runs against the corpus's usual pairing.

The collection's hard-extraction cases have tended to pair an expensive-pole cost column — force hard, because belief is absent — with a closed exit, and to find the floor driven toward the bone: the plantation and the mine are the type, and Morocco is the instructive near-inverse, a *cheap* cost column (belief present, force at the margins) with the exit also shut. Guinea completes the square. It is the case of an expensive-pole cost column — held wholly by force, the benefit column empty, the indigénat and the corvée and the tax doing all the work — combined with an exit that stayed *open*, onto orders genuinely other than the one doing the extracting. And the refinement the combination yields is that the exit dial governs not only the *depth* of extraction, which the framework already held, but the *form of resistance*, which it had not isolated. An open exit set beside a hard, unbelieved floor does not produce the submission-or-revolt of the sealed plantation; it produces flight, and flight is a form of resistance that leaves the floor entirely unchallenged while relieving exactly the pressure that would otherwise have tested it. So an order can hold a population by naked force, offering it no belief whatever, and still enjoy long stretches of quiet — not because it has solved the cost problem that an empty benefit column poses, but because it has *exported* it, letting the men who would have risen leave instead, and reading the resulting silence, as conquerors read such silences, as a kind of consent.

That reading carries the sting the study's end will collect, and it can be set down here as the module's forward edge. Quiet bought by leakage is quiet held on two conditions, and both were about to change. It holds only while the force stays credible enough that flight, not revolt, is the sane response to unbearable pressure — and only while the exit keeps drawing off the aggrieved faster than grievance accumulates. Remove the sharpest edge of the force, as the abolition of the indigénat's penalties in 1945 and of forced labour by the Houphouët-Boigny law of 1946 was about to do, and the pressure that had driven men to the border eases at its source while the men who remain lose the daily terror that made them prefer flight or silence to organisation. Give those who stayed a leader and a vehicle —

which the trade unions and the party of the coming modules were about to supply — and the calculation that had produced flight and quiet inverts: a man who would once have walked to Sierra Leone to escape the corvée can now stay and strike against it, because the corvée is going or gone and the striking is beginning to work. An order held by force alone, quiet only because its exit bled off the desperate, has nothing underneath it when the force relaxes and the exit's logic reverses — no belief to fall back on, no consent it ever earned, only a floor whose credibility is about to be tested by a population that never had any reason to hold it up. Morocco could relax its grip and lean on the rented belief beneath; Guinea, having rented no belief and bought its quiet by letting its most aggrieved leave, had nothing to lean on at all. The cost column that is filled entirely by force and drained partly by flight is the cheapest to run while the force is hard and the door is open, and the emptiest when either changes — which is the condition, precisely, of the order this study is watching move toward its end.

## A note on sources.

The primary and load-bearing material here is verified against multiple sources and, where it derives from modern scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The indigénat — its accreting decree form codified from 1887 and extended across French West Africa; the commandant de cercle's power of summary punishment without trial under a schedule of "special infractions" (thirty-four headings later reduced to twelve) running from serious crimes to "disrespect", non-payment of tax, disobedience of orders, "vagrancy", and desertion of labour; the penalties of fines up to a hundred francs or fifteen days' wages, imprisonment up to fifteen days, forced labour, and internment or banishment for up to ten years with seizure of goods; the officially prohibited but regularly used corporal punishment; the after-the-fact governor's signature; and the abolition of its penalties by texts of 22 December 1945 and 20 February 1946 — follows the standard scholarship (Gregory Mann, "What was the indigénat? The 'Empire of Law' in French West Africa"; Isabelle Merle; and the reference literature) and is paraphrased, with the numerical specifics given as reported there and in the reference summaries. The four forms of pre-1946 forced labour (the prestation of roughly eight to fifteen unpaid days per adult male per year on public works, pressured private contracts, punishment-labour under the indigénat, and forced cultivation) and the abolition

of forced labour by the Loi Houphouët-Boigny of 11 April 1946 follow the standard scholarship (Frederick Cooper, especially "Conditions analogous to slavery"; Babacar Fall on forced labour in French West Africa; and the reference literature). The Koniagui episode of 1902 — the frontier peoples' refusal of any overlordship, the war chief's answer that he would pay his tax in millet or groundnuts but knew nothing of money, and the officer's insistence on coin — is drawn from Jean Suret-Canale's history of colonial Guinea and French West Africa and is paraphrased, with the chief's reported words given as reproduced there. The exit valves — flight across the borders to Sierra Leone and Liberia as a documented form of resistance to forced labour and tax; the indigénat and corvée as drivers of rural flight and temporary migration; the seasonal migration to the Senegalese groundnut fields; the later pull of the Sierra Leone diamond diggings; and the commercial pull of Freetown — follow the standard scholarship on Guinean resistance and migration (Suret-Canale; Goerg; and the migration-history literature) and are paraphrased; the almami's complaint of the exodus of slaves and free subjects toward French-controlled territory in the 1890s follows the scholarship on the Fuuta Jalon conquest cited in Module 1. Morocco's closed exits and rented cost column, and Algeria's *permis de voyage*, are as established in those studies. All framework language — the cost column as the subject's ledger, the floor of force as the cost column, the empty benefit column and the expensive pole, the two dials of force and exit, the subsistence floor and its bone, surveillance as the tell of a belief that never took, and flight versus revolt — is developed across the collection (*Just Enough*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Cheapest Hold*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 6 · EXTRACTION

# NO KNOWLEDGE OF MONEY

*Module 6 · Extraction — how the arrangement pulled the surplus off the population: the head tax levied in a currency the subsistence household did not hold, which was therefore not revenue but a labour draft, driving the body toward the plantation, the railway, and the wage-work across the borders; the forced labour taken directly as unpaid days, and the conscription taken as lives; the trade monopoly that bought the crop cheap and sold the import dear; and the cold arithmetic beneath all of it — that the tax the Guinean paid funded chiefly the Frenchmen who collected it, and that the same borders the tax pushed his body toward were the doors through which he could also disappear*

## Following the surplus

Extraction is the plainest of the modules and the one the whole apparatus exists to serve: it is how the arrangement made money — how the surplus of a subsistence society was pulled off it and turned toward the metropole and the men who ran the colony in its name. The floor of Module 1 held the population down; the settlement of Module 2 declared who owned what; the robe and the formation of Modules 3 and 4 explained why the metropole believed and the mass did not; the cost column of Module 5 explained why the ordinary subject complied. This module asks what was taken, by what mechanisms, and how much, and it follows the framework's instruction to read the surplus as a flow drawn at a rate rather than a stock seized whole — because Guinea, as Module 2 established, was a colony of the flow: France wanted the labour and the crops and the coin the population produced year on year, and left the population on its land to keep producing them. The extraction therefore had to keep the Guinean alive and working, which sets it, in principle, at the "just

enough" the framework describes — the edge of the revolt threshold, no lower than the two dials allow. And in Guinea the exit dial of Module 5 stood open, which means the "just enough" floor was raised: France could not drive the extraction to the bone, because a man pressed past endurance could walk to Sierra Leone. Hold that fact, because it turns out to be joined to the extraction's own central engine in a way the module will close on.

That engine was a tax, and understanding what the tax actually was — as opposed to what it was called — is the whole of the module's method.

## The tax that was a labour draft

The instrument at the centre of the extraction was the head tax, the capitation or impôt personnel: a poll tax of a fixed sum, levied on every adult — and in the early years on children too — regardless of what the person earned or held. Its magnitude can be stated. Across French West Africa the average rate ran at something like sixteen francs at 1937 prices, which the economic historians who have reconstructed it reckon at roughly nine days of an average adult's income; it was, in the same reckoning, comparable in weight to the forced-labour obligation, the two together forming the "sweat tax" and the money tax as twin burdens on the same body. It was collected with striking effectiveness — compliance across the federation averaged around ninety per cent from the 1910s to the 1950s — and it was inflexible: when a district suffered a drought or a collapse in the price of its cash crop, the demand was largely unchanged, the shock ignored, the sum still due. By the 1920s the capitation brought on the order of a quarter or more of the colonial state's tax revenue. These are the numbers of the take. But the numbers are not the point of the instrument, and reading them as though the tax were simply revenue is exactly the error the framework's medium-of-payment test exists to prevent.

The operative fact about the head tax is not its rate but what it had to be paid in, and it had to be paid in French francs. Consider what that means levied on a household that lives by subsistence — that grows its food, herds its cattle, weaves or trades in kind, and holds, in the ordinary course of its life, no French coin whatever. Such a household cannot pay a franc tax out of what it has, because it has no francs; it can pay only by *getting* francs, and there are exactly two ways to get them. It can grow a crop the French buy — the bananas, the coffee, the wild rubber, the palm kernels the trading houses exported — and sell it for coin. Or it

can sell its labour for a wage, on a plantation, on the railway, in a town, or by migrating to the groundnut fields of Senegal or, later, the diamond diggings of Sierra Leone. Both roads lead to the same place: out of the subsistence economy the household lived in and into the cash economy the French had built. And this is the mechanism, stated in the framework's terms: *a tax payable in kind is revenue; a tax payable only in the conqueror's currency, levied on a household that holds none, is a labour draft.* No law compelled the Guinean to grow bananas or to work for wages. The compulsion had simply been moved off the statute book, where forced labour was visible and would have troubled the metropole, and into the arithmetic of the household, where it was invisible to anyone reading the tax law in Paris — a lawful, familiar, unremarkable poll tax that happened to have as its necessary consequence the delivery of the taxed population into the labour market and the export economy the collectors had designed.

The colony's own record caught the moment of collision, and it is the scene Module 5 held back for this module. In the Koniagui country on the Senegalese frontier in 1902, among a people who had never accepted any overlordship and lived by their fields, a French lieutenant arrived with a column to levy the tax. The war chief of one village, in the account preserved in the standard history of colonial Guinea, answered that he was willing to pay — that he would render his tax in millet or in groundnuts, the things he had — but that he knew nothing of money. And the officer refused, and demanded coin, and pressed the demand in an imperious and provocative way. Read the refusal for what it reveals, because it is the medium-of-payment test proving itself in the field: if the object had been revenue, the millet and the groundnuts were revenue, and a state that needed to feed its garrisons or fund its works could have taken them and been paid. The insistence on coin from a man who had none, and could get it only by carrying his groundnuts to a French buyer or his body to a French worksite, shows that the object was not the man's grain but the man's entry into the money economy — that the tax was reaching past what he produced to *how* he was to be made to produce it, and for whom. The direction a tax pushes the body is its real purpose, and the Koniagui chief was being pushed, by a demand for coin he could satisfy in only one way, toward the labour and the market that the whole colonial economy was built to absorb.

Two further things the head tax reveals belong here. The first is that its very form is a confession. A conqueror who inherits a working revenue system captures

it, because capturing an existing stream is cheaper than building one and comes with its own legitimacy — as France itself did in the north, where it laid a modern income tax over the developed fiscal life of Algeria and Morocco and imposed no capitation at all. A conqueror who reaches instead for a flat charge on a countable object — a head — has found nothing to capture, and must now build a census, a register, and a headman made responsible for the return; and that apparatus of counting and compelling is the surveillance the cost column of Module 5 was made of. The head tax is thus the fiscal tell of the thin, unlegible substrate the framework predicts, and its confinement to sub-Saharan Africa, with the income tax reserved for the north, is the tell made visible across the whole empire. The second thing is that the head tax sorted the population by caste while naming no caste. It fell on the *sujet* — the native, the non-citizen — and not on the French citizen or the tiny assimilated class; it was, in the oldest meaning of the poll tax across two millennia, the mark of subject status, the levy per head that has distinguished the subject from the citizen since the Roman provinces. But it was called an impôt personnel, a personal tax, formally neutral, so that — like the flat tax Morocco laid over an unequal settlement — it could not be quoted against its authors as the caste tax it was. Everyone in Guinea knew who paid it. The law did not say.

## The days and the lives

Beside the tax that extracted coin stood two institutions that extracted the body directly, without the detour through money, and both belong in the ledger of the take.

The first was forced labour, the "sweat tax," which Module 5 described as coercion and which reappears here as extraction — the surplus taken not as francs but as unpaid days. The prestation obliged each adult male to give a fixed number of days a year, on the order of eight to fifteen, to the public works, above all the roads and the Conakry–Niger railway; the requisition delivered hands to the private planters; the forced-cultivation quotas obliged peasants to grow particular crops for a designated buyer. The magnitude was large: across French West Africa in a single year of the 1920s something on the order of twenty million days of civilian forced labour were worked. This was extraction in its most naked form, the man's time taken from him at the point of the indigénat, and its greatest single

monument — the railway — was built substantially on it, at a cost in lives the grim-accounting module will weigh.

The second was conscription, the "blood tax," the impôt du sang, which extracted not the man's days but his life. Where the British raised their African armies from volunteers, France conscripted, and the tirailleurs who had carried the conquest of Module 1 were drawn, generation after generation, from the same population by a levy of bodies; the term impôt du sang was coined in the First World War, when more than twenty-five thousand West African soldiers died in France's trenches. The head tax, the sweat tax, and the blood tax together are the three faces of a single extraction bearing on a single body — its coin, its days, and its life — and all three fell on the sujet and spared the citizen, sorted by the same silent caste line.

## The monopoly on the exchange

The tax forced the Guinean to grow a crop for sale and to earn a wage; the next mechanism took its cut of both, and it is the one the framing of this module named first — the monopoly on trade. The buying of the colony's produce and the selling of its imports were controlled by a handful of large French import-export houses, with Lebanese and Syrian traders working the retail relay into the interior, so that the cultivator whom the tax had turned into a seller sold his bananas and coffee and rubber to a company at the company's price, and bought his cloth and salt and tools from the same commercial chain at its price, the margin between the two running home to metropolitan shareholders. Around this ran the tariff architecture of the pacte colonial: the colony traded inside the French customs wall, selling preferentially to France and buying preferentially from her, and the banana crop that came to dominate the colony's exports was itself grown up behind a preferential customs duty that guaranteed it the metropolitan market. The extraction was therefore double, and the two halves locked together. The tax manufactured the seller — drove the subsistence household to produce a marketable surplus it would not otherwise have grown — and the monopoly then took the margin on what he sold and on what he bought with the proceeds. A household that had lived outside the market was pushed into it by the demand for coin and then met, at the market's edge, by a buyer and a seller who were the same few firms setting both prices. Bananas and coffee came, by the 1950s, to make up

something like four-fifths of the colony's export value, and the greater part of the plantation capital and the whole of the export trade that handled them were French.

## Who received the take

There remains the coldest question of the extraction, which is where the surplus went, and the answer disposes of the gentlest justification of the whole arrangement. The colonial state of French West Africa was held to self-financing: France's own contribution to its revenue was small, and the colony's administration was paid for out of what the colony's own population was made to yield — the head tax and the customs above all. And what the administration then spent that revenue on was, in the largest part, itself. The reconstruction of the colonial budgets shows the expenditure dominated by the cost of French personnel — a French teacher drawing ten times the salary of an African instructor, the district officers and their cabinets consuming the revenue at the top — with limited funds left over for the schools, the clinics, the wells, the investments that the civilising robe of Module 3 promised and that would have formed the "development" the doctrine of mise en valeur advertised. The tax the Guinean paid, in a coin he had to sell his crop or his labour to obtain, funded chiefly the salaries of the Frenchmen who governed and taxed him. This is the extraction closing its own circle: a surplus taken from the population to pay the apparatus whose function was to take it, dressed at home as the improvement of the taken. It is the plainest possible refutation of the conqueror's account of himself, and it must be set down plainly — while conceding, as the framework's discipline requires, what is true on the other side.

For revenue was genuinely needed and genuinely raised, and taxation as such is not theft; a state that governs must be funded, and the framework does not pretend otherwise. The honest formulation of the objection is not that the head tax was a fraud from the first but that an instrument adopted for the ordinary purpose of revenue was found to do a second thing — to drive a subsistence people into a cash economy and a labour market — and that the second thing was then deliberately designed for, the tax kept payable only in coin and inflexible to shocks precisely because its pressure on the body was useful, the customs bent to grow the crop the tax-driven labour would tend. The objection is to a levy imposed by an

authority the payer had no part in constituting, at a rate he could not contest, in a medium chosen to compel him into a labour market the collectors had built, and whose proceeds paid the collectors. That is a precise charge, and it survives the concession.

## Reading extraction against the framework

The medium-of-payment test, applied to Guinea, works exactly as the framework predicts, and the case's contribution lies not in the test itself but at the seam where this module meets the last one — the point at which the extraction's engine and the cost column's safety valve turn out to be the same thing.

The framework has read the tax-as-labour-draft and the open exit as two separate dynamics. The first is a mechanism of extraction: the franc tax pushes the body toward the place the state wants it — the settler farm, the mine, the groundnut field. The second is a limit on extraction and a form of resistance: where a door stands open onto another order, the subject can flee, the floor is raised, and the pressure discharges harmlessly across the border. Guinea shows that in an open-exit flow colony these are not two systems but one, because the labour the tax manufactures and the flight the pressure produces move through the very same doors. The Guinean whom the head tax drove to earn coin earned much of it by migrating — to the Senegalese groundnut fields, to the Sierra Leone mines, to the coastal towns — and those destinations, across the frontiers into other flags' territory, were the identical routes by which a man fled the corvée and the indigénat altogether. The tax that was meant to deliver the body into the colonial labour market delivered it, by the same movement, to the edge of the colony and sometimes out of it; the extraction's own engine ran on a mobility that was also the exit valve. This fusion is the module's refinement, and it cuts two ways at once. It made the extraction genuinely self-limiting in a manner the closed-exit colonies never had to reckon with: France could not press the tax to the bone, because the migration it induced could always become emigration, and a district squeezed too hard would empty toward Freetown and Monrovia rather than fill the plantations of Guinea. And it tied the Guinean's livelihood, and in time his political horizon, to economies France did not control — his wages paid across a border, his fellow-workers drawn from three colonies and two empires, his experience of labour formed as much in Dakar and Freetown as in Conakry.

That tie is where the extraction hands the study to its ending. The whole apparatus of this module was built on coerced and semi-coerced labour — the tax that forced the body into the market, the prestation that took its days outright, the requisition that delivered it to the planters. When the forced-labour half of that apparatus was struck down in 1946 by the Houphouët-Boigny law, the extraction did not end but narrowed: the tax remained, the trade monopoly remained, the export economy remained, but the labour that fed them could no longer simply be requisitioned and now had to be *bought*. And a labour force that must be bought is a labour force that can bargain, combine, and withhold itself — can, in the framework's own account of how the floor beneath the lowest ever rises, manufacture a cost the master had not previously had to reckon with. The extraction of Guinea, running for fifty years on the sujet's coin and days and life and tempered only by the open border, had by its own operation assembled the thing that would end it: a mobile, wage-earning, cross-border population, schooled in labour across three colonies, which the abolition of 1946 turned from a requisitioned mass into a workforce with the right to organise. The surplus the extraction pulled off that population built the colonial revenue and the metropolitan margin; and the labour market the same extraction manufactured built, by 1946, the union hall. Follow the surplus in Guinea and it leads, in the end, not only to the shareholders of the trading houses but to the general strike — which is the next module's subject, and the beginning of the end of the arrangement.

## A note on sources.

The quantitative and institutional specifics here are drawn from modern scholarship and are paraphrased and credited. The head tax (capitation / impôt personnel) — a fixed-rate regressive poll tax on the adult and teenage population (children in the early years), averaging on the order of sixteen francs at 1937 prices, reckoned at roughly nine days of average adult income and comparable in weight to the forced-labour burden; compliance averaging around ninety per cent from the 1910s to the 1950s; its inflexibility to droughts and cash-crop price collapses; its yield of on the order of a quarter or more of tax revenue by the 1920s; its confinement to sub-Saharan Africa with the income tax reserved for Algeria and Morocco; and its enforcement by the administrative and police apparatus —

follows the recent quantitative work on AOF fiscal history (Denis Cogneau, Zhexun Mo and colleagues; the World Inequality Lab working paper on the blood tax and head tax; Cogneau, Dupraz and colleagues; and the taxation-history literature) and is given as their finding. The "sweat tax" of forced labour and its magnitude (on the order of twenty million civilian forced-labour days across AOF in a single year of the 1920s) follows Marlous van Waijenburg's work on colonial forced labour and the same literature. The "blood tax" (impôt du sang) of conscription, the contrast with British volunteer recruitment, and the figure of more than twenty-five thousand West African soldiers killed in the First World War follow the same scholarship (Cogneau and Mo; and the reference literature on the tirailleurs). The self-financing character of the colonial budget, the domination of expenditure by the cost of French personnel (the French teacher paid ten times the African instructor), and the limited funds left for public investment follow Élise Huillery's work on the cost of colonization in French West Africa ("The Black Man's Burden"). The Koniagui episode of 1902 — the chief's offer to pay in millet or groundnuts, his statement that he knew nothing of money, and the officer's insistence on coin — is drawn from Jean Suret-Canale's history of colonial Guinea and is paraphrased, with the chief's reported words given as reproduced there. The trade monopoly of the French import-export houses with a Lebanese-Syrian retail relay, the banana and coffee export economy and its preferential customs, and bananas and coffee at roughly four-fifths of export value by the 1950s follow Odile Goerg's work on colonial Guinea and the economic-historical literature, as established in Module 2. The abolition of forced labour by the Loi Houphouët-Boigny of 11 April 1946, and the ensuing transformation of the labour question, follow Frederick Cooper's work on labour and decolonisation in French Africa. All framework language — extraction as the flow of surplus, "just enough" and the two dials, the flow/stock reading, the medium-of-payment test and the invented head tax as a tell, the poll tax as the marker of subject status, and the floor that rises when labour can combine — is developed across the collection (*Just Enough*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Three Monopolies*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 7 · INFORMATION AND SUPPRESSION

# YOU ARE GOING THERE TO SUPPRESS THE RDA

*Module 7 · Information and Suppression — the seam between where the story was told and where the cost was paid, and the surprise that for most of the colonial period France had almost nothing to suppress: the extraction was lawful, distant, and unspectacular, held open not by censorship but by the metropole's own incuriosity, while the scandals that did break broke somewhere else, in the concession-atrocities of Equatorial Africa; and how active suppression appeared only at the end, when the colonised forced the seam not by leaking a fact but by acquiring a voice inside the metropole's own institutions — a deputy, a union, a party — at which point the order reached, too late and through the lens of the Cold War, for repression*

## The seam, and the question of what held it

Every colony in this collection runs a seam. Because the robe is reversed — cut, as Module 3 found, for the metropole whose belief funds the conquest rather than for the conquered whose belief the floor does not need — the order has two ends that must be kept from meeting: the end in Paris, where the story of a civilising duty is told and believed, and the end in Guinea, where the cost of the head tax and the corvée and the indigénat is actually paid. The seam is the distance between them, and the framework's usual expectation is that the order's core labour is the keeping of that distance — the concealment, the euphemism, the sealing of the channel, so that the metropole never learns what would turn its belief. This module asks how the Guinea seam was held, and it begins by taking seriously a surprise that has recurred across the

studies and that the case confirms: that for most of the colonial period the seam was held by almost no active labour at all, because the metropole was not trying to look, and there was nothing lurid enough in the looking to make it start.

The framework has a name for this and an instruction about it. Where an order answers to a distant metropole, the seam may be held open not by concealment but by *indifference* — and the two must be told apart, because an uninteresting fact is far safer than a censored one, and the absence of a suppression record may mean not that something was hidden but that nobody was watching. The instruction is to test which held the seam, and Guinea's answer, worked out below, is: indifference did nearly all of it, for nearly the whole period, and the reason indifference sufficed is the same reason the colony was cheap in every other dimension the study has traced. It is only at the very end, when the seam was forced open — and forced not by a leaked fact but by the colonised acquiring a voice inside the metropole's own institutions — that anything the record would recognise as suppression appears at all.

## Held by indifference

Consider what France would have had to hide, and to whom, and the case for indifference makes itself. The extraction of Modules 5 and 6 was, on the documents, entirely lawful. The head tax was a tax, voted and gazetted; the prestation was a labour obligation in the code; the indigénat was a published régime of administrative sanctions; the requisition of labour for the planters ran through legal instruments. There was no crime on the page to conceal, because the whole apparatus had been built, as the settlement module found, precisely so that the taking would take the form of ordinary lawful transactions — property, contract, tax — that a metropolitan reader would walk past as furniture. A thing that is lawful does not need to be hidden; it needs only to be uninteresting, and the administrative extraction of a distant West African territory was profoundly uninteresting to the French public, who had been formed, as Module 4 showed, to experience the empire as the greatness of France and the discharge of a civilising duty, and who had no reason and no invitation to inquire into the price of a banana or the collection of a poll tax four thousand miles away. The colony was also, as Module 6 established, self-financing — it did not cost the metropolitan

taxpayer money, and a possession that does not send a bill does not invite an audit. Distance, lawfulness, dullness, and fiscal self-sufficiency together held the seam shut without anyone in Guinea having to hold it, and the thin record of censorship and suppression from the settled decades is not the trace of a concealment that worked but the trace of a scrutiny that never came.

The clearest proof that this is what held the seam — rather than distance alone, or a censorship efficient enough to leave no record — is that when a French colony *did* produce something lurid enough to be worth looking at, the seam was forced open across the very same distance, by the very same metropolitan press, in the same years. But it was not Guinea, and not French West Africa at all. It was Equatorial Africa. In the interwar years the concession régime of the Congo and the Oubangui — the chartered-company horror that Module 2 noted Guinea had been spared — produced a scandal apparatus of its own. André Gide, touring French Equatorial Africa in 1926 and 1927, published *Voyage au Congo* and *Retour du Tchad*, a cold-angered witness to the exploitation of the rubber gatherers and the porters that reached, and disturbed, literary Paris. Albert Londres followed his tracks and published *Terre d'ébène* in 1929, whose account of the Congo–Océan railway — the line built through the equatorial forest from Brazzaville to the sea between 1921 and 1934 at a cost of something like seventeen to twenty thousand African lives — put the figure in the plainest words the seam ever received: seventeen thousand dead, he wrote, under the blows of a hysterical pack of European overseers and their tirailleurs. The matter reached the Chamber of Deputies, where a parliamentarian rose to draw attention to the pitiable situation of the workers on the Brazzaville railway, where recruitment was by constraint. The seam was forced. And it was forced not because Equatorial Africa was nearer than Guinea — it was farther and worse-connected — but because it had produced a spectacle: a mass death spectacular enough to overcome the metropole's indifference, which the lawful administrative extraction of Guinea never did. The variable that determined whether the seam held was not distance, which was constant, but the spectacle-value of the fact, and a flow-extraction colony that takes its surplus in lawful poll taxes and eight-day corvées produces no spectacle. Guinea was hidden by being dull, and it was dull because it was cheap.

Two further things the Equatorial scandal reveals about the seam belong here, because they qualify the finding in ways the case will need. The first is that even a forced seam was cheaply resealed. The response of the French administration to its

most publicised interwar scandals was, in the judgement of the historians who have studied it, little more than debate, bureaucratic self-inspection, denial, and continuation: the exposés produced a stir, some committees, a beginning of metropolitan conscience — and the forced labour they exposed continued for another two decades, until 1946. This is the leash of Module 3 operating exactly as described: the metropole's belief that France governs justly is a real constraint, and when a scandal threatens it the reflex is to reword and reinspect rather than to stop, because rewording preserves the belief and stopping would concede there was something to stop. A leaked fact, however lurid, could be absorbed by that reflex. The second thing is that the seam toward the *conquered* was never France's to hold at all: the Guinean's own channels of information and interpretation were the ones Module 4 described — the marabout, the Quranic school, the chief — which France surveilled through its *politique musulmane* but never controlled, so that the mass received its account of the world from the old order and not from France. France held the metropolitan end of the seam by indifference and never held the Guinean end by anything. Both facts point the same way: the concealment that mattered was never really concealment. It was the gap between an incurious metropole and a conquered population that spoke to itself, and the order lived in that gap without having to do much to maintain it.

## The seam forced — by a voice, not a fact

If a leaked fact could be reworded and a lurid one was needed even to leak, then what finally forced the Guinea seam open was neither. It was the colonised acquiring the one thing the leash reflex could not absorb: a voice inside the metropole's own institutions. And the door through which that voice entered was opened by the metropole itself, in the reforms of 1945 and 1946 that the extraction module left at its hinge.

After the war, the Fourth Republic gave its African territories the right to send representatives to the National Assembly in Paris; it abolished the indigénat's penalties and, by the Houphouët-Boigny law of 1946, forced labour; it permitted, for the first time, African political parties and trade unions. At a congress in Bamako in October 1946 the African deputies and activists founded the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, an interterritorial federation of parties reaching across French West and Equatorial Africa, whose Guinea section would

become the Parti Démocratique de Guinée. The RDA took its parliamentary support, in those first years, from the French Communist Party, the one metropolitan force then committed to anti-colonialism. And with these instruments — a bloc of deputies in Paris, a party across the federation, a union movement with the right to organise and to strike — the cost paid in Guinea could now be spoken where it would be heard: not smuggled out as a journalist's exposé to be reworded, but declared in the Assembly by a Guinean deputy, or pressed on a strike line that shut a French railway, in the metropole's own language of equality and the rights of man.

The labour movement forced the seam first and hardest. In October 1947 the workers of the French West African railway — some seventeen thousand *cheminots*, with the dockers beside them — struck across the whole federation for wage equality and the conditions their French counterparts enjoyed, and held out, on the main lines, for five months into 1948. This was the seam forced through labour: a strike on a strategic French interest, impossible to ignore because it stopped the trains, and unanswerable by rewording because its demand was the metropole's own stated principle of equal pay for equal work turned back upon the metropole. It entered French consciousness as the interwar scandals never quite had — it would be given its monument in Sembène Ousmane's novel of the strike — because it was not a fact reported *about* the colonised but an act performed *by* them, in a register the Republic could not disown without disowning itself. And it was the school of the man who would end French rule in Guinea: Sékou Touré rose entirely through this channel, through the union, the Confédération Générale du Travail, and made his name by leading a general strike of some two months in 1953 that won a large rise in the minimum wage and the forty-hour week — establishing him, by the mechanism of a labour victory the administration could not prevent, as the undisputed leader of Guinean nationalism.

## The suppression that came too late

And now, at last, the record shows suppression — real, violent, and framed not as the concealment of an extraction but as the containment of a menace. Because the RDA had taken its support from the Communists, and because the Cold War had by 1947 turned France into a battleground and driven the communist ministers out of the French government, the repression that fell on the RDA fell under the

sign of anti-communism. In February 1948 the Minister of Overseas France sent the newly appointed governor to Côte d'Ivoire with an instruction the historian of the episode records in his own words: *you are going there to suppress the RDA*. Between 1947 and 1950, across French sub-Saharan Africa, hundreds of RDA cadres and some of its leadership were injured or killed by the colonial administration and its African auxiliaries, and thousands were imprisoned. Under that duress the RDA's parliamentary leadership severed its tie to the Communist Party in 1950, to save the party from being destroyed piecemeal — a break the grassroots activists of Guinea, whose section was led by the civil servants and trade unionists rather than the planters and chiefs who dominated the Ivorian wing, opposed and resented. The suppression was concentrated where the party's base most threatened the settlement's own beneficiaries, and it was severe.

But mark what this suppression was, and when it came, because it is the module's finding in miniature. It came only after the seam had been forced — not to keep the metropole from learning about the extraction, which the metropole had never much cared to learn and which was in any case now lawful history after 1946, but to break the political power the colonised had assembled inside the metropole's own institutions. It was aimed not at a fact but at a party, a union, a bloc of votes. And it was, by the standards of the cheap concealment that had held the seam for fifty years, enormously expensive and largely self-defeating: repression conducted against deputies who sat in the French Assembly, against unions that struck in the Republic's own legal framework, against a party allied to a legal French party, was itself the kind of thing that forced the seam wider, because it could not be done quietly and it contradicted, in full metropolitan view, the civilising and lawful self-image the whole robe existed to protect. The order had held the seam for half a century by letting an incurious metropole not look; it could not hold it for a decade once the colonised had walked into the room where the metropole did its looking.

## Reading the seam against the framework

The field manual already holds that a colonial seam may be held by indifference rather than concealment, and that the absence of suppression records can mean nobody was watching. Guinea confirms this at full strength and sharpens it in two ways that compound the study's argument.

The first refinement corrects the phrase itself. It is not *distance* that lets indifference hold a seam — the Congo was farther than Guinea and its seam was forced — but the *spectacle-value of the fact*, and distance matters only as one thing that lowers it. An extraction that is lawful, administrative, and undramatic is held by indifference across any distance, because there is nothing in it to overcome the metropole's disinclination to look; an extraction that produces spectacle — a railway paved with the dead — forces the seam across the same distance, because the spectacle supplies the interest that indifference otherwise withholds. This ties the seam directly to everything the study has found about the kind of colony Guinea was. Guinea was held cheaply at the seam for exactly the reasons it was held cheaply everywhere else: it took the flow and not the stock, so it dispossessed no one visibly; it extracted by lawful poll tax and short corvée rather than by the concessionary atrocity of the equatorial forest, so it killed no one spectacularly; it was, in every dimension, the administrative rather than the lurid form of empire. The cheapness that made it easy to run made it easy to hide, because a cheap colony generates nothing worth the metropole's alarm. The corollary is a warning the grim-accounting module will have to heed: the quiet of the Guinea seam is not evidence that little was taken, only that what was taken was taken in a form that left no spectacle — and a method of measuring colonial harm that registers only what forced a scandal will systematically under-count the colonies that were cheap enough to stay quiet.

The second refinement is the sharper one, and it is a finding about how a colonial seam actually breaks. It does not break when a fact leaks, because the leash reflex can absorb a leaked fact by rewording and reinspecting, as the Equatorial scandals were absorbed while the forced labour they exposed ran on for twenty years. It breaks when the excluded acquire *standing inside the metropole's own institutions* — a deputy in the Assembly, a union with the legal right to strike, a party with a metropolitan ally — because at that moment the two cheap methods of holding the seam both fail at once. Indifference fails, because you cannot decline to notice a five-month strike that stops your trains or a deputy who speaks in your own chamber; and rewording fails, because you cannot reword a man who is in the room speaking for himself. The seam is forced not by information but by *enfranchisement*, and this is why the same 1946 reforms that abolished forced labour in the extraction module also began the collapse of the seam in this one: they did not teach the metropole anything new about the colony; they put the

colonised inside the room where the metropole's belief was kept, where nothing they said could any longer be held at the distance the whole order depended on. What remained to the order then was neither indifference nor euphemism but repression, the most expensive and most visible tool on the shelf, and the one whose use inside the metropole's own institutions is itself the scandal it was meant to prevent. The Guinea seam held by indifference for fifty years and broke in a decade — and it broke not because France began hiding less, but because the colonised, handed a voice by the metropole's own reforms, began speaking where the metropole could not help but hear.

## A note on sources.

The primary and load-bearing material here is verified and, where drawn from modern scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The interwar Equatorial scandals — André Gide's *Voyage au Congo* (1927) and *Retour du Tchad* (1928), published through the *Nouvelle Revue Française* and Gallimard; Albert Londres's *Terre d'ébène* (1929) and its figure of some seventeen thousand dead on the Congo–Océan railway (built 1921–1934, with a toll generally estimated between roughly seventeen and twenty thousand African lives); and the raising of the matter in the Chamber of Deputies — are given as reproduced in the standard scholarship and reference literature, Gide's and Londres's works being in the public domain and the Congo–Océan toll given as a contested range. The judgement that even the best-publicised interwar colonial scandals produced "little more than debate, bureaucratic self-inspection, denial, and continuation" follows J. P. Daughton's work on scandal and violence in interwar French Equatorial Africa and is quoted from that scholarship. That Guinea and French West Africa were spared the chartered-concession régime that produced the Equatorial atrocities is as established in Module 2. The post-war reforms enabling African representation in the National Assembly, the abolition of the indigénat's penalties and of forced labour (the Houphouët-Boigny law of 1946), and the authorisation of parties and unions follow the standard scholarship (Frederick Cooper on labour and citizenship; and the reference literature). The founding of the RDA at Bamako in October 1946, its federation of territorial parties (the PDG as its Guinea section), its support from the French Communist Party until the 1950 break, and the repression of 1947–1950 — the Minister of Overseas France's instruction to the

incoming Ivory Coast governor ("you are going there to suppress the RDA"), the hundreds of cadres killed or injured and thousands imprisoned, and the Guinean grassroots' opposition to the PCF break — follow Elizabeth Schmidt's work on Guinea's decolonisation ("Cold War in Guinea" and *Mobilizing the Masses*), from which the minister's quoted instruction is taken, and are paraphrased and credited. The French West African railway strike of October 1947 to March 1948 (some seventeen thousand *cheminots* and dockers striking for wage equality), its literary monument in Sembène Ousmane's *Les Bouts de bois de Dieu*, and Sékou Touré's rise through the CGT and his general strike of 1953 (of roughly two months, winning a substantial minimum-wage rise and the forty-hour week) follow the standard scholarship (Cooper; Schmidt; and the reference literature), with the strike's duration given as reported. All framework language — the seam and its two ends, the reversed robe, concealment versus indifference, the leash and the reword reflex, the *politique musulmane* and the uncontrolled native interpreter class, and enfranchisement as distinct from information — is developed across the collection (*The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Cheapest Hold*, *The Three Monopolies*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 8 · ELITE COORDINATION AND THE DEFAULT

# NO POSITION TO DEFEND

*Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — how a durable order runs not on conspiracy but on the default, each position-holder defending the whole by defending his own place; and how the colonial order broke that default at the two tiers that mattered, foreclosing the rising native elite its own robe forbade it to admit — so that the évolués had no position in the arrangement to defend and became its opponents — while co-opting an intermediary tier of chiefs whose positions were so artificial and resented that defending them was a liability the counter-elite could destroy for applause; and how the PDG then did the one thing that moves a settled order, re-pricing the positions until even a Fulani aristocrat abandoned his, and abolished the chieftaincy outright in 1957*

## The engine that needs no driver

The previous modules have followed the ordinary Guinean, who is, for the purposes of this one, a settled fact: held in his place by the cost column, formed by the old order, extracted from at a rate the open border only partly restrained. This module turns to the other end of the hierarchy, to the elite, and asks the question the framework treats as the master-key to how long an order lasts: how do the people at the top hold together? The tempting answer is conspiracy — that the powerful coordinate their domination by design. The framework's answer, worked out across the corpus and stated most fully in the study of the default, is that a durable order needs no conspiracy, because it has arranged for its own reproduction to ride on the most ordinary motive there is. Each person up and down the hierarchy defends his own position, for the plain reason that his position is what sustains him; and because the arrangement is what

makes his position worth having, defending his position *is*, by default, defending the whole arrangement — without his ever forming the intention, the way a man walking to his own door wears the path that everyone after him will follow. The order reproduces itself through self-interest, needing no cabal because the structure performs the cabal's office. When it is threatened, the parallel self-defence of a thousand position-holders converges into real coordination, which the cynic mistakes for the standing conspiracy he always suspected; and when the threat passes, the coordination dissolves back into the quiet automatic defence of default. This is the engine that needs no driver, and the only lever that has ever moved it is the re-pricing of the positions themselves — raising the cost of defending the old arrangement or the benefit of accepting a new one.

The question for Guinea, then, is not whether the French conspired to hold it — they did not need to — but whether the default ran. And the finding of this module, which is where the case earns its place among the two the study weighs most carefully, is that in Guinea the default was broken at the two tiers that decide an order's fate, and that the break traces, like everything else in this study, to the single clause of the reversed robe. The colonial order foreclosed the one elite whose co-optation would have stabilised it, and co-opted an intermediary tier whose positions were a liability rather than a defence; and so it had made almost no Guinean's self-interest depend on its survival. An order like that does not run by default. It has to be held by force — and when the force relaxes and someone re-prices the positions, there is nothing running underneath to save it.

Take the tiers in turn.

## The metropolitan default: real, but funded from outside

At the top the default ran exactly as the framework describes, but with a qualification that will matter at the end. The administration, the trading houses, and the planters of Module 2 held positions the colony had made, and each defended the colony by defending his position — the official his career and his authority, the company its monopoly, the planter his estate and his supply of requisitioned labour. No one had to coordinate this; the structure did the work, in precisely the impersonal way the theorists of the state have described, whereby an

arrangement is served not because its beneficiaries pull strings but because the whole apparatus structurally depends on the arrangement continuing. This default was genuine and, within the colony, strong. But it was a default of *metropolitan* position-holders, and their positions rested, at one remove, on something outside the colony altogether: the metropole's will to keep it, the belief of Module 3 that funded and manned the enterprise. The colonial administrator's position was worth defending only so long as France wished to have a Guinea to administer; the trading house's monopoly, only so long as the pacte colonial held. The default at the top was therefore contingent in a way the default of a home-grown ruling class is not — it could be emptied not by revolt from below but by a change of mind in Paris, which is the subject of Module 10 and is named here only to mark that even Guinea's strongest default hung from a thread the colony did not hold.

## The co-opted tier: a default that ran, and a liability that grew

Beneath the metropolitan elite sat the tier the settlement module built: the canton chiefs, the co-opted intermediaries who collected the tax, raised the labour, and kept the peace. Here the default ran in the textbook manner — and here is the first of the module's two findings, because the running of it was the order's weakness rather than its strength. The chiefs defended the colonial arrangement because the arrangement was their position: they held their cantons from the commandant's appointment, drew their wage and their rebate from the tax they gathered, and would lose everything the moment French rule ended. So they were, as the historians of the period put it plainly, a ruling class of chiefs who actually supported the colonial government — their self-interest welded to its survival exactly as the default predicts. The trouble was that their positions had been built, as Module 2 found, on nothing of their own. They were artificial where they were not simply appointed, resented as the local face of every exaction, and worth nothing the instant the appointing power weakened, because the appointment had replaced rather than rested on the people's recognition. A default is a defence of the arrangement only where the positions being defended have some legitimacy of their own — where attacking them would cost the attacker something. The Guinean chieftaincy had none. Its defenders defended the arrangement, but they were so illegitimate in the eyes of those they governed that their defence made them

a target, not a shield: a rising counter-elite could attack the arrangement most effectively, and most popularly, precisely by attacking them. The tier that the default was supposed to make into the order's lower rampart was instead its softest point, a set of positions that could be re-priced to nothing because they had been worth nothing to anyone but their holders and France.

## The foreclosed tier: an elite with no position to defend

Now the second and deeper finding, which is where the reversed robe does its work at the level of elite coordination. The framework's account of the default rests on a quiet assumption: that a rising order absorbs its new talent, that the ambitious latecomer *rises within* the arrangement and, having risen, defends it — so that each generation's ablest are converted, by the positions they are given, into new pillars of the whole. This is how a mature order renews itself without conspiracy: it co-opts its rising elite, and the co-optation makes them defenders by default. A colonial order of the French kind could not do this, and could not do it by doctrine. The rising native elite — the évolués of Module 4, formed just enough to be useful, the Ponty men and the union leaders and the clerks — were exactly the people a healthy default would have absorbed, given real positions, and thereby turned into defenders. But absorbing them meant admitting them, and admitting them meant Frenchmen who were Guinean, which the whole robe of Module 3 existed to forbid. Harmand had written it: the subjects cannot be citizens. So the order foreclosed the very elite whose co-optation was the ordinary mechanism of its own renewal, and left them with no position in the arrangement to defend — which is the same thing as leaving them with every reason to attack it. An elite that has been formed to expect a place and then denied one is not a neutral fact; it is the raw material of a counter-elite, and the default, run backwards, works against the order as reliably as it works for it: a man with no position in the arrangement defends, by default, whatever arrangement *would* give him one. France, by the same clause that funded the empire cheaply at home, manufactured on the ground a stratum of able, organised, French-literate men whose self-interest lay not in defending the colony but in ending it.

That stratum built the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, the Guinea section of the interterritorial RDA, and its history is the history of a foreclosed elite

discovering that the mass, too, had no position in the arrangement to defend. For the ordinary Guinean, as Modules 5 and 6 showed, was not a beneficiary of the order but a payer into it — taxed, drafted, extracted from, given nothing to be loyal to. The PDG's genius, under Sékou Touré, was to see that a foreclosed elite and an unattached mass could be joined, and to do the patient work of joining them: the party spent the early 1950s losing elections to the conservative parties of the notables and then building, in depth, a cross-ethnic mass organisation reaching the rural majority — some four-fifths of the population — and the women and the young whom no notable party had troubled to organise. Where the chiefs and the aristocratic parties, the Bloc Africain de Guinée and its like, represented the tier whose positions were tied to the colonial arrangement, the PDG represented everyone the arrangement had given nothing to keep — and that, in a colony, was almost everyone.

## Re-pricing the positions

What the PDG then did is the clearest illustration in the study of the framework's lever, the one thing that moves a settled order: it re-priced the positions. It could not argue the colonial arrangement away, and it did not try to unmask a conspiracy that was not there. It changed the arithmetic. Through the strikes of Module 7 it made defending the arrangement costly — a struck railway, a stopped port, a general strike the administration could not break. Through the ballot, opened by the reforms, it made the new order attainable — a vote for the PDG was a vote that counted, and counted more each year. And it offered, in place of the positions the colony had denied, new ones the coming order would supply: dignity for the mass, careers for the évolués, and — most pointedly — the destruction of the chiefs who had lorded the tax and the corvée over the villages. In the oratory of the campaign, Touré framed the choice as one between servitude and a free sky, between the chain and the horizon; and he made a spectacle of the re-pricing by placing at his own side, as co-leader of the party, Saïfoulaye Diallo, a man of the Fuuta Jalon aristocracy who had abandoned the position his birth assigned him to stand with the movement against his own class. The image was exact: the re-pricing had grown strong enough that even a man born to the co-opted tier now found his interest lay in ending the arrangement rather than defending it. When the positions are re-priced far enough, even the default's own beneficiaries defect.

The colonial order responded as the framework says a threatened order responds — not with a standing conspiracy, which it never had, but with a reactive convergence of its position-holders against the common danger. The administration backed the conservative parties, propped the chiefs, and, in the by-election of 1954, rigged the count to keep Touré out of the National Assembly, a fraud a French minister would admit fourteen years later; and it repressed the RDA, as Module 7 traced, under the sign of anti-communism. This is the cabal the cynic always expects, assembling out of nothing but many separate interests reading the same threat the same way at the same moment. But it failed, and it failed for the reasons the default analysis predicts. The convergence of a threatened elite out-organises a dispersed challenge only when the challengers are dispersed; the PDG had done the work of concentrating them, welding the foreclosed elite to the unattached mass into a single organised body, so that the usual asymmetry was cancelled. And the metropolitan end of the colonial default, as the next module will show, was itself beginning to empty, its position-holders in Paris starting to re-price the colony from the top even as Touré re-priced it from below. When the reforms of 1956 devolved real power to elected territorial governments, the PDG swept the elections of 1957 — taking on the order of fifty-six of sixty seats — and Touré became vice-president of the Government Council, the effective head of the territory's own administration. And having won the arrangement's own offices, the PDG did the thing that names this module: it abolished the institution of the chieftaincy. The co-opted tier that the French had built as the order's lower rampart was dismantled, not by the power that made it, but by the counter-elite that the same order's foreclosure had produced — and the dismantling was popular, because the positions destroyed had been a liability all along.

## Reading elite coordination against the framework

The framework holds that a mature order runs on the default — each position defended defends the whole — and renews itself by absorbing its rising elite into new positions that make them defenders. Guinea shows a colonial order structurally unable to run that default at the tier that decides an order's survival, and the inability traces to the clause this study has followed from the first module.

The refinement is this. The default is not automatic; it requires that the order be *able* to give its rising elite real positions in the arrangement, because only a position held is a position defended. A colonial order of the French kind cannot meet that requirement, because its reversed robe forbids it to admit the conquered, and admission is exactly what a real position would be. It must therefore foreclose its rising native elite — and foreclosure runs the default in reverse, converting the ablest of the conquered from the defenders they would have become into the counter-elite they are instead. The colony breeds its own opposition by the same clause that funds it at home: the assertion of a superiority too deep to let the conquered in is, at the level of elite coordination, the refusal to run the default at the rising-elite tier, which guarantees that tier will organise against the order rather than for it. And the corollary sharpens the default analysis itself, for it shows that co-optation can be done so badly that it produces a liability rather than a defence. The intermediary tier the colonial order *did* co-opt, the chiefs, it co-opted onto positions so artificial and so resented that their defence of the arrangement made them its softest target — re-priceable to nothing by a counter-elite that gained popularity by destroying them. The colonial default was thus broken at both of the tiers a domestic order relies on: it foreclosed the elite it should have absorbed, and it co-opted an elite it would have done better to legitimate or to leave alone. Between the foreclosed évolués with no position to defend and the artificial chiefs whose positions were a liability, and above a mass that had never been given anything to be loyal to, the colonial order in Guinea had arranged for almost no one's self-interest to depend on its survival. It had built the opposite of a default.

This is why the lever, when it came, met so little resistance, and it is the deepest sense in which this module confirms the study's accumulating argument. The framework's founding image is of the machine that runs itself — an order maintained tirelessly and without direction by people merely minding their own positions. The colonial machine in Guinea did not run itself, because it had made too few positions that its survival was worth minding. It had to be held by force and surveillance, as Modules 5 and 7 showed, precisely because the default that holds cheaper orders for free was not available to it: an order that will not admit its subjects cannot make them into defenders, and an order that makes its intermediaries hated cannot shelter behind them. So when the counter-elite re-priced the positions — made defending the colonial arrangement costly and accepting the new one attractive, until even a chief's son defected and the mass and

the évolués moved as one body — there was nothing running by default to absorb the shock. The re-pricing that would have met a wall of self-defending position-holders in a mature domestic order met, in Guinea, almost nothing, because the reversed robe had spent sixty years making sure the conquered had no position in the arrangement worth defending. The machine that runs itself is cheap and durable; the machine that must be held by force, having created no defenders of its own, is expensive and brittle, and falls the moment the hand slips. Guinea had built the second machine, by the same clause that had seemed, at home, to build the first so cheaply — and the next module turns to the moment the hand slipped.

## A note on sources.

The narrative and quantitative specifics here are verified and, where drawn from modern scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The reforms devolving power to elected African territorial governments — the *loi-cadre* (the Defferre outline law) of 23 June 1956, universal suffrage, and the government councils headed by African vice-presidents under French governors — follow the standard scholarship and reference literature. The PDG's electoral trajectory — its early defeats to the conservative and notable parties (the Bloc Africain de Guinée under Diawadou Barry, the SFIO-linked DSG of Yacine Diallo), its deliberate turn after 1954 to organising the rural masses (about four-fifths of the population), women, and youth, its sweep of the territorial elections of 31 March 1957 (on the order of fifty-six of sixty seats), Sékou Touré's accession as vice-president of the Government Council, and the party's subsequent abolition of the chieftaincy — follows the standard scholarship on Guinean decolonisation (Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses* and her work on the PDG; R. W. Johnson and the work reflected in the SOAS scholarship on France and the PDG; and the reference literature) and is paraphrased, with seat figures given as reported. That the ruling class of chiefs supported the colonial government, and that the PDG mobilised the masses against both the administration and the chiefs, follows the same scholarship. The rigging of the 1954 by-election to keep Touré from the National Assembly, later admitted by the French minister Robert Buron (1968), follows the standard reference account. Sékou Touré's accumulation of offices in 1957 (deputy, mayor of Conakry, president of the UGTAN union federation, vice-president of the Government Council, PDG secretary-general, RDA leadership) follows the

biographical literature. Saïfoulaye Diallo's aristocratic Fuuta Jalon origins and his role as co-leader of the PDG follow the reference literature; Touré's campaign oratory (the choice between "servitude and a free sky," "your chain and the horizon," and the invocation of a chief who abandoned his chieftaincy for freedom) is given as reported in that literature and rendered as reported rather than as a verified verbatim transcript. All framework language — the default and position-logic, the machine that runs itself, co-optation and foreclosure, reactive convergence versus standing conspiracy (with Lindblom's "privileged position of business" and Poulantzas's structural state, and the collective-action asymmetry), and the re-pricing of positions as the only lever — is developed across the collection (*By Default*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Cheapest Hold*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 9 · PLURALITY OR FORECLOSURE

# THE DOUBLE COLLEGE

*Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — the test of whether liberty was ever really there behind the rhetoric: how the colonial order held all three monopolies in one hand, so that the Guinean sujet had no liberty whatever regardless of the rights of man, the indigénat standing where due process should have been; how liberty appeared only as the residue of a contestability the colonised forced from below — the citizenship of the loi Lamine Guèye, the abolition of the indigénat, the franchise — each gain leaving a right behind it; how that residue was leashed, the African's vote weighted into a separate college and his citizenship tiered by personal status; and how, because the reversed robe forbade the participation the residue seemed to promise, the contestability resolved not into a share in a continuing order but into exit — and then, the struggle won, the liberty it had produced vanished into the single hand of the party that had won it*

## The master question, and where liberty comes from

This is the module the whole framework points toward, because it asks, of any order, the single question that most decides how free or foreclosed its people are: are the three monopolies — the violence, the wealth, the trusted information — held by one hand, or are they genuinely pried apart into hands that can check one another? Foreclosure is the name for the first, plurality for the second, and the framework's hardest-won finding about liberty follows from the distinction. Liberty is not a value that descends on the deserving, nor a gift a generous ruler bestows; it is a *residue*. Where several centres of power have had to bargain with one another for protection against one another, they leave

behind them, as the sediment of their mutual fear, the things we call rights — due process, which is a protection wrung from a sword by those it could not simply crush; free speech, which survives where no single hand owns every channel; the independent court, the charter, the franchise, each of them the fossilised record of a moment when power had to treat with power because it could not swallow it whole. Where the monopolies converge into one hand, liberty erodes no matter how loud the rhetoric of freedom, because there is no longer any faction whose self-protection would leave a right behind. And where they are pried apart, liberty accretes, not because anyone intends it but because the factions fighting for protection from each other cannot help depositing it. The question the framing of this module asks — of the states that do have liberties, what are the dynamics? — has that answer: the dynamic is contestability, and liberty is what it leaves on the ground. This module tests Guinea against it, and the test has two halves, because Guinea was two orders in succession: a colonial order of near-total foreclosure, and a brief decolonising order of forced and leashed plurality that resolved, in the end, not into liberty but into a new foreclosure.

## Foreclosure, and the loudest rhetoric of all

Take the colonial order first, and it is the framework's cleanest case of foreclosure, made sharper by the fact that the rhetoric of liberty laid over it was the loudest in the world. France held all three monopolies in Guinea in a single hand. It held the violence — the floor of Module 1, the army, the gardes-cercles. It held the wealth — the domaine, the trade monopoly, the tax of Modules 2 and 6. It held the trusted information, toward the metropole through the reversed robe of Module 3 and toward the conquered by surveilling the native channels it could not replace. There was no second hand. No African held a share of any monopoly that could check the others; no court could find against the administration on a subject's behalf; no press the administration did not tolerate; no franchise, no assembly, no vote. And over this total concentration France flew the flag of the rights of man — the Republic of 1789, the abolition of 1848, the civilising mission that promised liberty as its very cargo. The contradiction is the module's first lesson, and it is exactly the one the framing predicts: rhetoric without plural institutions is not liberty, and the colony proves it at the extreme, because nowhere was the language

of freedom more fluent and nowhere was the substance of it more totally absent for the people ruled.

The instrument that fixed the absence in law was the status of the *sujet*. The Guinean was not a citizen but a subject — an *indigène* — and the distinction was the whole architecture of foreclosure rendered as a legal category. Where Senegal had its Four Communes, whose inhabitants were citizens with the vote, Guinea had no such enclave, so that its population was, to a man and woman, subjects without political existence. And the daily texture of subject status was the indigénat of Module 5, which the framing of this module lets us see for what it constitutionally was: the negation of due process, a régime of summary administrative punishment without trial, imposed — in the words of the historians who have described it — as an exceptional disciplinary code whose function was to remind the subject that the French were the masters. Due process is the residue a sword leaves when it must bargain with those it cannot crush; the indigénat is what stands in its place where the sword bargains with no one, a machinery for punishing without the forms that a plural order would have forced upon it. The colonial order in Guinea had no such forms because it had no plurality to generate them. All three monopolies in one hand, and the subject with no share of any — this is foreclosure entire, and it is why the subject had no liberty regardless of what was proclaimed four thousand miles away in his rulers' name.

## The residue forced from below

Liberty, when it came, came exactly as the framework says it must — not as a gift but as a residue, and not from French principle but from the colonised forcing a contestability France had to answer. The reforms after 1945 that the extraction and seam modules met at their hinges were, read through this module, the record of the conquered acquiring shares in the monopolies and leaving rights behind as they did. Africans were elected, for the first time, to the assembly that would write the Fourth Republic's constitution — Guinea sending Yacine Diallo in October 1945 — so that the wealth-and-violence monopoly of the colonial state now faced, in the metropole's own chamber, a handful of hands it did not hold. And in 1946 the sediment of that contestation was deposited as law. The loi Lamine Guèye, proposed by the Senegalese deputy and mayor of Dakar, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in April and promulgated on the seventh of May 1946,

declared in a single sweeping article that from the first of June all nationals of the overseas territories — Algeria included — held the quality of citizen on the same footing as the French nationals of the metropole. It is a sentence worth setting down in its own weight, because it abolished at a stroke the sujet status that had been the legal form of foreclosure, and struck down with it the indigénat that had stood where due process should have been. Contemporaries reached for the grandest precedent they knew and compared it to the Edict of Caracalla, the decree by which a Roman emperor had made citizens of all the free inhabitants of his empire — and the comparison is more apt than they meant, for reasons the module will come to. Around this central deposit lay others: the right, at last, to form parties and trade unions, which gave the colonised a share of the information monopoly and a hand on the wealth monopoly through the strike; the franchise, extended in stages; elected territorial councils. Each was a right, and each was left behind by the same process — the colonised pressing a claim, France conceding what it could not refuse, the concession hardening into an institution. The residue was real. For a decade, Guinea had more liberty than it had ever had, and every grain of it was the sediment of a contest.

## Counting the leash

But the framework's discipline is to count the leash as carefully as the grant, and the residue of 1945 to 1956 was leashed at every point, so that the plurality it created was partial, weighted, and revocable — a foreclosure persisting inside the forms of liberty. Count it.

The vote was given and rigged in the giving. By the ordinance of August 1945, overseas elections were held in a *double college*: one college for the French citizens and the citizens of the Four Communes, and a separate college for the *indigènes*, the subjects-become-citizens of the empire — two colleges electing to the same body, but weighted so that the small European-and-assimilated first college returned a share of the seats grossly disproportionate to its numbers, and the vast African second college a share far below its own. The African could now vote, but his vote was penned in a college built to count for less, and the penning was the point: a franchise conceded in form and hollowed in weight, so that the assembly it filled could never be carried by African numbers alone. The citizenship, too, was tiered. The loi Lamine Guèye made the African a citizen, but a citizen of *personal*

*status* — able to retain his customary or Muslim civil status rather than the French one, which sounded like respect and functioned like a ceiling, since only the citizen of full French civil status held the plenitude of civil and political rights, and the African who kept his personal status held a citizenship that was, in the historians' plain judgement, limited in execution and partial in fact. And the powers the residue purchased were themselves leashed: the territorial councils of 1946 were consultative, able to approve a budget but not to govern; and where the leash of law was not enough, the leash of fraud served, as in the by-election of 1954 that France rigged to keep Sékou Touré out of the National Assembly. Only in 1956, with the loi-cadre, were the double college dissolved into a single college, universal suffrage established, and real executive power devolved to the territories — the fullest plurality the colonial period would see, and it arrived, as the modules to come will show, barely two years before the whole arrangement was put to the vote and ended. The leash, counted, tells the truth the rhetoric of citizenship obscured: for most of the decade the plurality was a controlled one, the monopolies still substantially in France's hand, the African's new share weighted and tiered and consultative — liberty extended precisely far enough to be a residue and not far enough to be a transfer of power.

## Participation or exit

Now the module's central finding, which is a refinement of the framework's account of what contestability produces, and which the two great figures of these years embody so exactly that they can be read as the fork itself. Contestability leaves a residue of rights — but that residue can crystallise in two quite different ways, and the colony reveals the difference because it takes the second road where a domestic order takes the first.

In a domestic order, the contestability of factions resolves, characteristically, toward *participation*: the barons who wring a charter from the king do not leave the realm, they take a permanent share in a continuing order, and the residue of their contest hardens into rights that stabilise a plural version of the same polity. The residue is a share in the order, held henceforth against the crown. This is the classic liberty story, and it is the resolution Lamine Guèye himself sought for Africa. The doyen of French African politicians wanted the residue to become participation: he demanded that the laws of France be applied equally to all, at

home and overseas; he attacked, in the standard account, the discriminatory and autocratic aspects of colonial rule but never colonial rule itself; he laboured to demonstrate the compatibility of French citizenship and African civil status; and in 1958, when the choice finally came, he would argue for remaining within a reformed French Community. His was the participation road — the residue as a permanent equal share in a continuing France — and it is the road the Caracalla comparison truly illuminates, for Caracalla too extended citizenship not to free his subjects but to bind them more completely into his order, the citizenship a tool of the arrangement and not an exit from it.

But the participation road, in a colony of the French kind, was foreclosed by the same clause that had foreclosed everything else — the reversed robe of Module 3, the doctrine that the subject could not be made a citizen because he could not be admitted. And the leash of this module is that doctrine made administrative: the citizenship tiered by personal status, the vote weighted into a second college, the execution limited, precisely because full participation — the African as an equal French citizen in undiminished numbers — was the one thing the robe could not allow, since it would have meant the metropole outvoted in its own empire by the people it had conquered. Frederick Cooper has traced how the Africans of these years first sought, in good faith and at length, exactly the participation Lamine Guèye articulated — equal citizenship within a French Union — and turned toward independence only as it became clear that France would concede the citizenship's name while withholding its substance, would offer the residue and leash it, would extend the franchise and weight it, forever. And when participation is foreclosed, contestability takes the only other road it can, which is *exit*: the residue crystallises not as a share in a continuing order but as the means to end it. The citizenship becomes the ground for a national citizenship; the franchise becomes the instrument of a vote to leave; the party built to contest the order becomes the state that replaces it. Sékou Touré is the exit road as Lamine Guèye is the participation road, and the finding of this module is that the colony drives to the second because its founding clause forbids the first. The same dynamic — contestability leaving a residue of rights — produces, in a domestic order, rights of participation, and in a colonial order, rights of exit, and the reversed robe is the whole of the difference.

## The residue re-occupied

There remains the darkest turn, and it is the one that most sharply answers the module's question about the dynamics of liberty, because it shows those dynamics running in reverse. The liberty of 1945 to 1958 was the residue of a contestability — but the contest was between the colonised and France, and a contest ends when one side wins. The residue existed only in the window while the two hands were still bargaining, while the colonised had shares in the monopolies but France still held the rest; and that window was, by its nature, temporary. When the colonised won — when the party carried the territory and then the referendum and then the flag — the contest that had deposited the liberty was over, and the liberty began at once to be re-occupied. The PDG that swept 1957 had already, as Module 8 recorded, wiped out the opposition parties along with the chieftaincy; and the independent Guinea that Module 10 will reach became, within a few years, a one-party state in which the three monopolies — the violence, the wealth, the trusted information — were gathered again into a single hand, now the party's and ultimately one man's, with consequences the final module must weigh. The residue of the anti-colonial contest did not harden into a plural independent order; it was swept up by the victor of the contest that had produced it. This is the framework's most sobering law observed in a single lifetime: the seam is never emptied, only re-occupied, and a subjugated population that crosses a great rupture finds, on the far side, a new coalition controlling the same three monopolies the old one held. The liberty of Guinea's decolonisation was real, and it was the lever of independence, and it did not survive independence, because it had never been a property of the order — it had been a property of the *struggle*, and it died with the struggle's success.

## Reading plurality against the framework

The framework's honest edge holds that liberty is the residue of contestability and that contestability — forcing each of the three monopolies to be held by more than one hand — is the only lever that has ever measurably improved a subjugated population's lot. Guinea confirms this and refines it by distinguishing two resolutions of contestability that the honest edge had held together, and by exposing a fragility particular to the colonial form.

The refinement is that contestability's residue crystallises differently depending on whether the contesting party can be admitted to the order or only exit from it. In a domestic order, where the rising faction can take a permanent share, the residue hardens into *rights of participation* — due process, franchise, representation held henceforth within a continuing plural polity, the liberty stabilising the order that granted it. In a colonial order, where the reversed robe forecloses admission by doctrine, the residue cannot harden into participation, because participation is the one thing the founding clause forbids; so it hardens instead into *rights of exit* — a citizenship that becomes national, a vote that becomes a vote to leave, a party that becomes a state. The two roads are not two temperaments but two structural possibilities, and the colony is driven to the second by the same clause that has driven everything in this study: the assertion of a superiority too deep to admit the conquered forecloses the participation resolution and leaves only the exit resolution available. Lamine Guèye sought participation and could not have it; Touré took exit and could; and the difference between them is not that one was moderate and the other radical but that one tried the road the robe had closed and the other took the road the robe left open. This is why colonial liberty is real but transient in a way domestic liberty is not. Domestic liberty, being a share in a continuing order, persists as long as the plural order does. Colonial liberty, being the residue of a contest aimed at exit, exists only in the window of the struggle and does not survive the victory, because the victor inherits the foreclosure it fought — takes possession of the three monopolies the departing power held, and, having no faction left to bargain with, deposits no further residue and re-occupies the one the struggle left. The framework's grimmest finding stands confirmed at its starkest: there is no durable escape from the three monopolies, only their transfer from hand to hand; the seam is re-occupied and not emptied; and the liberty that blazed up in Guinea between the loi Lamine Guèye and the referendum was not the dawn of a free order but the light thrown off by a struggle, bright while it burned and gone when it was won. The dynamics that produce liberty are the dynamics of contestability — and the same analysis that locates liberty in the contest warns that where the contest ends in a single victor, the liberty ends with it, which is the true and sobering answer to the question this module was built to ask.

## A note on sources.

The primary legal texts here are verified against reproductions and, being public-domain French law, quoted or closely rendered. The loi Lamine Guèye (loi n° 46-940), adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 25 April 1946, promulgated 7 May 1946 and in force from 1 June 1946, declaring that all nationals of the overseas territories (Algeria included) held the quality of citizen on the same footing as metropolitan French nationals, and abolishing the indigénat, is given as reproduced in the standard sources (the text as published in the Journal officiel; the reference and historical literature marking its eightieth anniversary); its comparison to the Edict of Caracalla and its association with Lamine Guèye (SFIO deputy and mayor of Dakar) follow the same sources. The double-college electoral system established by the ordinance of 22 August 1945, the tiered "personal status" citizenship, the consultative character of the 1946 territorial councils, and the establishment of universal suffrage and the single college by the loi-cadre (Defferre) of 23 June 1956 follow the standard scholarship and reference literature and are given as reported, with the judgement that the loi Lamine Guèye's execution was limited in fact drawn from that literature. The absence of Four Communes in Guinea (so that its population were sujets to a person), and the character of the indigénat as an exceptional disciplinary régime reminding subjects that the French were the masters, follow the scholarship established in Module 5 and the anniversary literature on the loi Lamine Guèye. The election of Yacine Diallo for Guinea to the Constituent Assembly in October 1945 follows the reference literature. The interpretation of the decolonisation decade as a movement first toward equal citizenship within France (participation) and only later toward independence (exit) follows Frederick Cooper's *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960* and is credited to it; Lamine Guèye's assimilationist position (equal application of French law, attack on colonial abuses but not colonial rule, advocacy of remaining within the French Community in 1958) follows the biographical and reference literature. The PDG's suppression of opposition parties, and independent Guinea's development into a one-party state concentrating power, follow the scholarship established in Module 8 and are treated fully in the final modules. All framework language — the three monopolies and the master question of plurality versus foreclosure, capture versus contestability, liberty as the residue of contestability, the leash, and the seam re-

occupied rather than emptied — is developed across the collection (*The Three Monopolies*, *By Default*, *Just Enough*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 10 · CHANGE AND COLLAPSE

# NO OBSTACLE

*Module 10 · Change and Collapse — how the order ended, and why the ending was a vote and a withdrawal rather than a war: how the structural change came, as it must, from the elite ledgers and not from a peasant rising — above all from a metropole exhausted by two world wars and bleeding in Algeria, which still had the power to crush Guinea but re-priced whether it was worth the cost and judged it was not; how the counter-elite forced the choice, Sékou Touré telling de Gaulle to his face that there is no dignity without liberty; how the mass mobilisation that delivered the ninety-five per cent NON was real and popular and yet functioned to re-price the elite ledgers rather than to overthrow the apparatus; and how both ledgers repriced to "leave" at once, so that the order fell all at the same moment*

## Who actually makes the change

This is the module the whole study was built to reach, because Guinea is the collection's rupture case — the one French African territory whose colonial order did not survive decolonisation intact, the single territory of the 1958 referendum to answer NON. And it is the module where the framework's discipline about change must be held most firmly, because the temptation to tell the story as a people's uprising is strongest exactly where the people were most visibly involved. The discipline is this: the ordinary subject — the peasant, the herder, the labourer, the smith — does not, by rising, overthrow a functioning state apparatus. A garrisoned, officered, solvent colonial state is not brought down by the anger of the governed, however deep, because anger is not a siege engine and a hoe is not a rifle. When such an order changes, the change comes from within the hierarchy: from a fracture among the elite, from a rival power's intervention, or from exhaustion that alters the elite's own reckoning of whether the arrangement is still worth its cost. The gains of the bottom cluster around the cracks in the floor of force — but the bottom does not make the crack. And in a

colony, the framework tells us exactly where to look for the crack, because the reversed robe means the order runs on the will of the metropole: the elite whose ledger decides the colony's fate sits not in Conakry but in Paris. Guinea confirms this at every point — and it also presents the strongest apparent counter-evidence in the collection, a mass mobilisation so real and so total that it looks, at first, like precisely the people's uprising the framework says does not topple states. Reconciling the two is the work of this module, and the reconciliation is its contribution.

## The metropolitan ledger empties

Begin where the framework says to begin, with the ledger in Paris, because by 1958 it had been re-priced by forces that had nothing to do with Guinea at all. France had been bled by two world wars; it had been broken in Indochina, its army humiliated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954; and in that same year it had entered the Algerian war, which was consuming its soldiers, its treasury, its politics, and its standing in the world. The Fourth Republic itself had collapsed under the strain in the spring of 1958, and Charles de Gaulle had returned to power to write a new constitution and, with it, a new frame for the empire: not the assimilationist Union of 1946 but a French Community, a looser association in which the African territories would have autonomy while France kept the commanding powers. The referendum of 28 September 1958 put this constitution to every territory at once, and de Gaulle attached to it a stark alternative: a territory that voted YES entered the Community; a territory that voted NO took its independence immediately, and took it alone. This was the crack, and it is essential to see what made it. It was not made by Guinean pressure. It was made by the exhaustion of a metropole that had re-priced its whole imperial position after Indochina and amid Algeria — that had come to weigh the benefit of holding its colonies against a cost that two wars had driven past what the benefit could justify. France in 1958 still possessed, beyond any question, the military power to crush Guinea; it had incomparably more force than anything Sékou Touré or the évolués could field, and could have broken them in the field whenever it chose. The change did not come because France lacked the power to hold Guinea. It came because the metropolitan elite had re-priced whether holding Guinea was worth the power it would cost — and,

for a territory it judged marginal, in a year it could not spare the trouble, the answer was turning to no.

De Gaulle said as much, and his words are the metropolitan repricing made audible. When Touré's defiance reached him at Conakry, he replied with cold brevity that independence was Guinea's for the taking — that it could have it by voting NO — and that France, in that case, «d'obstacles, elle n'en fera pas»: France would put no obstacle in the way. It would draw the consequences, he warned; but it would not fight to keep her. And in private, by the accounts that have come down, he was blunter still, telling his circle that Guinea was not indispensable to France and could take its responsibilities. There is the ledger, totalled in a sentence. Not "Guinea cannot be held" — it could — but "Guinea is not worth holding," which is a different judgement entirely, and the one that the framework says makes empires let go. The crack in the floor of force through which Guinea's independence came was opened in Paris, by a metropole re-pricing its exhausted empire, and not in Conakry by anyone Conakry could put in the streets.

## The counter-elite forces the choice

But a crack is an opportunity, not an outcome, and here the counter-elite of Module 8 did its decisive work — not by making the crack, which it could not, but by forcing the metropole to the moment of choice and by ensuring that when the choice came, it went to exit. Sékou Touré and the PDG had spent a decade re-pricing the colonial arrangement from below, as Module 8 traced; and at Conakry, on the twenty-fifth of August 1958, standing before de Gaulle in a white boubou at thirty-six against the general's sixty-seven, Touré re-priced it to the metropole's face, in words that would enter the political legend of the continent. A people's first and indispensable need, he said, was its dignity; and there was no dignity without liberty, for every imposed and endured constraint degrades the one it weighs on, strips from him a part of his quality as a man, and arbitrarily makes of him an inferior being. And then the sentence that named the whole rupture: «Nous préférons la pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l'esclavage» — we prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery. Read it against everything the study has established and it is not rhetoric but a ledger stated as a principle. The colony had always offered a trade — riches, the mise en valeur of Module 6, development and the franc zone and the metropolitan market, at the price of the subjection the

whole order rested on. Touré rejected the trade in the only terms that could not be leashed: he priced dignity above wealth and liberty above the security of the arrangement, and in doing so he forced the choice the metropole had offered to a NO. His was the exit resolution of Module 9 spoken aloud, and it was aimed as precisely at de Gaulle's ledger as at his own people's, for it made plain that Guinea would not be held cheaply within the Community, that keeping it would mean keeping it against its declared will — which was exactly the cost the exhausted metropole had already decided not to pay. The PDG broke with the rest of the RDA, whose leaders wished to remain within the Community, and carried the NO alone.

## The mass, and what its mobilisation did

Now the hard part, the part where the honest historian and the framework seem to collide, and where the module earns its keep by showing they do not. For the NON was not a narrow elite manoeuvre. It was a landslide of the whole people: on a turnout above eighty-five per cent, more than 1,130,000 Guineans voted against the constitution and fewer than 57,000 for it, a rejection of over ninety-five per cent, in a territory that stood alone against every other in French Africa, all of which voted heavily YES. And the scholarship that has looked most closely at how that landslide was produced — Elizabeth Schmidt's work above all — shows that it was the product of a genuine and deep grassroots mobilisation: the PDG's organisation reaching into the villages and the markets, the trade unions, and, centrally, the women and the young, who canvassed and chanted and turned the vote into a mass act of the ordinary Guinean. This is real, and the framework must not be allowed to flatten it into a Touré stage-managing a passive population, because that would be false to the evidence and false in a way that matters. The mobilisation happened; the people were its engine; the NON was theirs.

The reconciliation is not to deny the mobilisation but to see precisely what work it did in the structure of the change, and it is this: the mass mobilisation was real and decisive for the *outcome*, and its structural *function* was to re-price the elite ledgers, not to overthrow the apparatus. Notice what the people did and did not do. They did not storm the garrisons, seize the arsenals, or break the colonial state by force — the thing the framework says the common man does not do, and did not do here. They *voted*, in a referendum the metropole had called, organised by a

counter-elite the colony had foreclosed. And the vote did two things, both of them to the ledgers above. It raised, to a height the exhausted metropole would not pay, the price of the alternative to letting go: a ninety-five per cent NON meant that to keep Guinea in the Community against its will, France would have had to crush not a party but a people, to garrison and coerce a united population indefinitely, in the same year it was already doing exactly that, at ruinous cost, in Algeria. The mobilisation made holding Guinea expensive in the one currency the metropole had run out of — willingness — and thereby confirmed the repricing de Gaulle had already half-made. And it delivered to the counter-elite the mandate and the machinery to inherit the state, so that when France let go there was a party ready to take the apparatus whole. The people, in short, did not make the structural change by rising; they made it by voting in numbers that re-priced the metropole's ledger past the point of holding and handed the counter-elite the succession. The common man's energy was a real and necessary input to the change — but it entered the change through the elite ledgers, by altering what holding and letting go would cost the powers that actually decide such things, and not by any independent capacity to topple a state that no peasantry has ever had. Schmidt is right that the mobilisation was real and popular; the framework is right that the structural change ran through the ledgers of the powerful; and the two are the same story told at two levels, because the mobilisation's power was precisely its power to move those ledgers.

## Both ledgers said leave

What made Guinea's rupture clean — a vote and a withdrawal rather than a war — was that both ledgers were re-priced to "leave" at the same moment, and the comparison with the cases where they were not is the proof. Where only the metropole re-prices and the counter-elite does not — as across the rest of French Black Africa in 1958, where Houphouët-Boigny and the other leaders judged their interest to lie inside the Community and voted YES — the territory stays, because the exit ledger reads "remain." Where only the counter-elite re-prices to exit and the metropole does not — as in Algeria, where the settler stake and the army's honour kept France's ledger reading "hold at any cost" — the result is not a clean rupture but a savage war, because one side has decided to leave and the other has decided to fight. Guinea is the case where both ledgers, for their own separate

reasons, totalled the same way at once: the metropole exhausted and judging Guinea not worth the trouble, the counter-elite foreclosed and judging the arrangement worth ending, and the mass, given no belief and no stake across sixty years, judging French rule worth nothing to keep. When all three read "leave," the order does not fight its way out or grind on; it simply ends, on a single day, by a vote — and Guinea declared its independence on 2 October 1958, five weeks after Touré's speech, the first of French sub-Saharan Africa to do so.

The manner of the leaving, though, was the metropole's last decision, and it proves the whole argument about where the change was made, because it was vindictive by *choice*. Touré had not sought a total rupture; in the days after the vote he tried to keep Guinea in the franc zone and to keep French business and technical help, wanting the softest landing the NO allowed. It was France that chose otherwise. Reading the rejection as a personal affront to de Gaulle and a dangerous example to the territories that had voted YES, the French administration withdrew from Guinea within weeks, as completely and as damagingly as it could — pulling out its officials and technicians, taking or destroying the equipment and the records of the state it had run, stripping what could be stripped and breaking what could not, halting all aid, withholding recognition, and, later, moving covertly against the new country's currency to wreck its economy. The destruction was not the reflex of a defeated power but the deliberate act of an intact one making an example: France, which could not be bothered to *hold* Guinea, could be bothered to *punish* it, precisely to raise the price of the NO for anyone else tempted to say it. That is an elite decision from first to last — the metropole disposing of a colony's fate by its own reckoning of cost and example, to the very end. The peasant had voted; the metropole decided how to leave, and left ruin behind it to teach the others.

## Reading change against the framework

The framework holds that structural change in a settled order comes from the elite ledgers and not from a rising of the common man, and that the gains of the bottom cluster around cracks in the floor of force that the bottom does not make. Guinea confirms this — the crack was opened in Paris by a metropole re-pricing its exhausted empire, not in Conakry by a revolt — and it refines the account at

exactly the point where the honest historiography presses hardest, the point of the mass mobilisation.

The refinement is a precise statement of what a popular mobilisation does in a structural change, and it dissolves the apparent conflict between "change is elite" and the evidence that the Guinean people made the NON. A mass mobilisation, even a total one, does not overthrow a functioning apparatus; what it does is re-price the elite ledgers, and it can be entirely decisive by that route without ever becoming the uprising the framework rightly says does not topple states. The Guinean people did not break the colonial state; they voted in numbers that made holding it cost more than the exhausted metropole would pay and that handed the foreclosed counter-elite the succession — operating on the change *through* the ledgers of the powerful, not around them. This is why the mobilisation and the elite-change account are not rivals but the same mechanism seen from below and above: the people's power in a decolonisation is real, but it is the power to alter what the metropole and the counter-elite find it costs to hold or to leave, and it discharges into history through their decisions and not in place of them. The corollary is the condition for a clean rupture, which Guinea meets and its neighbours and Algeria do not: that *both* ledgers re-price to "leave" at once — the metropole judging the colony no longer worth holding and the counter-elite, with a mobilised mass behind it, judging the arrangement worth ending — so that the order falls by a vote rather than by a war or not at all. And the deepest confirmation is the totality of the NO itself, which is the bill for everything the earlier modules recorded. The order could be repudiated by ninety-five per cent of its people because it had given ninety-five per cent of its people nothing to defend: no belief, as Modules 3 and 4 found; no stake in the settlement, as Module 2 found; only the tax and the corvée and the chief, as Modules 5 and 6 found; and a foreclosed elite with every reason to lead the repudiation, as Modules 8 and 9 found. The cheapness that had run the colony — held by force, believed by no one, defended by almost no position-holder among the ruled — is exactly what made its collapse so total the moment the metropole's will emptied. An order with defenders among its subjects falls slowly and in parts, each defended position yielding grudgingly; an order with none falls all at once, on a single day, by a show of hands. Guinea had built the second kind, by the reversed robe that had seemed, at home, to make it so cheap; and when Paris re-priced the empire and Conakry re-priced the arrangement in the same season, the floor that no belief had ever underpinned

simply gave way beneath a people who had been given, in sixty years, not one reason to hold it up. What remained was to count what the sixty years had cost, and to weigh what the NO would come to — which are the last two modules.

## A note on sources.

The primary quotations here are verified against multiple sources, including a recorded original. Sékou Touré's speech to de Gaulle at Conakry on 25 August 1958 — that a people's first need is its dignity, that there is no dignity without liberty because every imposed constraint degrades and diminishes the man it weighs on, and «Nous préférons la pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l'esclavage» ("We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery"), together with his declaration that Guinea would never renounce its natural right to independence — is quoted as reproduced in the standard accounts and the published text of the speech, and the key sentence exists in the sound archive of the Institut national de l'audiovisuel. De Gaulle's reply — that independence was at Guinea's disposal, that it could take it by voting NO, that it would draw the consequences, and that France «d'obstacles, elle n'en fera pas» ("will make no obstacle") — is quoted as reproduced in the standard accounts; his reported private remark that Guinea was not indispensable to France is given as attributed rather than as a verified transcript. The referendum figures for Guinea (28 September 1958) — 1,136,324 against and 56,981 for, 95.22 per cent against, on a turnout of 85.47 per cent of 1,408,500 registered voters — are from the compiled electoral record (Sternberger and others, as reproduced in the reference literature), and the contrast with the heavy YES votes of the other French African territories is from the same records. The metropolitan context (two world wars, the defeat in Indochina and Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the Algerian war from 1954, the fall of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's return in 1958, and the Community offered in the new constitution) follows the standard scholarship and reference literature. The grassroots and especially female and youth character of the mobilisation that produced the NON follows Elizabeth Schmidt's work on Guinean nationalism (*Mobilizing the Masses* and *Cold War in Guinea*) and is credited to it. That Touré did not initially seek total rupture and attempted to preserve ties (the franc zone, French business and technical help), and that France chose instead a rapid and punitive withdrawal — removing personnel and assets within weeks, destroying or stripping infrastructure

and records, halting aid, withholding recognition, and later moving against Guinea's currency — follows the standard scholarship and reference literature on the withdrawal and its aftermath; the more lurid specific accounts of the destruction are given as accounts, with the verified core being the rapid total withdrawal, the asset-stripping and destruction, and the cutting of aid. The independence of Guinea on 2 October 1958 and the adoption of its constitution on 10 November 1958 follow the reference record. All framework language — change as elite chaos and repricing rather than popular overthrow, the floor cracking from above and the bottom's gains clustering around the crack, the reversed robe placing the deciding ledger in the metropole, the two ledgers and the condition for a clean rupture, and the re-pricing of positions as the only lever — is developed across the collection (*Elite Chaos*, *By Default*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, and the field manual) and named where used.

MODULE 11 · THE GRIM ACCOUNTING

# THE DEBT NOT CALLED

*Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — what the sixty years cost, counted in ranges and without flinching: how the metabolic debt that comes due when a conquest destroys the coordination holding a population above its land's carrying capacity was, in Guinea, largely never called, because France preserved the order it milked rather than shattering it, so that the population rose rather than collapsed; how the one place the note did come due is charged to a native conqueror's war-method and not the colonial administration; how the accounting Guinea did pay was therefore the sword's, held high because the belief never took; and how the credit that is real must be granted at full weight and yet pardons nothing*

## Two ledgers of the dead

A grim accounting has to reckon two different kinds of death, and the framework is careful to keep them apart because they have different causes and fall on different pages. The first is the sword's: the people killed in the conquest and in the suppressions that hold the order — the direct, countable dead of battle, reprisal, and repression. The second is subtler and usually larger, and the framework calls it the metabolic debt. An advanced civilisation, by its coordination — its intensive agriculture, its trade in grain, its stores against famine, its division of labour — raises the population it carries above the number the land could feed if that coordination failed; it runs, in effect, a demographic overdraft against the bare carrying capacity of the soil. When a conquest shatters that coordination — burns the granaries, breaks the trade, scatters the labour that the intensive fields require, kills or drives off the administrators who ran the stores and the irrigation — the overdraft is called in, and the population falls, through famine and disease and the collapse of the

systems that had held it up, to the level the broken land can bear. This metabolic note is the great hidden killer of conquests, and across the collection it has often dwarfed the sword: the dead of the destroyed coordination outnumber the dead of the battles that destroyed it, many times over.

The question this module puts to Guinea is which ledger carries the weight, and the answer, which the framing of the module anticipated and the evidence bears out, is the strange and revealing one: in Guinea the metabolic note was, for the most part, never called. The population did not collapse. It rose. And it rose for a reason that runs straight back through this whole study — because France, as the settlement module found, wanted the flow and not the land, and so it preserved the coordinating order it had conquered rather than shattering it, kept the cultivator on his fields and the chief over his canton and the old agricultural and social system substantially intact, because a shattered order produces no flow to extract. The colony that took the least it could take, and ruled through the order it found, was for that very reason the colony that spared its subjects the demographic catastrophe a coordination-destroying conquest brings. Guinea's grim accounting is dominated not by the metabolic note but by the sword — and by a third thing, the chronic and unspectacular harm that leaves no bodies to count and that a ledger of the dead alone would miss entirely.

## The note that came due elsewhere, and in another hand

Before crediting France with the population it did not kill, the accounting must be honest about the depopulation that did occur, because the upper Guinea of the conquest era did suffer something very like the metabolic note — and the honesty consists in charging it to the right account. The devastation of the Malinké country in the last decades of the nineteenth century was real and severe, and it was substantially the work not of the French administrative order but of the native conqueror whose resistance to that order the modern nation most honours: Samory Touré. Samory's Wassoulou empire, built by conquest across the 1870s and 1880s and then defended against the French advance until his capture in 1898, was made and unmade by war, and his war-method destroyed coordination in exactly the way the metabolic note requires. In his campaigns of conquest and still more in his scorched-earth resistance and his great fighting retreat eastward, he

burned and emptied country to deny it to his enemies; and he financed his long war — the arms, the cavalry horses, the powder — by selling captives into slavery on a large scale, so that the population of the lands he fought over was drained by the sword, by the flight from it, and by the slave-caravans that turned people into the price of his resistance. The standard accounts record it without flinching and without simple condemnation: his conquests and his resistance are remembered, in the West African scholarship's own summary, for the great suffering and, in places, the considerable depopulation they caused — and in the same breath for his genuine military and administrative gifts and his long defence of independence, so that he stands in modern Guinea as a national hero and a symbol of anti-colonial resistance, and Sékou Touré would claim descent from him. Both things are true, and the framework's discipline is to hold them together: the man who resisted the coordination-preserving conquest most heroically was himself, in his war, a coordination-destroyer, and the metabolic note that came due in upper Guinea came due substantially under his hand and not France's. This is not a point scored against Samory, whose war was a war of survival against an invader; it is the accounting placed on the correct page. The one great demographic wound of the Guinea conquest era belongs to the native war-method, and France's subsequent order — whatever else is charged to it below — did not repeat it, because France's whole purpose was to keep the population in place and producing, not to burn it out.

## The sword's ledger

What France's order does carry is the sword's own toll, and it must be counted, in the ranges the honest evidence allows and no more precisely than that. The conquest itself, traced in Module 1, was in most of Guinea a cheaper affair than in the settler colonies — the coast taken by treaty, the Fuuta Jalon plateau largely by the manipulation of its own factions and settled at Porédaka in 1896 in an engagement whose casualties, heavy for the outnumbered and out-gunned Imamate force, ran to the low hundreds on the losing side against a handful on the French — but it was not bloodless, and the frontier peoples of the forest and the Senegalese border, who had never accepted any overlordship, were subdued over years and at a cost that was never carefully counted because no one who counted thought their dead worth the tally. To the conquest's dead must be added the

sword's continuing costs across the sixty years: the men taken by the blood tax, the conscription that fed the tirailleurs into France's wars, of whom more than twenty-five thousand West Africans died in the First World War alone and a smaller but real number of them Guinean, with the Second World War taking its own further share; and the dead of the suppressions, above all the repression of the RDA between 1947 and 1950, which killed cadres and militants across French Black Africa in the hundreds and jailed thousands, Guinea taking its portion under the anti-communist campaign of Module 7. And running beneath the countable dead was the toll of the labour extractions — the prestation, the requisition, and above all the construction of the Conakry–Niger railway, driven inland in the century's first years on conscript labour at a cost in lives that, tellingly, no one recorded with any care. That silence is itself a finding of Module 7: the Guinean railway had its dead, but it produced no Gide and no Londres, no exposé and no figure, because its toll — real as it was — never reached the spectacular scale of the Congo–Océan's seventeen thousand that forced the equatorial scandal, and so it left almost no record, and the historian is left able to say honestly only that men died building it and dishonestly nothing more precise. The sword's ledger for Guinea is thus a real but comparatively modest tally of the directly killed, swollen at its edges by the labour dead whom no one counted — a grim page, but not the great slaughter that the metabolic note writes where coordination is destroyed, because in Guinea it was not.

## The harm that leaves no body

And here the accounting must resist its own instrument, because a reckoning that counts only the dead will read Guinea as a gentle colony, and Guinea was not a gentle colony. The warning Module 7 issued about the seam applies with full force to the accounting: a method of measuring harm that registers only what produced a body or a scandal will systematically under-count the colonies that were cheap enough to stay quiet, and Guinea was the quiet colony par excellence. Its characteristic harm was not the massacre but the chronic exaction, distributed across a whole population and across sixty years, spectacular nowhere and total everywhere. It was the head tax of Module 6, some nine days of a man's income drawn off every year in a coin he had to sell his crop or his body to obtain, inflexible in the famine years when it fell hardest. It was the corvée, the eight to fifteen days a

year of unpaid labour, multiplied across the adult men of a territory into the twenty million forced-labour days a year that the federation worked. It was the internal slavery that France declined to abolish and tolerated, in the Fuuta Jalon and the upper country, until the mid-1950s — so that the nation of 1848 governed for half a century through chiefs whose own households held slaves. It was the disruption of families and villages by the labour migration the tax compelled, the young men drawn off to the groundnut fields and the mines, the households left short-handed. None of this killed in a way a coroner could enter, and all of it was harm — the taking of a people's days, their coin, their labour, their dignity, and their consent, year upon year, lawfully and quietly. A grim accounting that omitted it because it produced no corpses would commit exactly the error the whole framework warns against: mistaking the absence of spectacle for the absence of wrong. Guinea killed relatively few and wronged very nearly everyone, and the second half of that sentence is as much a part of the accounting as the first.

## The credit, at full weight

The framework's discipline also requires the other column, granted at full weight and not grudgingly, because a study that could not credit an order's real achievements would be propaganda and not analysis. And Guinea's colonial order has real credits. The largest is the one this module has already half-stated: the peace. France's conquest ended the wars — Samory's above all, but also the raiding of the Fuuta Jalon and the endemic violence of the pre-colonial competition — and in ending them it ended the very coordination-destroying warfare that had been the metabolic note's one caller in the region. The population that rose across the colonial decades, from something on the order of a million and a half or two million early in the century to some three million by the 1950s — the figures uncertain, colonial censuses being what they were, but the direction of travel unmistakable — rose in part because the wars that had drained it had stopped. To the peace can be added the ending of the external slave trade by the decree of 1905; a road and rail and port infrastructure that had not existed before; the beginnings, however thin, of a modern medical presence against the sleeping sickness and the epidemics; and the framework of a territorial administration and a written law. These are real, and the analysis grants them fully.

But the framework's phrase for what such credits do and do not do is exact: legibility is not pardon. To explain the logic of the order, and to grant its achievements at their true weight, is not to absolve it, and the credits of Guinea come attached to the same conditions that qualified them throughout the study. The peace was real and it enabled the extraction — you tax and conscript and requisition a pacified population far more easily than a warring one, and the pacification served the tax as much as it served the peasant. The roads and the railway were real and they served the export economy — the line was laid to carry the crop and the ore to the sea, not to carry the villager to the market, and its route was the route of the extraction. The population rose, and it rose on infrastructure the African had paid for himself, out of the self-financing tax of Module 6, under an administration whose expenditure went in the largest part to the salaries of the Frenchmen who ran it rather than to the schools and clinics the civilising robe had promised. And the peace that ended Samory's wars was, seen structurally, the substitution of one apex's force for another's — France holding the order it inherited by a floor of force whose naked cost, as Module 5 established and as this accounting confirms, was the main debit of the whole enterprise, because the belief that might have held the order cheaply never took. The credit is granted at full weight; it pardons nothing; and it sits on the same page as the tax, the corvée, the tolerated slavery, and the sword.

## Reading the accounting against the framework

The framework's grim accounting distinguishes the sword's toll from the metabolic note, and Guinea refines the relationship between them by showing what determines which one dominates — and the determinant is the flow-versus-stock fork this study has followed from its second module.

The metabolic note is called not by conquest as such but by conquest that *destroys the coordination* holding a population above its land's carrying capacity. It follows that the note is called by the kind of conquest that has reason to destroy that coordination — the extraction-as-stock conquest that wants the land cleared for settlers, or the concession-atrocity that works a population to death for rubber, or the war of expansion and scorched-earth resistance that burns the country to deny it to an enemy. It is *not* called, or is called only lightly, by the extraction-as-

flow conquest that wants the population in place and producing, and therefore preserves the coordinating order it has captured. The metabolic debt and the flow/stock fork are thus the same variable seen from the accounting side: a stock conquest shatters the coordination and calls the note, and its ledger is dominated by the metabolic dead; a flow conquest preserves the coordination and spares the note, and its ledger is dominated instead by the sword. Guinea is the flow conquest, and its accounting is the proof — the metabolic note largely uncalled, the population rising, the great regional depopulation charged to the native war-method that France's flow-preserving order then ended, and the sword's toll and the chronic exaction carrying what weight the ledger bears. The refinement to carry forward is that a colony's body count is not a measure of its gentleness but a signature of its extractive form: a low metabolic toll marks a flow colony that preserved the order it milked, exactly as a catastrophic one marks a stock colony that destroyed it, and the same cheapness that ran Guinea so quietly through all the preceding modules is what kept its demographic catastrophe from ever being written.

Two consequences complete the accounting and hand the study to its close. The first joins this module to Module 5 and names the strange dynamic the framing anticipated: Guinea's is the accounting of an order that preserved its subjects' bodies while never winning their belief. It spared them the metabolic collapse because it kept the coordinating order intact; it held them by naked force because that order's belief was never made to transfer to the new apex; and so it paid in coercion what it saved in coordination, its ledger light on the metabolic page and heavy on the sword's, a population kept alive and kept down at once. The second is the warning that a ledger of the dead must not become a verdict of innocence. The absence of a great slaughter is not the presence of a benefaction; a colony can preserve its subjects' lives and still take, across sixty years, their days and their coin and their labour and their dignity and their voice, and the taking is the harm even where the corpse is not. Guinea killed relatively few and wronged very nearly everyone, held them by a force whose cost was the accounting's chief debit, and rose in numbers on infrastructure they paid for themselves under an order that gave them no belief to hold it up and no share to defend — which is why, when the metropole's will emptied, it fell all at once, and why the last module must weigh what its fall came to, crediting the achievement of the leaving without swallowing the cost of what the leaving left.

## A note on sources.

The figures here are given as ranges and estimates, as the evidence requires. The metabolic-debt framework — that advanced coordination raises population above bare carrying capacity, and that conquest destroying that coordination calls the note as famine and demographic collapse — is the collection's, developed in the field manual and the accounting literature of the corpus. Guinea's colonial-era population growth is given as an estimate with explicit uncertainty: colonial censuses are unreliable, and figures for the early twentieth century (on the order of one and a half to two million) and the 1950s (approaching or exceeding three million, with the United Nations World Population Prospects placing the 1950 population near three million) come from different and non-comparable sources, so that only the direction of travel — growth, not collapse — is asserted with confidence. The devastation and depopulation of the Malinké country under Samory Touré, attributed to his conquests and his scorched-earth resistance and his financing of war by large-scale enslavement of captives, together with the ambiguity of his modern reputation (national hero and symbol of resistance, and cause of great suffering and depopulation), follow the standard scholarship and reference literature (the *Area Handbook* and encyclopaedic summaries drawing on the historians of the Wassoulou state) and are given as their assessment. The conquest casualties (Porédaka in 1896; the protracted subjection of the frontier peoples) follow the sources established in Module 1. The blood tax — more than twenty-five thousand West African soldiers killed in the First World War, with a smaller Guinean share, and further losses in the Second — follows the scholarship established in Module 6 (Cogneau and Mo; the World Inequality Lab working paper). The RDA repression of 1947–1950 follows Module 7 (Schmidt). That the Conakry–Niger railway and the other labour extractions killed men whose toll was never carefully recorded, and that this railway produced no exposé comparable to the Congo–Océan's, follows the scholarship on AOF forced labour and the contrast established in Module 7. The chronic harms (the head tax burden, the corvée days, the tolerated internal slavery to the mid-1950s, the migration-driven disruption) follow the scholarship established in Modules 5 and 6 (Cogneau and colleagues; van Waijenburg; Klein on slavery; Suret-Canale; Goerg). The credits — the ending of the pre-colonial wars and of the external slave trade (the decree of 1905), the road, rail and port infrastructure, and the beginnings of a medical and administrative presence — follow the standard scholarship and are granted at full

weight; the qualification that this infrastructure was self-financed by the taxed population and served the extraction follows Huillery ("The Black Man's Burden") and Module 6. All framework language — the sword's toll and the metabolic note, the flow/stock fork, the cost column held by force where belief does not take, the seam's under-counting of quiet harm, and "legibility is not pardon" — is developed across the collection (the field manual, *Just Enough*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, and *The Cheapest Hold*) and named where used.

MODULE 12 · CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

# AN EXAMPLE TO THE OTHERS

*Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — the study read against its companions and closed on the hardest truth: how Guinea is the corpus's case of total rupture, its deepest parallel not the smooth continuity of Morocco but the other colony that broke away whole, Saint-Domingue; how a metropole that has repriced a colony and let it go extracts one last benefit from the leaving — an example to the others of what a clean break costs — so that France crippled independent Haiti with an indemnity in 1825 and independent Guinea with a vindictive withdrawal and a counterfeit currency in 1958, reaching the same act by the same position-logic a century and a third apart; and how the strongest case against the NON — that "poverty in freedom" became poverty and tyranny both — must be stated in full and answered without flinching*

## Laying it out

This closing module does two things the study has been building toward: it reads Guinea against the other cases in the collection, to see what its shape shares with them and where it diverges; and it ends, as the method requires, on the strongest case that can be made against the reading offered here, stated at full strength and answered without flinching. And it begins by naming the discipline that governs both, which is the discipline of laying it out rather than arguing it. The temptation in a study of colonial rule is to marshal the evidence toward a verdict — to build the case for the prosecution or, less often, for the defence, and to leave the reader persuaded. This study refuses that, and refuses it for a reason that is practical as much as principled. There are those who would defend the colonial enterprise, and the surest way to hand them the argument is to overstate the case against it — to deny the roads, the peace, the population that

rose, the real things that were really built — because a reader who catches the analysis suppressing an inconvenient truth will rightly distrust everything else it says. So the method is to lay it out: the conquest and the pacification; the forced labour and the head tax and the corvée and the tolerated slavery; and, on the same page and at the same weight, the railway and the roads, the ending of the internal wars, the population that grew rather than collapsed. Set the exact debits beside the exact credits, and leave the sum to the reader. The analysis will draw the structural conclusions the framework licenses — about how the order was held, and why, and what it cost — but it will not tell the reader what verdict to reach on the whole, because the whole is a moral question and the reader is the one who must answer it. What the analysis will not permit is a false sum, in either direction — and the strongest false sum, the one this module must end by refusing, is the apologist's, and it can be refused precisely because the arithmetic has been laid out honestly enough to expose it.

## Guinea against the collection

Read against its companions, Guinea is the collection's case of the clean break, and its place is fixed by contrast with the case at the other pole, which is Morocco. Morocco is the study of the smoothest continuity the corpus contains — a conquest that ruled through a preserved sovereign, kept the sultan on his throne and the sacred authority intact, and rented the compliance of the ruled through a legitimacy it did not have to manufacture; and at decolonisation the order held, the sultan becoming the king, the elite and the settlement largely surviving the transfer, the country remaining within the French economic sphere, the machine passing from colonial to national hands with its parts substantially in place. Morocco is convergence: the colonial order and the independent state are, beneath the flag, largely the same order, because the conquest had preserved and ruled through the structures that outlived it. Guinea is the opposite in every register the study has traced. Where Morocco rented a belief, Guinea manufactured none and held its subjects by force; where Morocco preserved and ruled through the sovereign, Guinea hollowed the almamate and built an artificial chieftaincy it could not make legitimate; where Morocco's order converged with the independent state, Guinea's was repudiated whole, by a NON of ninety-five per cent, and its co-opted intermediary tier abolished by the very counter-elite the order's foreclosure had

produced. Guinea is divergence — the total rupture, the case where the order did not hold because, as every module has shown, there was almost nothing holding it but a force that the metropole, in 1958, was no longer willing to spend.

And the divergence has a deeper companion than Morocco, one from the other side of the collection and the other side of an ocean, which the framing of this module rightly reaches for: Saint-Domingue. For Guinea is not the only colony in the corpus that broke away whole. The richest slave colony France ever held broke away in the revolution of 1791 to 1804 — the one successful slave revolution in recorded history — and became Haiti, and the parallel between that rupture and Guinea's is not one of resemblance in their events, which could hardly differ more, but one of structure in what a metropole does to a colony that leaves it entirely. Both were repriced and let go: Saint-Domingue by a France convulsed by its own revolution, its expeditionary army destroyed by Haitian arms and yellow fever, its First Consul turning from the American project toward Europe and selling Louisiana and abandoning the Caribbean ambition; Guinea by a France exhausted by two world wars and Algeria, its president judging the territory not worth the holding. In each case the metropole, having decided the colony was not worth keeping, let it go. And in each case it extracted from the leaving one last benefit — the same benefit, by the same logic, a century and a third apart.

## The last benefit: an example

That benefit was an example, and it is the sharpest convergence the module finds, because it shows a single position-logic producing the same act across two centuries and two continents without anyone needing to remember the first time. Consider Haiti. Having failed to reconquer it, France did not simply recognise the new republic and move on; it withheld recognition for a generation, and then, in 1825, sent King Charles X's envoy to Port-au-Prince with a squadron of fourteen warships and an ordinance demanding, as the price of recognition, an indemnity of a hundred and fifty million gold francs — to compensate the former slaveholders for the "property," principally the enslaved human beings, they had lost. The sum was on the order of ten times Haiti's annual revenue, comparable to what the United States had paid for the whole Louisiana territory; the new nation, unable to pay, borrowed from French banks to do so, and entered the "double debt" that consumed something like four-fifths of its wealth over the following century and

was not discharged until 1947. The former slaves were made to compensate their former masters, at gunpoint, for the crime of having freed themselves — and the effect, and in large part the purpose, was to make Haiti an example: to demonstrate to every other slave colony in the hemisphere, and to France's own planters, that a break from the colonial order would be punished into ruin, that freedom taken would be freedom bankrupted. The first free Black republic was strangled in its cradle by a debt, and the debt was a message to the others.

Now Guinea, in 1958, and the message is the same one. France, having offered the choice and heard the NON, did not let Guinea go quietly. It withdrew, as Modules 10 and 11 recorded, with a vindictiveness that was a deliberate act and not a defeated reflex — pulling out its thousands of officials and technicians within weeks, stripping and destroying the equipment and records of the state, halting all aid, withholding recognition. And then it went further, into covert economic warfare: in 1959 and 1960 the external intelligence service launched Opération Persil, arming and training Guinean exiles against Touré and, in imitation of a wartime German operation, manufacturing counterfeit Guinean banknotes — on the order of hundreds of millions of francs — and flooding them into the new country to wreck its currency, driving inflation past two hundred per cent and aiming at the economic collapse that would bring the government down. The operation failed to topple Touré, but it inflicted real damage, and its purpose is not in doubt, because the historians who have assessed it state it plainly: the disaster of Guinea was to be a warning to the other French African territories to stay within the French sphere of influence. There is the example again — Haiti's indemnity and Guinea's counterfeit francs, the same act of a metropole punishing the colony that broke away whole, to deter the ones it meant to keep.

The framework's account of why the two acts are the same act is the one this study has leaned on throughout, and it is not conspiracy and not memory but position. De Gaulle in 1958 was almost certainly not thinking of Charles X in 1825; he did not need to be. He occupied a position — the head of a metropole that had let one colony go but meant to keep a dozen others inside its economic and political sphere, the Community and what would become Françafrique — and from that position a single logic follows without anyone having to design it: a clean break that succeeds is a standing invitation to the others, and so a clean break must be made to fail, or at least to look like failure, whatever the cost to the departing colony. The position generates the example the way the American property-holder

of the default study generates the defence of the constitution — by pursuing its own plain interest, which here is the deterrence of the other colonies, and reaching thereby an act it never had to plan. Two men a hundred and thirty-three years apart, in the same structural seat, reached the same deed, because the seat and not the man is what produces it. This is the collection's deepest convergence and its coldest: that the punishment of the breakaway colony, to make an example for the others, is not a French cruelty or a Bourbon or a Gaullist choice but a property of the metropolitan position itself, recurring wherever that position recurs, because the interest in deterring the others is built into the seat and does not depend on the character or the memory of whoever sits in it.

## The strongest case against the NON

Now the counter-position, which the method requires be stated at its full strength, and which is strong. It is this: that the NON was a catastrophe, and that everything this study has honoured in it — the dignity, the self-determination, the refusal to be held by force — must be weighed against what it actually brought, which was not freedom but a poverty and an un-freedom together, worse than the colony it replaced. Sékou Touré, who had told de Gaulle that his people preferred poverty in liberty to riches in slavery, delivered his people, within a few years, into a poverty that was also a slavery of its own. He built a one-party dictatorship and a machinery of terror at its heart: Camp Boiro, the Conakry detention camp where, from 1960 to his death in 1984, thousands of Guineans accused of plots real and mostly invented were held without trial, made to sign confessions broadcast on the state radio, and killed by execution or by the "black diet" of enforced starvation and thirst — the toll estimated, in figures that are contested and range widely, from some five thousand at the camp itself to as many as fifty thousand across the regime. He turned on his own: ministers, the old opposition leaders, intellectuals, and eventually his own associates and kin went into the camp, and he made an ethnic enemy of the Fuuta Jalon Fulani, whom his paranoia cast as perpetual plotters. Something on the order of a million Guineans and more — a quarter or more of the population, by many estimates — fled into exile. The economy that France's withdrawal and counterfeiting had wounded, Touré's own doctrinaire socialism and his war on private trade finished, so that the country with the world's great bauxite reserves became, by the measures of the United Nations, one of the

poorest and least developed on earth. The man of the NON became, in the memory of his victims, the tyrant of Camp Boiro — and the war over his memory continues, the young of West Africa reclaiming him as the hero of dignity while the families of the dead watch the camp's evidence quietly removed. The apologist's sum is built from all of this, and it is simple: they were better off under France; the NON was folly; the proof is the camp and the exile and the ruin; native rule, given fully, failed.

This must be answered, and answered without flinching in either direction — without excusing Touré and without conceding the apologist's conclusion — and the study has laid the ground to do exactly that.

The first half of the answer concedes what is true, and concedes it fully, because the framework's own law demands it. Touré's tyranny was real, and it was his. The camp, the black diet, the fabricated plots, the ethnic persecution, the exile of a nation's fraction — these were not France's doing and cannot be laid at France's door, and the study that has traced the reversed robe to the root of Guinea's every misfortune must not now flinch from naming a Guinean tyranny a Guinean tyranny. Nor is it an aberration the framework failed to predict; it is the framework's grimmest law fulfilled to the letter. The Three Monopolies holds that the seam is never emptied, only re-occupied — that a subjugated people crossing a rupture finds, on the far side, a new coalition gathering the same three monopolies the old one held. Touré's regime is that law made flesh: the counter-elite that had used the residue of contestability to win independence, once it held the state, re-gathered the monopoly of violence, of wealth, and of trusted information into a single hand, and held them exactly as foreclosingly as France had, replacing the indigénat's public discipline with the camp's secret elimination. The liberty of Module 9 was the residue of the anti-colonial struggle, and it died with the struggle's victory, because the victor inherited the foreclosure it had fought and, having no faction left to bargain with, deposited no further residue and re-occupied the seam. This is not a refutation of the study; it is its confirmation at the harshest possible register, and it is named here in full.

The second half of the answer refuses the apologist's conclusion, and refuses it not by denying the ruin but by exposing the dishonest step in his sum — which is the step from "independence brought ruin" to "therefore the colony was better and should have stayed." That step fails, and the arithmetic this module has laid out is what makes it fail, because France was not a bystander to Guinea's ruin but

an author of it. The metropole that points to the wreck of independent Guinea as proof that independence fails is pointing at a wreck it helped cause and, in part, deliberately caused: the sudden total withdrawal that stripped the new state of its administration overnight, the counterfeit currency that wrecked its economy, the armed exiles and the attempted coups, the isolation that drove a cornered Touré toward the Soviet bloc and fed the siege-paranoia that filled the camp. A metropole that ruins the colony that leaves it, in order to make an example for the others, cannot then present the ruin as evidence that leaving was the error — for the ruin was the punishment for leaving, not the consequence of freedom, and to read the punishment as the verdict is to mistake the executioner's blow for a proof of the condemned man's guilt. This is the precise sense in which the apologist's sum is false: not that the camp and the exile and the poverty were not real — they were terribly real — but that they cannot be charged wholly to the account of independence when the metropole worked, by deliberate policy, to produce them. Lay it out honestly and the sum does not come to "France was better." It comes to something colder and sadder: that a colony which broke away whole was caught between two foreclosures — the parting blow of the metropole it left, and the re-gathering hand of the counter-elite it raised — and crushed between them.

## Reading convergence and divergence against the framework

Here is the refinement the case contributes, and it is the study's last. The framework holds that the seam is re-occupied and not emptied, and Guinea confirms it. But the comparison of the total-rupture cases — Guinea and Haiti — against the continuity cases — Morocco, and the other territories that voted OUI and stayed within the French sphere — yields a finding the corpus had not isolated: that a *total* rupture is structurally doubly cursed, and that its double curse is the true and sufficient explanation of the tragic pattern the framing of this module named — that the two French colonies which took the fullest independence and the fullest native rule, Haiti and Guinea, fared worst of all afterward.

The double curse is the joining of two position-logics that a clean break, and only a clean break, triggers together. On the departing side, the metropole makes an example of the breakaway, by the position-logic traced above: a power with other colonies to keep cannot let a clean break look costless, and so it punishes the

one that leaves — Haiti's indemnity, Guinea's sabotage — deliberately impairing the new state to deter the others. On the inheriting side, the counter-elite re-forecloses, by the position-logic of the Three Monopolies: having won the whole apparatus and faced no surviving faction to bargain with, it gathers the monopolies into its own hand and holds them as its predecessor did. A negotiated continuity escapes both. The metropole does not need to make an example of a colony that stays inside its sphere, because that colony is itself the counter-example, the demonstration that loyalty is rewarded; and the co-opted elite of a continuity does not re-foreclose from a standing start, because it never fought a total struggle to win the whole and never inherited an apparatus swept clean of every check. So Morocco keeps its sultan and its French capital and its place in the sphere, and prospers in the narrow material sense, because it was kept; and Guinea and Haiti, having taken everything, are punished for the taking and then re-foreclosed by their own victors, and are ruined. The correlation the apologist reads as "independence causes ruin" is real, but its cause is not independence. Its cause is that a total rupture is the one path that triggers both the metropole's parting example and the counter-elite's re-foreclosure at once — while the paths that fared better fared better because they were spared the first by staying and the second by never rupturing whole. The colonies that broke away most completely did worst, not because freedom fails, but because the clean break is caught between the two hands that a clean break, uniquely, brings down upon it.

And this closes the study's whole arc, because Guinea is the corpus's purest case of the reversed robe, and every extremity of its ending follows from that purity. It was held, more nakedly than any other case, by force without belief: the robe cut only for the metropole, the mass formed by the old order and offered nothing of France's to believe, the cost column filled by the indigénat and the corvée, the elite foreclosed by the doctrine that could not admit it. An order so purely held by force, and by nothing else, is an order with no defenders among the ruled — and such an order, the study has argued from its first module, is cheap to run and total in its collapse. So when the metropole's will emptied, Guinea did not fray at the edges as a believed order frays; it fell whole, in a single vote, because nothing among the ruled was holding it up. Its rupture was total because its holding had been total force and no belief. Its punishment was total — the example made most savagely of the colony that broke most cleanly — because the break was clean. And its re-foreclosure was total, the camp and the one-party state, because the counter-elite

inherited a state that had been held by force alone, with no tradition of contestability anywhere in its bones to restrain the hand that now held it. The cheapness that ran Guinea so quietly for sixty years is the same cheapness that made its ending so complete and so bitter: every dimension the study traced ran, in Guinea, to its extreme, because in Guinea the reversed robe was worn most purely of all.

What remains is to hold, at the last, the two truths the study has carried to its end, and to hold them without resolving the one into the other, because they do not resolve and the honesty of the whole depends on refusing to pretend they do. The first is that the NON was a real act of dignity, and that the dignity was not cancelled by what came after. A conquered people, formed for sixty years to be told they could never be equals, stood up in the last hour and said, in the words that a continent remembers, that there is no dignity without liberty and that they preferred poverty in freedom to riches in slavery — and they said it as equals, for the first and only time, to the face of the power that had ruled them, and they meant it, and more than a million of them voted it. That is a real thing, and it is honoured here without qualification. The second truth is that the freedom they chose became, within a few years, a poverty and an un-freedom together — the camp, the exile, the ruin — under a counter-elite that re-gathered the monopolies France had held, and with the deliberate help of a metropole that punished the leaving to warn the others. That is also a real thing, and it is named here without flinching. The dignity does not pardon the tyranny; the tyranny does not cancel the dignity; and the metropole's example does not excuse the tyranny but does forbid the apologist his conclusion, because a colony ruined on its way out, and punished for the crime of leaving, is not a proof that it should have stayed but a proof that its ruler would rather break it than release it. Guinea chose freedom and was made to pay for the choice twice — once to the metropole that punished the leaving, and once to the counter-elite that re-foreclosed the freedom — and the framework can explain, coldly and exactly, why both payments fell due. But the framework cannot tell the reader whether the dignity was worth the price, and it does not try. It lays out the arithmetic — the conquest and the peace, the forced labour and the roads, the NON and the camp, the metropole's example and the counter-elite's re-foreclosure — and it leaves the sum, as it has left every sum, to the reader. What it will say, and says as its last word, is that the sum is not the apologist's, and never can be; for a people held sixty years by force and no belief,

offered no share and no dignity until the decade they seized their own, and then punished into ruin for seizing it, have written an accounting in which the deepest entry is not their poverty and not even their tyranny, but the plain and terrible fact that the order which ruled them gave them, in all that time, nothing of itself worth keeping — and that this, and not their choosing to leave, is the thing that most needs explaining, and the thing this study has tried to explain.

## A note on sources.

The primary and load-bearing facts here are verified and, where drawn from modern scholarship, paraphrased and credited; contested figures are given as ranges. The Haiti indemnity — the ordinance of King Charles X of 1825 demanding 150 million gold francs (the sum on the order of ten times Haiti's annual revenue, comparable to the Louisiana purchase price) as compensation to the former slaveholders in exchange for recognition, delivered under the threat of a naval squadron; the resulting "double debt" and its consumption of roughly four-fifths of Haiti's wealth until final discharge in 1947 (the indemnity later reduced, with instalment terms revised in 1838) — follows the standard scholarship and the recent reference and journalistic literature (including the *New York Times* "Ransom" investigation and the bicentenary scholarship) and is given as reproduced there, the ordinance text being public domain. The characterisation of Saint-Domingue's rupture (the revolution of 1791–1804, the failed French reconquest, yellow fever, and Napoleon's abandonment of the American project) follows the corpus's own Saint-Domingue study and the standard scholarship. Morocco's continuity (rule through the preserved sultan, the order holding at decolonisation) follows the corpus's Morocco study. Guinea's vindictive decolonisation follows Modules 10 and 11. Opération Persil — the SDECE operation of 1959–1960, run from Senegal, arming and training Guinean exiles and manufacturing counterfeit Guinean banknotes (on the order of hundreds of millions of francs) to wreck the currency and destabilise the government, driving inflation past roughly two hundred per cent, and assessed by historians as a failure at regime change but a deliberate act of economic sabotage intended as a warning to the other territories — follows the standard reference literature (including the France–Guinea relations scholarship) and is given as reported. Camp Boiro (1960–1984) and the terror of the Touré regime — thousands imprisoned without trial,

forced confessions, deaths by execution and by the "black diet," the purge of ministers, opposition leaders, intellectuals and the president's own kin, and the persecution of the Fuuta Jalon Fulani — are given with death-toll estimates as a contested range (from roughly five thousand at the camp to as many as fifty thousand across the regime, per the divergent estimates in the reference literature and human-rights and press accounts), with the exile figure (on the order of a million or more) given as an estimate; the contested memory of Touré (national hero and dictator both) follows the recent reporting. The economic decline of independent Guinea follows the standard reference literature, with the framework's caution that its causes were multiple (the French withdrawal and sabotage, the Cold War isolation, and Touré's own doctrinaire policy). All framework language — convergence and divergence, the reversed robe, the cheap order held by force, the seam re-occupied and not emptied, position-logic and the default, and "legibility is not pardon" — is developed across the collection (*The Three Monopolies*, *By Default*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Cheapest Hold*, and the field manual, together with the Morocco and Saint-Domingue case studies) and named where used.